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Abstract
In  this  thesis  the  family  of  concepts,  including  characters,  traits  and  phenotypes  of 
organisms  is  analyzed  according  to  the  various  roles  these  concepts  play  in  different 
disciplines and in different historical periods. The ways the concepts are construed in order 
to fulfill these roles are spelled out in terms of the representational practices in which these 
concepts  are  embedded.  In  particular,  I  will  look  at  classical  genetics,  in  the  period 
spanning  from Mendel  to  Morgan,  and  compare  the  character  concept  that  gradually 
developed  in  this  period,  and  which  I  characterize  as  a  thin  concept,  meaning  that 
characters appear as values of variables that are represented in articulated symbol systems, 
with a thick concept of parts, properties and processes as it prevails in anatomy, physiology 
and embryology. In order to illustrate that both concepts still  play their role in modern 
biology  and  to  address  the  question  of  their  possible  integration,  I  will,  by  way  of 
conclusion, briefly look at current developmental genetics.
I introduce the topic of organismal characters by pointing out that characters are such an 
important category in the life sciences, as well as in broader social contexts, because the 
parts and properties of organisms they specify can be seen as the interfaces between human 
interests and organisms, including humans themselves. Since from the plurality of interests 
results  a  plurality  of  character  concepts,  I  will  address  the  general  issue  of  scientific 
pluralism in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 and 3 introduce the methodological concepts necessary 
to  analyze  the  representational  practices  that  embody  the  various  character  concepts. 
Representation will be characterized as having a systemic structure, in which alternatives 
of  labels  are  coordinated  with  alternatives  of  referents.  The  notions  of  thick  and  thin 
phenomena  that  mark  an  important  difference  in  character  concepts,  and  the  idea  of 
syntactically  and  semantically  dense  or  articulated  symbol  systems  on  which  the 
distinction is  based,  will  be introduced here.  Furthermore,  a notion of practice will  be 
developed that  relates actions to symbol systems. Chapters 4,  5,  6 and the Conclusion 
contain the discussion of the character concepts in the disciplines taken into consideration.
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Introduction: Characters as Interfaces Between Organisms and Human Interests
Science  and  signs  are  inseparably  interconnected,  since  science  both 
presents men with more reliable signs and embodies its results in systems 
of  signs.  Human  civilization  is  dependent  upon  signs  and  systems  of 
signs, and the human mind is inseparable from the functioning of signs. 
(Charles Morris [1938] 1971, 17)
Some concept of a character, trait or phenotype, or parts, properties or capacities of an 
organism by any other name (e.g.  homology, adaptation, organ, behavior, etc.),  plays a 
central  role  in  almost  every  branch  of  the  life  sciences.  In  taxonomy  organisms  are 
classified according to their similarity or disparity with respect to certain characters. In 
evolutionary ecology organisms are considered to be adapted to certain environments in 
that  they  possess  certain  characters.  In  developmental  biology parts  and  properties  of 
organisms are studied as outcomes of developmental processes. In genetics the characters 
appear as inherited from the parental generation. Also in today’s molecular biology, the 
understanding and manipulation of the organism’s pathological or desirable traits is the 
ultimate  motivation  for  research.  And  even  in  the  behavioral  sciences,  the  objects  of 
investigation are often treated as characters of organisms.
This ubiquity of character concepts does not come as a surprise, given that humans have 
vital interest in organisms, including themselves. Organisms are predators, prey, pathogens 
and pets, tools, food and goods, they are the source as much for inspiring fiction as for 
interesting  facts  and,  most  notably,  being  an  organism  is  one  aspect  of  human  self-
understanding.  Characters  can  be said to  be  the interfaces  between the  various  human 
interests  and the integrated whole of the organism, they are the relevant aspects of an 
organism in a given situation. Therefore, to study the way parts, properties and capacities 
of organisms are conceived should be the right angle to understand the interests that drive 
particular  human  practices,  inside  and outside  the  sciences.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that 
characters play a role in so many contexts makes them the ideal focal point for questions 
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concerning  the  relations  between  scientific  disciplines,  for  instance,  with  respect  to 
reduction,  integration or uncircumventable plurality.  In addition, it  allows philosophers, 
historians and sociologists to address the question how the life sciences are influenced by 
broader social issues, and how those are in turn affected by scientific results.
My interest in the concept family of characters, traits and phenotypes originated from 
assisting in the editing of  the book “Heredity  Produced,” by Staffan Müller-Wille  and 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (2007). In their introduction to the volume the editors put forward 
the thesis that “the knowledge regime of heredity started to unfold where people, objects, 
and relationships among them were set into motion” on a global level, due to the exchange 
of  goods,  colonialism and industrialization around the mid-eighteenth century (Müller-
Wille and Rheinberger 2007, 16). Another way to put this is to say that the cultural history 
of heredity is a history of characters becoming visible. Plants and animals were brought 
home from expeditions, were imported or exported from and to colonized territories and, 
unfortunately,  also humans were objects of this  trade business. New organisms entered 
agriculture  and  breeding  and  racial  systems  were  established  to  organize  the  colonial 
societies. At the same time, legal systems became more elaborated and with them notions 
of kinship and ways to track genealogies. Also medicine became more institutionalized and 
relied  increasingly  on  statistical  tools.  All  these  developments  materialized  in  various 
practices and new ways of representation and, above all, enabled new contrasts between 
organisms and within organisms. The new contexts and the associated practices rendered 
certain parts and properties of organisms visible and turned them into characters. 
A trait, or character, is any part or property of an organism that plays a role in certain 
cultural  contexts  or  practices,  including particular  scientific  interests.  In  the  history of 
heredity, the focus lies on the fact that once they are recognised, characters can be tracked 
along the generations. Doing so is to establish a concept of heredity. But there are other 
roles that characters play. For instance, one might say, once they are recognized one can 
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ask  questions  about  their  function,  or  wonder  how  they  arise  from  the  apparently 
homogeneous mass of the early embryo. 
Given the relevance of character concepts, it is remarkable how little there has been 
written about the issue from a general perspective. Of course, there is much literature about 
characters in their particular roles, concerning some roles more than others. Insofar, the 
literature that has to be taken into account to provide a more synoptic view would be vast.  
Since in this thesis, I take a more narrow view myself, I will only give a brief overview on 
what  types  of texts are  available.  Homology and adaptation are examples of  character 
concepts that are widely discussed (see e.g. Griffiths and Brigandt, eds. 2007; Forber, ed. 
2009, for recent special issues about these topics in a philosophical journal). Systematicists 
in general have the most explicit discussions about the characters, because what counts as a 
character, but also how characters are weighted, determines their proposed taxonomy (see 
e.g. Ghiselin 1984; Colless 1985; Richards 2003). And they are most likely to use the term, 
because it entered modern biology via natural history. A notable collection that takes a 
broader perspective on characters in development and evolution is provided by Wagner 
(ed.  2001).  Much of the literature by biologists,  as well  as philosophers,  is  normative, 
though, in the sense that it argues for a particular understanding of a concept in a given 
field.  My concern  is  rather  descriptive.  I  want  to  analyse  how character  concepts  are 
construed in the disciplines I look at in certain historical periods. With respect to genetics 
and development, much writing focuses on the concept of the gene, but since the issue is 
intrinsically  connected  to  the  concept  of  a  character,  trait  or  phenotype,  this  literature 
contains much discussion on those concepts as well (see e.g. Beurton et al., eds. 2000). The 
contribution to the history and philosophy of characters in genetics, which is probably most 
closely related to my project, has been made by Sara Schwartz (1998).1 Another notable 
article on traits in genetics is Falk (1991). Not everywhere, where parts and properties of 
1 The text is an unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Since the thesis is written in Hebrew, my knowledge of the work is 
restricted to an extended English abstract and those parts that were published as articles (Schwartz 2000,  
2002). I thank Sara Schwartz for sending me the abstract.
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organisms are considered, the terms “character” or “trait” are used, e.g. in anatomy and 
physiology,  organisms are  dissected,  literally and conceptually,  in  terms of  organs  and 
capacities. Winther (2006) is an important contribution to the study of those disciplines that 
investigate body parts.
It is impossible in the scope of this thesis to investigate the roles characters play in all 
disciplines and social contexts at all times in history. But I see the thesis as part of the 
larger project to map at least a large part of that territory. Here, I restrict myself to taking a 
closer  look  at  the  role  of  characters  in  the  study  of  heredity  in  the  context  of  its 
“disciplining” (Rheinberger and Müller-Wille 2009, 169). In particular, in Chapter 6, I will 
center on Wilhelm Johannsen’s phenotype concept (1909), in order to show how thick and 
thin  interpretations  of  characters  were  negotiated  in  genetics.  I  will  introduce  the 
distinction  in  Chapters  3  and  4,  but  roughly  speaking,  thick  characters  are  parts  of 
organisms in their morphological detail, while thin characters are abstract variables. I will 
follow the trajectory from Mendel’s introduction of thin characters (1866) in contrasts to 
the  Darwinian-biometrician  thick  notion  of  variation,  via  Bateson’s  interpretation  of 
Mendel’s  model  in  terms  of  characters  as  parts  (unit-characters)  that  fall  somewhat  in 
between  a  thick  and  a  thin  interpretation,  from  the  perspective  of  Johannsen’s 
interpretation of Mendelian characters. Johannsen embraces a thin character concept in his 
rejection of gradual variation and criticizes the morphological unit-character concept. He 
distinguishes between thin properties as the appropriate category for genetics and thick 
morphological parts as the result  of epigenetic development.  Morgan and his followers 
(1915, 1926) can be seen as completing the thinning of characters in genetics and reducing 
their role to mere data for chromosome level processes. I will argue that, in the light of the 
distinction  between  thick  and thin  characters,  the  so-called  separation  of  genetics  and 
development appears differently from how it is usually interpreted.
In order to make the distinction more clear, I will show in Chapter 5 how anatomy and 
classical embryology deal with thick notions of parts and processes that bring them about. I 
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will  also  take  the  opportunity,  to  discuss  the  plurality  of  decompositions  in  those 
disciplines that operate with thick characters (Winther 2006) and the role of function in the 
individuation of parts in biology (Laubichler 1999).
In Chapter 4, I set the stage for the discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 by giving a brief  
overview  on  the  history  and  etymology  of  the  relevant  terms  and  introducing  the 
conceptual  distinction between characters  as parts  and characters as variables that take 
different values (Colless 1985).
What is needed to analyse the way characters are conceived in different contexts, is an 
account  on  human  practice  in  general  and scientific  practice  in  particular.  Although a 
linguistic, pictorial, or generally semiotic turn, as well as a material or practical turn in the 
study of  science has  often  been called  for  or  declared  by philosophers,  historians  and 
sociologists  of  science,  it  is  still  difficult  to  find  the  analytic  instruments  to  represent 
representation  as  the  result  of  certain  activities  and at  the  same time  as  informing or 
motivating action and behavior. The reason is that philosophers and linguists often have 
developed elaborate formal theories of representation, sometimes also indicating a role for 
action in such theories, but did not care much about the applicability of such theories to 
actual practical contexts. On the other hand, most historians of science are concerned with 
the  details  and  specificity  of  their  case.  They  provide  sensitive  and  fine-grained 
descriptions  of  representations  and practices,  but  usually have  little  interest  in  making 
general claims about scientific practice. For those philosophers and historians who hover in 
between these two approaches and hope to catch some generalizable pattern in scientific 
practice that is still  informed by and capable to inform the particular cases, it  is  often 
difficult to find the right balance between principles and details. In the first part of this 
thesis  I  attempt  to  sketch  an  account  of  scientific  practice.  I  say  “account”  and  not 
“theory,”  because  I  conceive  of  such  an  endeavor  as  enabling  scholars  of  science  to 
describe practices and the representations they are related to, to track their transposition 
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and  transformation  between  disciplines  and  across  times,  instead  of  defining  what  a 
practice or representation is. In a nutshell, the argument I develop is the following.
Scientific  results  necessarily take some semiotic  form. Also characters  will  in  some 
form be named, described, depicted or pointed out. I will argue for an understanding of 
representation, where the entities scientists deal with, as any entity any person recognizes 
as existing, has to be understood as part of the symbol system in which it is represented, 
instead of thinking about things in the world as pre-delineated and perceived as such, that 
get labelled, drawn, photographed or described, or in any other way re-presented. I find in 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1959) a thinker who has forcefully argued that in semiotic systems, 
the units are delimited through the other units in the system and that this applies as much to 
the representing sign-vehicles as to what is represented. Saussure, however, in rejecting the 
image of words labelling given things in the world, conceives of words or other sign-
vehicles as not representing things in the world at all, but relating to concepts. I will recruit  
Hilary Putnam (1975) to make the point that one has to bite the bullet, especially when 
talking  about  scientific  representations,  and  admit  that  words  and  other  forms  of 
representation are about the world. If terms like “gold” and “tiger,” but also “eye” and 
“red,” are not taken as referring to things in the world, the account cannot be adequate to 
describe  the  way  language  and  other  semiotic  systems  are  used  in  science.  Putnam, 
however,  misses  the systemic character  of  language and thus  his  theory lends  itself  to 
essentialist interpretations. Instead, a view is needed in which things become individuated 
within the semiotic system in which they are represented.
In  the  light  of  the  discussion  of  structuralist  and  extensionalist  approaches,  Nelson 
Goodman’s theory of symbols (1976) seems to do justice to the requirements for a theory 
of  representation  that  is  useful  to  describe  the  practice  of  science.  First,  Goodman’s 
account is extensional; labels denote things in the world. Second, it is systemic, in that it  
describes labels as parts of sets of alternatives that organize a realm of things such that it 
becomes partitioned or classified.  A scheme of labels and the realm it  organizes are  a 
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symbol system in which the units gain their significance in that they delimit each other. 
Third, things are not only individuated within symbol systems, but they can themselves 
figure as symbols, as exemplars that refer to labels and thus indirectly to other things. 
Fourth,  Goodman  takes  into  account  non-linguistic  symbols,  and  with  the  notions  of 
syntactic and semantic density or differentiatedness provides precise tools for the analysis 
of different forms of representation.
However,  Goodman,  as  the  other  authors  discussed,  does  not  explain  how  symbol 
systems come into being. This is even more regrettable since on this account, — and this is 
especially important in the study of science, — the individuation of things depends on the 
introduction  of  symbol  systems,  which  must  happen  through  some  form  of  activity. 
Furthermore, actions usually relate to given things, represented in some symbol system, in 
one way or the other and thus they must relate to symbol systems. I therefore attempt in 
Chapter  3  to  develop  a  notion  of  practice  that  describes  actions  coming  in  sets  of 
alternatives as well, that either map on systems of labels that organize a realm, or sort a 
realm themselves. To describe the relation between the objects in a realm and the actions, 
analogue to exemplificational reference in the case of labels, I introduce James Gibson’s 
concept of affordance (1986). 
I  further  describe  a  particular  kind of  actions  that  are  capable  to  introduce  symbol 
systems; these might be called epistemic actions. Since such systems consist of schemes of 
labels or behaviors that organize a realm into ranges of extension, such actions must have a 
contrastive nature. They must introduce a difference between the objects in the realm. I 
discuss  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (esp.  1953),  David  Gooding  (1990)  and  Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger (1997), in order to understand ostensive definitions as procedures of that kind, 
which  can  also  include  difference-introducing  interventions.  Those  interventions  that 
explicitly  aim  at  detecting  differences  in  the  causal  relations  between  objects,  I  call 
experiments and I use Woodward’s (e.g. 2008) counterfactual-interventionist approach to 
emphasise  their  contrastive  nature.  Such  contrastive  procedures  can  be  further 
12
distinguished in those that aim at attributing parts and properties to an object and those that 
aim at  classification  or  partitioning  of  objects  according  to  their  parts  and  properties. 
Additionally,  contrastive  procedures  can  be  used  to  introduce  new  differences  or  to 
demonstrate known classification or partitioning schemes.
Scientific phenomena become represented when they are made perceptible as different 
from  something  else,  that  is,  as  part  of  a  symbol  system  and  through  a  contrastive 
procedure. The contrastive constellation of material, including the phenomenon itself, is a 
representation of the phenomenon (Rheinberger 1997; Gooding 1990). But the procedure 
can  also  bring  about  various  other  forms  of  representations,  such  as  diagrammatic  or 
photographic images. Furthermore, within the system, the phenomenon can be represented 
by a label, a behavior or by its causes or effects, if causal differences are highlighted.  
These  different  forms  of  representation  can  be  dense  or  differentiated.  Phenomena 
represented in differentiated symbol systems are taken as units and afford certain actions as 
such. In these cases I speak of thin phenomena. Concerning epistemic actions, they afford 
external contrasts, that is contrasts between the realm they are part of and another realm. A 
representation in a dense symbol system can always be interpreted under a differentiated 
scheme. But if a phenomenon is represented in a dense symbol system, it affords different 
actions than a thin phenomenon. In particular, it affords internal contrasts, in which the 
phenomenon itself is the realm that gets organized by a scheme in the course of contrastive 
procedures.  I  speak  of  thick  phenomena  here.  As  indicated  above,  this  distinction  is 
relevant in the investigation of character concepts. The question always has to be: What is 
the contrastive procedure? That is,  what is contrasted (organisms with organisms, parts 
with parts, effects with effects) and which method is used to introduce differences (e.g. 
looking under  a microscope,  touching,  staining,  irritating,  manipulating)?  What  are  the 
syntactic  and  semantic  properties  of  the  representations  produced  (such  as  exemplars, 
photographs, diagrams, names), that is, of the symbol systems to which they belong? And 
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what do the represented phenomena afford (e.g. further contrast, e.g. of organisms with 
organisms or parts with parts, or any other action such as selecting, eating, selling etc.)?
The  account  of  practice  and  representation  offered  suits  the  plurality  of  character 
concepts alluded to above. Characters can play various roles according to the context. They 
can  be  desired  or  unwanted,  explained  or  explaining  and  classified  or  used  in 
classifications. Different roles will be associated with different contrastive procedures and 
representations  and  lead  to  different  ways  to  divide  the  organisms  into  parts  or  to 
determine properties or capacities. In Chapter 1, I will take a general philosophical position 
concerning the interpretation of such plurality in the sciences. I will defend a version of 
pluralism, which I refer to as anthropocentric pluralism and which I see in accord with 
Goodman’s pluralism (1983, 1978). Since proper monists are hard to find, at least in the 
philosophy of the life sciences, I will specify my view in opposition not to a monistic 
position, but to a different view of pluralism, which I find to be almost consensus in the 
field. The view can be characterized as grounding scientific pluralism in the complexity of 
the living world, which is usually taken as a fundamental property of this domain that 
derives from the evolutionary process. Instead, I maintain that pluralism stems from the 
open  nature  of  human  practices,  which  allows  for  always-new  contrasts  and  thus 
representations through transporting and transforming natural material and relating it to 
artifacts and cultural concepts.
The sentence that serves as a motto of this Introduction was written by  Charles William 
Morris in his Foundations of the Theory of Signs, his contribution to the Encyclopedia of  
the Unified Sciences. While I deny the possibility of a unification of the sciences, as the 
editors of the Encyclopedia envisioned it, and advocate a disunity of science instead, I 
embrace  the  possibility  of  achieving  some  unification  in  the  description  of  scientific 
practice. Morris’ claim  subsumes  scientific  observation,  the  “reliable  signs,”  and  the 
formulation of results in the form of images, diagrams and language, under the things that 
14
can be described by semiotics. Semiotics thereby promises a unified description of science. 
It  does so,  however,  only if  action is  seen as  part  and parcel  of  the semiotic  process. 
Experimental interventions and the use of language do no longer appear as separate realms, 
but are both described as semiotic processes. Characters must be seen as appearing in such 
semiotic processes.
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PART  I.  FOUNDATIONAL  ISSUES:  PLURALISM,  REPRESENTATION  AND 
PRACTICE
Chapter 1. Pluralism: Complexity and Human Practices
Chapter Introduction
The zoologist Olivier Rieppel writes: 
The notion of what a ‘character’ is will vary with the perspective from which a 
character is being analysed. An embryologist will have a different notion of a 
character than a systematist,  and an ecologist  may look at  ‘characters’ in  a 
somewhat different way than a functional anatomist. (Rieppel 2001, 59) 
A “different notion” of a character can be understood as the different relations the term 
holds to other notions that are relevant to a given perspective, while a different perspective 
can  be  spelled  out  in  terms  of  observational  practices  and  the  overall  goals  of  the 
respective disciplines. 
What is expressed here is a pluralist account of characters, according to which the way 
characters are individuated depends on the interest  and practice of a discipline.  How a 
notion of character, and the particular character categories it identifies, arises in the context 
of  the  disciplinary  perspectives  of  classical  embryology,  genetics  and  modern 
developmental genetics is the subject of the thesis. Anatomy in the broadest sense plays a 
role in all disciplines and will therefore be discussed as well.  Other disciplines such as 
systematics and ecology are not considered in the scope of this thesis.2 By showing how 
2 A caveat is in place here. The term “discipline” invokes the impression that perspectives are fixed, that 
there  is  a  limited number  of  interests  that  map on  different  aspects  of  organisms,  the  domain  of  the 
disciplines, which defines the disciplinary boundaries. It is a consequence of plurality that this is not the 
case.  The juxtaposition of  embryology,  genetics  and developmental  genetics  already makes  clear  that, 
historically speaking, interests and methods merge and divide and give rise to ever new perspectives. But  
even within what we perceive as a discipline at a given time, many strongly diverging perspectives might 
exist in parallel. As much as I don’t want to commit myself to the existence of separate domains, I am not  
regarding disciplines as institutional entities, because those are also obviously subject to change. I still use  
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character categories arise in the context of other concepts and the material practice of these 
disciplines, it should be possible to draw some general conclusions about what it means 
that categories arise in the context of certain interests and practices. By showing that the 
disciplines indeed have very different  notions of character and that  the categories  they 
define depend on the specific contexts in which they are meaningful, pluralism should be 
indirectly justified. Before I turn to the analysis of the plurality of character concepts in 
biology, I should say some words about the concept of plurality in philosophy itself. I will  
present a particular view of pluralism in contrast, not to monism, but mainly to another 
form pluralism, which I diagnose to be common to most writers in philosophy of the life 
sciences.
Pluralism
Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino and Kenneth Waters, in the introduction to an anthology 
on “Scientific Pluralism” (Kellert et al. 2006), make a distinction between plurality in, and 
pluralism about  the  sciences.  The  former  is  hard  to  deny.  There  is  obviously  a  great 
diversity of scientific representations, classifications, theories and explanations, some of 
which  are  seen  as  applying  to  different  domains,  some  as  concerning  the  same 
phenomenon. Monism is characterized by Kellert et al. as the position which holds that 
“the nature of the world is such that it can, at least in principle, be completely described or 
explained by [...] a single, complete, and comprehensive account of the natural world (or 
the part of the world investigated by the science) based on a single set of fundamental 
principles.” (Kellert et al. 2006, x) This view also entails that there is a method of inquiry 
through which such an account is established. Methods, representations, classifications, 
theories and explanations are evaluated with respect to their contribution to the quest for 
such  a  unified  account.  It  seems  that  the  attenuator  “at  least  in  principle”  is  deemed 
the term to indicate broad differences between perspectives, because no more fine-grained term, such as 
research programme etc. would be more precise. The point is that the boundaries have to be determined on 
a case by case basis.
17
necessary  because  such  an  account  could  be  too  complicated  to  handle  in  practice. 
Physicalism, for instance, is a form of monism, but a complete physical description of the 
world,  even if  there would be such a thing,  would not be feasible for achieving many 
practical  goals,  and even as  a  description,  devoid  of  any application,  it  would  not  be 
possible to handle for human minds. Nevertheless, for a physicalist other descriptions are 
mere short cuts to explain specific phenomena that would still be fully explained only in 
physical terms and their physical basis should also explain why they can be captured by 
such short cuts. 
The bracketed alternative in Kellert et al.’s definition of monism — single accounts for 
a “part of the world,” — is meant to address positions that acknowledge that there might be 
different domains of phenomena in the world (e.g. living vs. non living, or organic vs. 
mental),  that  require  different  and specific  scientific  accounts,  but  that  for  every such 
domain  there  is  a  single,  complete,  and  comprehensive  account.  This  view  can  be 
described as a form of pluralism, because it denies the reducibility of all phenomena to one 
set of fundamental principles, but it may also be called “domain-monism.”
Kellert et al. describe pluralism as a position that acknowledges that there is no a priori 
reason to believe that there is such a unitary account, not even with respect to separate 
domains of phenomena. They emphasize, however, that there is equally no a priori reason 
to  deny that  a  unitary account  can  be  found,  at  least  with  respect  to  partial  domains. 
Therefore, they describe their view as the “pluralist stance” (Kellert et al. 2006, xiii). This 
position is open to unification, if it is empirically justified, but guards against a hastened 
move towards unification on the basis of a metaphysical assumption that runs the risk of 
overlooking important differences, or neglecting scientific approaches that lie outside the 
scientific mainstream, a strategy, which could be detrimental to science (Kellert et al. 2006, 
xii). 
This view is different from a view that embraces diversity in the sciences only for the 
reason that it makes the occurrence of a successful unificatory account more likely, and 
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which Sandra Mitchell summarizes as holding that it is a “rational strategy to adopt for the 
scientific community as a whole in order to hedge its bets against empirical uncertainty” 
(Mitchell 2002, 56). This view, of course, would ultimately be a form of monism. Kellert et 
al., instead, see a real possibility that a unified account might not be available. But the 
latter conclusion is to be drawn on an empirical basis: “The only way to determine whether 
a part of the world will require a plurality of accounts is to examine the empirical results of 
scientific research of that part of the world.” (Kellert et al. 2006, xxiii) 
It remains unclear, however, how the success of unification, or the need for plurality is 
decided  empirically,  that  is,  what  would  be  evidence  for  a  legitimate  unification  or  a 
justified plurality? Would it be evidence that supports some principle of identity of entities 
from  different  domains,  e.g.  brain  functions  and  mental  states?  It  is  clear  that  such 
evidence is only evidence in the context of a particular theory that incorporates the identity 
principle, and which therefore is an competing alternative to the separate theories related to 
the different domains, rather than a justification for replacing them, because they instead 
have their own criteria to decide what counts as evidence. Or is the evidence for or against 
unification historical evidence on the social success or lack thereof of unitary theories? If 
conflicting, or, at least alternative views are maintained in parallel by different groups, this 
would be evidence that they are not unifiable, whereas the closure of controversies or the 
extinction of alternative accounts would be evidence for the legitimacy of unification. But 
history shows that unification is often only transitory and that new alternatives emerge. 
And not rarely, it is even the old alternatives that arise in new guise. From their text it  
appears as if Kellert et al. think of the empirical evidence that justifies unification or the 
maintenance of plurality, respectively, as the practical success of some theories (making 
good  predictions,  allowing  for  intended  interventions  etc.).  If  a  unified  view is  more 
successful  in  this  sense,  it  should  replace  alternative  views.  If  those,  however,  yield 
practical knowledge that is lost in the unified account, they should prevail. But practical 
success is always restricted to particular needs (e.g. medical cure) and the success with 
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respect to one need does not entail that the same account facilitates practical success with 
respect to other needs. That is, the success of a unified neurological theory of the mental 
and the organic with respect to some surgical or chemical intervention on mental disease 
would not  entail  the successful  application of  this  theory in  other  cases  where  mental 
categories are used, say in legal contexts. This is not a problem for the pluralist stance, 
because here the need for pluralism would be empirically justified. The real problem is that 
if separate accounts are abandoned because of a unified account is useful in all fields of 
application  of  the  particular  theories,  it  will  never  be  known if  they would  have  had 
applications under new circumstances and the circumstances always change.
Even if it does not become clear how exactly it is decided on empirical grounds whether 
unification is possible or not, the important point with respect to the kind of pluralism I 
wish to defend in this chapter is that Kellert et al. see the reason for the plurality in science 
and  the  possibility  that  unification  might  turn  out  to  be  impossible,  at  least  in  some 
domains,  in  the complexity of the world:  “It  appears  that  some parts  of the world (or 
situations  in  the  world)  are  such  that  a  plurality  of  accounts  or  approaches  will  be 
necessary for answering all the questions we have about those parts or situations.” (Kellert 
et al. 2006, xxii) With respect to the world’s “being such that,” they explain, that there 
might be different reasons for different parts of the world. With reference to some of the 
case studies collected in their anthology, Kellert et al. gesture towards “the complexity of 
the  phenomena—whether  associated  with  crossing  levels  of  organization  or  multiple 
factors within the same level of organization” (Kellert et al. 2006, xvi), as one reason. They 
also name different “explanatory interests,” but the way they put it, a plurality of interests 
has to be understood as resulting from the fact that the “parts of the world in question are  
such” that we have different interests concerning it.
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Complexity
Complexity, by Kellert et al. and many other authors, is taken as a fact about the world. 
Therefore, a plurality of scientific accounts must co-exist to explain the different aspects of 
the complex world. Mitchell, for instance, writes:
This  ‘fact’ of  pluralism,  on the  face  of  it,  seems to  be  correlated  not  with 
maturity of the discipline, but with the complexity of the subject matter. Thus 
the diversity of views found in contemporary science is not an embarrassment 
or sign of failure, but rather the product of scientists doing what they must do 
to produce effective science. Pluralism reflects complexity. (Mitchell 2002, 55)
Also Ronald Giere, in his contribution to the anthology edited by Kellert et al., expresses a 
similar view:
Complexity raises more serious issues in biology. In this respect, biology may 
provide a better paradigm for the sciences than does fundamental physics. Here 
the  traditional  way  of  dealing  with  the  overall  complexity  of  biological 
phenomena has  been to  distinguish  levels  of  organization:  molecules,  cells, 
organs,  whole  organisms.  The same strategy is  used  in  the social  sciences: 
individuals,  small  groups,  communities,  corporations,  nation  states.  Even  a 
metaphysical  materialist  who  presumes  that  there  is  ultimately  nothing  but 
elementary particles must agree that  there is  little  hope of finding a usable 
reductive  theory  in  either  biology  or  the  social  sciences.  So  models  are 
constructed  at  various  levels,  resulting  in  a  pluralism  of  perspectives  at 
different levels.  [...]  It seems an understatement to say that this plurality of 
perspectives at different levels is just a pragmatic response to complexity. It 
looks  to  be  a  more  fundamental  and  relatively  permanent  feature  of  the 
biological and social sciences. (Giere 2006, 34)
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Kellert et al., Mitchell, and Giere, all emphasize that different models are still models of 
one single phenomenon, or that different perspectives are still  perspectives on a single 
world. I see two fundamental problems with putting things like this.
First, complexity cannot be taken as a fact about the world. It is just another human 
concept.  It  comes  with  particular  representations  — representations  that  represent  the 
world  as  complex.  These  representations  can  be  many kinds  of  things,  from pictorial 
diagrams to linguistic metaphors, and the talk of “levels of organisation” is part of these 
representations  of  complexity.  Thus,  I  think,  it  is  necessary  to  exchange  the  claim of 
Kellert et al. that “parts of the world (or situations in the world) are such that a plurality of 
accounts or approaches will be necessary for answering all the questions we have about 
those parts or situations” by the claim that humans “are such that a plurality of accounts or 
approaches will be necessary for answering all the questions we have about those parts or 
situations.” I will argue for that view below.
Second, if  the different  models,  representations and perspectives are  versions of the 
world,  “we cannot test a version by comparing it with a world undescribed, undepicted, 
unperceived”  (Goodman  1978,  4).  Thus  the  notion  of  “the  world”  of  which  different 
versions exist becomes devoid of meaning. The only thing that can be said is that the claim 
that two representations are representations of the same phenomenon amounts to having a 
representation that represents the two representations as being representations of the same 
phenomenon. These points  are,  of course,  rather  fundamental,  touching on the core of 
philosophical epistemology. And the authors discussed are certainly aware of the problem 
and  develop  sophisticated  arguments  to  defend  their  respective  views  against  this 
objection.
As I will specify below, I will opt for an anthropocentric pluralism, which holds that ever-
new worlds are generated through human practice, as opposed to a view where a certain 
number of perspectives are required due to the complexity of the world. The diversity of 
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interests, accordingly, is not imposed upon humans by the complexity of the parts of the 
world they have interests in, but comes with the diversification of human practice. Before I 
further elaborate this position, I shall discuss some alternative views, to clarify why I deem 
such a strong anthropocentrism necessary.
Kellert et al. seem to read John Dupré as holding a position similar to the one I wish to put 
forward, when they write: “According to his ‘promiscuous realism,’ there are an indefinite 
number of ways of individuating and classifying the objects in the world, each of which is 
responsive to different interests, and no one of which is more correct than the others.” 
(Kellert et al. 2006, xiii) A closer reading, however, reveals that Dupré does not hold the 
kind of anthropocentric pluralism envisioned here, but, instead, is in line with the positions 
discussed above that ground pluralism in the complexity of the world. His pluralism as 
well  as  his  antireductionism are  ultimately  justified  by  the  fact  of  complexity  in  the 
biological  world.  On pluralism he writes:  “It  is  that  the complexity and variety of the 
biological world is such that only a pluralistic approach is likely to prove adequate for its  
investigation.” (Dupré 1993, 53) And with respect to reductionism he states: “I suspect that 
the complex interdependencies of entities at many different levels of structural complexity 
characteristic  of  biology  is  sufficient  to  show  the  implausibility  of  the  reductionistic 
project.” (Dupré 1993, 103)
The impression that Dupré grounds his pluralism in an anthropocentristic way in human 
interests stems from the structure of his argument. Dupré begins with the observation that 
ordinary language classifies organisms quite differently from scientific taxonomy. There is, 
for instance, no term in ordinary language co-extensive with “angiosperms” (an ordinary 
language term would be “flowering plants”, but this is neither a commonly used category, 
nor is it likely to be understood as having the same extension as “angiosperms,” but would 
probably be understood as co-extensive with “flowers”). Instead, there is the category tree, 
which includes, for instance, oak trees and pine trees, where the former, but not the latter 
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would fall under scientific category angiosperm. Dupré comments: “for most purposes it is 
much more relevant whether something is or is not a tree than whether its seeds develop in 
an  ovary.”  (Dupré  1993,  35)  Thus ordinary language and scientific  taxonomy produce 
conflicting classifications. Furthermore, there are areas of specialization other than science 
that produce very specific classifications of organisms. Dupré gives the example of the 
category of cedars, which does not correspond to any category in taxonomy, but classifies 
a  kind  of  timber  for  the  purposes  of  timber  merchants  and carpenters.  None of  these 
classifications is in itself better or worse, they apply in their context, but not in others. 
Dupré then moves on in his argumentation to show that even in scientific taxonomy 
distinctions are drawn with respect to different purposes. Interest in ecology as opposed to 
evolutionary history, for instance, will lead to the preference of a concept of species as 
classes as opposed to species as individuals (Dupré 1993, 42). Furthermore, it could favour 
morphological criteria as opposed to phylogenetic criteria for classification (Dupré 1993, 
45). Within a phylogenetic taxonomy (cladistics), it could motivate a divergence from the 
cladistic orthodoxy, for instance, to rescue the distinction between reptiles and aves that is 
not preserved by the strict application of cladistic criteria (Dupré 1993, 49).
Despite this emphasis on different interests, Dupré shares the view characterized above, 
that parts of the world, such as the domain of organisms, are such that they can give rise to  
a variety of human interests. And the property that makes parts of the world amenable to a 
plurality of interests is their complexity, the fact that they are not the product of a uniform 
process, governed by a single law, but in the case of organisms, of the process of evolution 
that necessarily produces heterogeneity. It is complexity that fosters different interests, not 
different interests that make the world appear complex. In contrast to this view, I content 
that pluralism grounds in the plurality of interests, in the complexity of human practice.
The fact that Dupré’s pluralism is not anthropocentric in this sense does not so much 
show in his use of the label “realism,” which after all does not mean much, but in his 
maintenance of the classical distinction between natural and artificial classifications. Carl 
24
Gustav Hempel rejects the notion of essential characteristics that distinguish natural from 
artificial  classifications.  Instead  he  offers  as  the  “rational  core”  of  the  distinction  “the 
consideration that in so called natural classifications the determining characteristics are 
associated, universally or in a high percentage of all cases, with other characteristics, of 
which they are logically independent.” (Hempel 1952, 53) Accordingly, he states that the 
distinction  between natural  and  artificial  classifications  is  a  matter  of  degree.  He also 
derives  a  form of  pluralism from this  observation,  when  he  claims  that  “a  particular 
classification may well prove ‘natural’ for the purposes of biology; others maybe fruitful 
for psychology or sociology, etc., and each of them would presumably be of little use in 
some of these contexts.” (Hempel 1952, 54) Whether a classification is fruitful, for Hempel 
is  an  empirical  question,  where  the  number  of  predictions  and deductions  that  can  be 
drawn from the classification are the empirical measure of its naturalness. Even though 
Hempel  denies  the  reality  of  essential  characteristics,  he  still  suggests  that  those 
characteristics  that  yield  fruitful  classifications  mark  real  boundaries  in  nature,  which 
explain the fruitfulness. A classification “of humans according to the first letter in their 
given names, or according to whether their weight does or does not exceed fifty pounds,” 
he cannot imagine to be fruitful (Hempel 1952, 53). Thus he somehow maintains the idea 
implicit  in  essentialism,  that  artificial  classifications  are  based  on  “superficial 
resemblances or external criteria.” (Hempel 1952, 52)
In the same vein, Dupré abandons essentialism and endorses pluralism, but maintains 
the  distinction  between  natural  and  artificial  kinds.  He  also  thinks  that  useful 
classifications can be distinguished from others because they capture many similarities and 
allow predictions:
The class of creatures with wings and feathers, for example, is more natural 
than that of creatures that are gray and over one foot long. This is so because 
when we know that a creature belongs to the first class, we can make numerous 
further predictions about it: that it or its female counterpart lays eggs, is warm-
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blooded, relatively large-brained, and so on. Membership in the second class 
carries no such benefits. (Dupré 1993, 64)
Several classifications can correspond to natural kinds, which are real, according to Dupré, 
even if they cross-classify a domain of objects, such as organisms. An individual can be of 
various kinds and this does not make those kinds less real. However, Dupré’s view implies 
that there are other possible classifications that do not capture natural kinds, such as the 
example given in the quotation. The term “natural kind” does not imply essentialism on 
this  account,  but  still  distinguishes  “butterflies,  coprolites,  volcanoes  and  suchlike 
somewhat homogeneous naturally occurring kinds of objects from kinds that are either not 
naturally  occurring  (artefacts)  or  not  remotely  homogeneous  (property  of  the  U.S. 
government, fast food, bigger than my head, and so on).” (Dupré 1993, 83)
The problem with such examples for unnatural kinds is that they are presented without 
any context. Take Hempel’s example: if we imagine a context where the classification of 
humans according to weight classes is used, there will be many properties that are shared 
between the individuals that fall in the same class; boxing is a case in point. And whether a 
class is homogeneous or heterogeneous depends on what properties we look at. Of course, 
the members of the class that is characterized as “property of the U.S. government” are 
very heterogeneous with respect to material and form, but since the context in which the 
classification is used is the legal context, we have to look at the legal properties of these 
objects and with respect to these, they are very homogeneous. For instance, they all fall 
under 18 USC Sec. 1361 02/01/2010 “Government property or contracts.” It is easy to 
make predictions if one knows that an object belongs to this class, for instance, concerning 
what happens if one “wilfully injures or commits any depredation against” such an object.
Dupré might want to admit that there are legal kinds, but maintain that they are different 
from natural kinds. But there are two points to be made in this respect. First, Dupré is very 
concerned  with  showing  that  there  is  no  sharp  boundary  between  scientific  and  non-
scientific, expert and natural language classifications. This can be interpreted in two ways. 
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Either one sees a sharp line between the domain of nature and the non-natural things, but 
thinks that both scientists and non-scientists classify objects in the domain of nature, or one 
does not draw this line. It would be more in the general thrust of Dupré’s anti-essentialist 
argumentation not to postulate such a sharp line, or more precisely, to expect that different 
classifications of objects as falling in the natural or unnatural domains can co-exist. The 
use of tools might be a case in point. Usually we see our artefacts as outside the domain of  
the natural, but in the context of tool-use in animals in general, the tools appear as natural  
objects.  Thus their  status  is  doubtful  at  least  concerning the early tool  uses  by  Homo 
sapiens.  But even if  a sharp line is drawn between natural and unnatural objects,  then 
cedars  are  natural  objects.  They  fall  in  the  domain  of  organisms  that  are  differently 
classified by taxonomists and timber merchants or carpenters. Still, if one realizes how the 
latter are involved in the unnatural world, cedar appears as very unnatural kind as well: 
there are almost certainly industrial norms regulating which timber can be sold as cedar, as 
well as norms that suggest which timber can be used for which purposes etc.
The second point that is important if the distinction between natural kinds and other 
kinds of kinds such as legal kinds is maintained is that also natural kinds only become 
comprehensible if the context is taken into account. One might argue, that while I could 
come up with a context in which “creatures that are gray and over one foot long” is used as 
a category and also allows some predictions, — I imagine some 19 th century British club of 
noble men, hosting a hunting contest in colonial territory —, in the case of “creatures with 
wings and feathers” it is clear without suggesting any context that they allow for further 
predictions. But this is only because we already know the context. Would we know nothing 
about the context of biology as a science, the second classification would be as absurd as 
the first.
So what is  the context? Is it  other kinds,  the kind in question interacts  with,  which 
makes recognizing this kind fruitful, or is it the humans that recognize the kind as such, for 
whatever reasons. It seems that in the case of hunting for gray creatures that are over one 
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food  long,  the  interactions  of  this  kind  with  other  kinds  is  deeply  entwined  with  the 
recognition of this kind by human actors. Whereas in the case of creatures with wings and 
feathers,  the  interaction  of  this  kind  with  other  kinds  in  an  ecological  context  is 
independent of the kind being recognized. But first of all, humans hunting animals is an 
ecological interaction.  Secondly,  the causal interactions in nature are manifold.  Even if 
they exist without humans detecting them, they do not mark boundaries of objects. Instead, 
it seems that by focussing on some causes will result in some ways to recognize objects or 
focussing on some objects will highlight some causal relations.
Pluralism Concerning Simple Things
I will now address one further instance of the type of pluralism that rests on the notion of  
the  complexity  of  the  world,  and  use  this  position  to  introduce  my own  position  by 
contrast.  The dependency of  the  context  in  which  a  classification  or  decomposition  is 
natural in terms of the interactions among natural kinds on the context of human interest in 
them, can be illustrated with an example provided by William Wimsatt, a lifelong thinker 
of complexity. Though both Dupré and Wimsatt look at organisms, the former is mostly 
concerned with pluralism concerning classifications of organisms, whereas Wimsatt looks 
at  their  decomposition  into  parts.  Wimsatt  distinguishes  two  forms  of  complexity: 
descriptive and interactional. Wimsatt defines the former in the following way:
Assume that it is possible to individuate the different theoretical perspectives, 
Ti, applicable to a system. Each of these Ti's implies or suggests criteria for the 
identification and individuation of parts, and thus generates a 'decomposition' 
of  the  system  into  parts.  These  decompositions,  K(T)i,  I  will  call  'K-
decompositions'. The different K(T)i, may or may not give spatially coincident 
boundaries for some or for all of the parts of the system. The boundaries of two 
parts are spatially coincident if and only if for any two points in a part under  
K(T)j these points are in a single part under K (T)k, and conversely. [...] If all of 
a set of decompositions, K(T)j, of a system produce coincident boundaries for 
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all parts of the system, the system will be called descriptively simple relative to 
those K(T)j,.
If two parts from different K(T)i are not coincident, but have a common point 
which is an interior point of at least one of them, then there are a number of 
different mapping relations which can hold between their boundaries, each of 
which contributes to its descriptive complexity. (Wimsatt 1972, 70)
Wimsatt  then illustrates descriptive complexity by comparing a piece of granite with a 
multicellular organism. One can take several theoretical perspectives towards a piece of 
granite  distinguishing  sub-regions  according  to  chemical  composition,  thermal 
conductivity,  electrical  conductivity,  density,  and  tensile  strength.  All  of  these 
decompositions yield sub-regions with coincident boundaries. In a multicellular organism 
such  as  a  fruit  fly,  the  theoretical  perspectives  might  offer  criteria  to  decompose  the 
organism into “anatomical, physiological, biochemical, or evolutionary functional system; 
into cells having common developmental fates or potentialities, or into phenotypic features 
determined by common sets of genes,” thus defining parts, that do not have coinciding 
boundaries (Wimsatt 1972, 70). Wimsatt remarks that the different descriptions of the piece 
of granite are basically perspectives derived from one theoretical perspective that describes 
the physico-chemical properties of the object. So it is no surprise that the boundaries they 
define coincide! The fly lends itself to many more theoretical perspectives that are not sub-
perspectives of the physico-chemical perspective, and which are “not meaningfully applied 
to the granite.” (Wimsatt 1972, 71, in the annotation to Wimsatt’s Figure 1) For sure, a 
piece of granite has neither anatomical parts nor cell fates, but the claim that the physico-
chemical  perspective  is  the  only  perspective  that  can  apply  to  a  stone  is  not  as 
straightforward as it seems.
Take  a  common  wrench  (my Figure  1).  Being  made  of  one  material,  the  physico-
chemical analysis along the lines suggested for the piece of granite will yield no sub parts. 
However, from a functional point of view we can distinguish the handle from the head. As 
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Figure 1 shows, the application of a geometric grid also defines sub-regions. And finally, 
the colors indicate parts that are affected differently by stress forces when the wrench is 
used with a given displacement. 
Figure 1: Different ways to partition a simple wrench
It might be argued that the distinctions of the sub parts are due to the fact that the wrench is 
an artefact that has a given function, and thus a given interaction with other objects. But 
first,  there  is  no reason to  exclude  artefacts  from the  discussion  of  the  complexity of 
objects.  Secondly,  stones  do  just  as  well  appear  in  particular  contexts.  If  the  stone  is 
investigated in an ecological context, for instance, and the interaction with algae or lichens 
is investigated, then the surface of a stone will certainly be distinguished as the relevant 
locus from the rest  of the stone,  and rugged surface parts might be distinguished from 
smooth parts. If it is about big granite blocks in rivers, the surface regions exposed to water 
will be distinguished from those outside the water. Ecologists might use categories from 
geology, for instance, when they call the parts of a granite boulder not covered by soil the 
“outcrop,” but they are interested in outcrops as habitats, while Geologists will  have a 
different  perspective  on  the  object,  being  interested  in  weathering  (where  in  turn  the 
lichens might be one factor). This decomposition of a variety of sub-regions of the surface, 
or parts inside or outside water or soil, produces boundaries that are not coincident with the 
physico-chemical  decompositions.  Let  us  look  at  the  inside/outside  the  water 
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decomposition. It might be said that it  is extrinsic, as opposed to such properties as to  
chemical  composition,  thermal  conductivity,  electrical  conductivity,  density,  and tensile 
strength. But first, other decompositions mentioned such as the rugged/not-rugged surface 
are not due to external factors, and second, some functional features in organisms are also 
individuated on the basis of the interaction with external ecological factors. It might also 
be said that the property is transitory, but also many parts of a fly are transitory, occurring 
and disappearing during the life cycle of the organism. It might be further objected that the 
inside/outside  the  water  decomposition  does  not  apply to  all  blocks  of  granite.  But  it 
applies  to  all  river-bed-granite-blocks  and objects  in  this  class  would  be  descriptively 
simple according to Wimsatt.  Finally, it might be said that these parts do not allow for 
generalizations. But riverbed ecologists certainly draw generalizations on the basis of such 
decompositions.
Just as Hempel’s and Dupré’s artificial kinds, Wimsatt’s simplicity is a rhetorical trick. By 
neglecting the context in one case (grey creatures over one foot long, piece of granite) and 
relying  on  the  fact  that  for  the  other  example  (creatures  with  wings  and  feathers, 
multicellular  organisms)  the  context  is  immediately  activated  (as  a  frame of  semantic 
knowledge, Fillmore 1976, which in this case is the frame of a typical reader of PSA) one 
side of the comparison is rendered absurd or simple, respectively. If we put ourselves in the 
shoes of someone who does not know about the many perspectives on an organism that 
biology has to offer, a fly would appear very simple, just as the stone appears simple, if we 
do not take the possible ecological, geological or geometrical descriptions into account. It 
seems that  descriptive  complexity  depends  on  the  perspectives.  Thus  the  plurality  of 
perspectives cannot be explained through complexity.
I am not denying that a multicellular organism is more complex than a piece of granite. 
But descriptive complexity is not a good measure for the complexity that is meant when 
we intuitively agree  with  that  statement.  Maybe interactional  complexity is.  I  will  not 
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discuss this point here. Interactional complexity is defined as interaction among the parts 
identified in different K-decompositions. Thus it depends on descriptive complexity. The 
question is when things are descriptively simple or complex. I content that there are no 
descriptively  simple  things,  because  there  are  indefinitely  many  perspectives  possible 
concerning every object,  some of which will  yield non-coincident  components.  Only a 
certain limited subset,  such as the set of physico-chemical perspectives, can be said to 
render the object descriptively simple. From 1972 paper it does not become fully clear 
whether Wimsatt holds the same view or whether he thinks that a piece of granite is in 
some ontological sense descriptively simple and that it lends itself to no other perspective 
than the physico-chemical.
In any case on my account a stone is descriptively complex. This might be due to the 
fact that it  is  part  of an ecological or geological system. The whole geological system 
might compete with a fly in complexity. Then the descriptive complexity is determined by 
the system it is part of. The complexity of the object thus depends on whether we represent 
it as a part of a system (and of which system) or not. Every object is, however, ultimately 
part of a causal system of the same complexity (earth, universe, or wherever the boundary 
is drawn). We can easily represent a piece of granite as isolated from any systemic context. 
We could do the same with a single molecule of the fly, as biochemists sometimes do when 
they investigate the chemical properties of the molecule without taking its functional role 
into  account.  This  is  in  line  with  what  I  said  before,  that  complexity  is  a  way  of 
representing things, namely as parts of systems. The bottom line is, descriptive complexity 
follows from the way things are described. The apparent circularity goes away if one takes 
a cultural perspective according to which it is the generation of new ways of description 
that make objects descriptively complex.
Anthropocentric Pluralism
The persisting idea of natural and artificial classifications, even if interpreted in a non-
essentialist way, as well as the idea that only intrinsic but not extrinsic properties (if the 
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distinction is sustainable at all) provide criteria for classification, are the subject of attack 
of Goodman’s new riddle of induction. “New riddle of induction” is therefore a bit of a 
misnomer. Before I explain this claim, I shall briefly introduce it in its original form of 
Goodman’s short note in the  Journal of Philosophy of 1946, because the way he puts it 
there is less prone to misunderstandings than the more well known formulation in  Fact  
Fiction and Forecast (Goodman 1983):
Suppose we had drawn a marble from a certain bowl on each of the ninety-nine 
days up to and including VE day, and each marble drawn was red. We would 
expect that the marble drawn on the following day would also be red. So far all 
is well. Our evidence maybe expressed by the conjunction “Ra1 • Ra2 • ... • Ra99,” 
which  well  confirms  the  prediction  “Ra100.”  But  increase  of  credibility, 
projection, “confirmation” in any intuitive sense, does not occur in the case of 
every predicate under similar circumstances. Let “S” be the predicate “is drawn 
by VE day and is red, or is drawn later and is non-red.” The evidence of the 
same drawings above assumed maybe expressed by the conjunction “Sa1  • Sa2 
• ... • Sa99.” By the theories of confirmation in question this well confirms the 
prediction “Sa100”; but actually we do not expect that the hundredth marble will 
be  non-red.  “Sa100”  gains  no  whit  of  credibility  from the  evidence  offered. 
(Goodman 1946, 383)
The problem is that, depending on what predicate (red or  S) is applied to the marbles in 
recording  the  data,  there  are  two  sets  of  data  that  support  different  hypotheses.  The 
formulation of the riddle in Fact Fiction and Forecast often gave rise to an interpretation 
of the riddle as  stating that  the objects  might  change their  color  and therefore corrupt 
prediction (the most prominent instance of this misreading is Barker and Achinstein 1997). 
But under this interpretation the “new riddle” would be a version of David Hume’s (2004 
[1748]) problem of induction, and therefore hardly new. The formulation above, instead, 
has the form of an urn model as a cognitive tool well known from probability theory. To be 
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precise, it represents an urn problem without replacement. This means that the marbles, 
once drawn, are not reconsidered. It does not matter, therefore, if they change their color. 
The point is not, as in Hume, that the uniformity of nature cannot be assumed, but the 
different ways by which we can classify objects. In one case the objects are classified by 
color and put in baskets, so to speak, that have color terms written on them. One can see 
these baskets as metaphors for our cognitive categories. All red marbles go into the basket 
that has “red” written on it and that is attached to the rule: “Put in this basket all and only 
those marbles that are red.” In the other case objects are classified according to the scheme 
S/not S. We have a basket that has “S” written on it and is attached to the rule: “Put in this 
basket all and only those marbles that are either drawn by VE day and are red, or drawn 
later and are non-red.” If one draws a marble before VE day and it is red it goes in the 
basket labelled “S” and after VE this marble is still red and it is still in the basket, where it 
belongs, because it was drawn before VE day and found to be red. Now in the first case, 
the prediction will be that, since all marbles were such that they go in the basket labelled 
“red,” the marble drawn on the first day after VE day will be such that it goes in that basket 
as well, which requires that it will be red. In the second case, we will predict that, since all 
marbles so far were such that they go in the basket labelled “S,” the hundredth marble will 
also be such that it goes in the basket labelled “S,” which would require that it is non-red.
Many arguments have been put forward in order to show that there are unique features 
of the predicate “S” (“grue” in Fact Fiction and Forecast) and that all predicates that share 
those features have to be excluded from contexts  where predictions are made, such as 
science (see e.g. Stalker, ed. 1994 for an annotated bibliography, which already contains 
more than 300 articles). The main lines of argument can be classified according to whether 
they focus on syntactic, semantic or epistemic differences between predicates of the same 
type  as  “S,”  and proper  predicates  such as  “red.”  All  three aspects  have  already been 
addressed in Carnap’s first response to Goodman’s 1946 paper (Carnap 1997). I will not 
discuss all arguments here, but just give an example to illustrate how difficult it is to define 
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“proper predicates,” if one feels the need to do so. Carnap suggested that proper predicates 
that can be used in scientific hypotheses should not be positional, that is, they should not 
contain in their definition any special or temporal restriction, or, to put it differently, the 
definition should not contain any individual constant. But this would make it hard to find 
any proper predicate in sciences such as geology and biology. Think of predicates such as 
“Arctic” or “Precambrian.” (Goodman 1997) The restriction would render those disciplines 
not proper sciences, a conclusion that any philosophical account on the sciences is well 
advised  to  avoid.  Furthermore,  science  is  not  the  only  context  where  hypotheses  are 
formulated and most contexts in which predictions really make a difference in the sense of 
being life saving happen outside of science.
One might argue that the definition of “S” requires human judgement and action. A 
marble must be drawn in a certain time interval and found to be red by a human agent to be 
S. One can also say that a marble must be drawn at any time and found to be red in order to 
be red, but it seems that in the case of “red” one can somehow omit human agency from 
the definition. Things are just red. But are they? Is something red in the absence of light? 
This depends again on the definition of red that, however it is construed, will contain many 
other predicates that have to be defined as well. But one way to put it would be that red is a 
relational property between an object, human senses and a set of circumstances. 
Be this  as  it  may,  we have  no reason to  exclude  predicates  that  depend on human 
judgement and agency in their definition as good candidates for being used in hypotheses. 
The  classification  of  objects  according  to  the  S/non-S  scheme  has  real  causal 
consequences. We can imagine a situation where marbles go in different literal baskets that 
might be further processed. The S marbles might be sold, while the non-S marbles might be 
destroyed. These categories then can well describe the relations in the ecology of humans 
and the objects in their environment. It shall become clear now, why I termed the kind of 
pluralism that sees no need to get rid of S-like predicates, that rather sees them as a virtue, 
not as a vice, an anthropocentric pluralism.
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The difference between “red” and “S” is according to Goodman just that in our current 
world, “red” is used and “S” is not. A predicate is projectible, that is, it can be applied to 
unobserved cases, if it has been successfully used in projections before. Such predicates 
Goodman calls entrenched (Goodman 1983, 94-96). As Goodman writes: “The reason why 
only the right predicates happen so luckily to have become well entrenched is just that the 
well  entrenched predicates  have thereby become the  right  ones.”  (Goodman 1983,  98) 
Projectibility  then  involves  another  inductive  inference,  of  course:  The  predicate  was 
appropriate  before,  so it  will  be appropriate  again.  But there is  no need to justify this 
projection. It is just the way that we proceed. We might be wrong in particular cases, if we 
apply the predicates that we have successfully applied before. The point is that predicates 
are used in the context of many other symbols. What makes them successful, and this is a 
point that Goodman emphasizes only later, is that they fit in a network of symbols, or, as 
we can also say, the categories fit in a network of categories. Goodman writes:
We have seen [...] that rightness of categorization, which enters into most other 
varieties of rightness, is rather a matter of fit with practice; that without the 
organization,  the  selection of  relevant  kinds,  effected  by evolving tradition, 
there is no rightness or wrongness of categorization, no validity or invalidity of 
inductive inference, no fair or unfair sampling and no uniformity or disparity 
among samples. (Goodman 1978, 138, 139)
It is entrenchment and fit that make a predicate projectible, or a category right. It is not that 
the right categories are natural kinds. Goodman speaks of relevant kinds instead. 
I say ‘relevant’ rather than ‘natural’ for two reasons: first, ‘natural’ is an inapt 
term to cover not only biological species but such artificial kinds as musical 
works,  psychological  experiments  and  types  of  machinery;  and  second, 
‘natural’ suggests some absolute categorical or psychological priority, while the 
kinds in question are rather habitual or traditional or devised for a new purpose. 
(Goodman 1978, 10) 
36
Categories, or the predicates that name them, fit not only with other words, but with all  
symbolic  practices,  whether  they  are  pictorial  or  performative.  Goodman  suggests  a 
number of criteria that explicate fit, such as coherence (Goodman 1978, 125) and utility 
(Goodman 1978, 123).3 And, of course, the description of fit requires a theory of symbols 
that enables one to detect the connections between verbal, pictorial and other symbols — 
the nodes in  the network,  — which Goodman also provides (Goodman 1976, see also 
Chapter 2). Given an account on the fitting of categories, one can also explain how new 
categories that are obviously not entrenched, can be introduced. They might either have no 
rivals, if they apply to unexplored realms, or they might fit well with given categories. In 
the latter case they might conflict with some categories or explicitly rival with some others, 
but if their overall fit is good, they may prevail and in the long run their rivals may vanish. 
With  Wittgenstein  we  can  say that  categories  are  right  within  a  given  “form of  life” 
(Wittgenstein 2001, § 19, for a pluralistic understanding of the term see e.g. Haller 1999). 
Predicates and other symbols are used successfully if the interaction between the sign users 
goes  smoothly,  which  it  usually  does  (see  Abel  2004,  173).  Words  are  answered  and 
actions are responded to in a continuous way. Only sometimes the flow of interaction is 
interrupted  by misunderstanding and  confusion.  In  this  case  the  categories  have  to  be 
readjusted.4
Let me finish this rather incomplete description of Goodman’s pluralism with a fictional 
example of what Wittgenstein would call a form of life. We live in a language community 
where “red” is used and we cannot imagine a situation where “S” is used on a regular  
basis. But imagine a feudal society in which the lord,  qua authority, establishes the rule 
that every calendar year, he receives all pigs born before summer solstice and all cows born 
after.  They have a  word for this  category of things,  which is  “duty.”  If  an ethnologist 
observes 99 piglets being brought to the lord before summer solstice, she will predict that 
3 On fitting, see, for instance, Goodman (1978, 19), as well as Goodman and Elgin (1988, 46), concerning 
the network metaphor, see Goodman (1976, 72), and Goodman and Elgin (1988, 8).
4 Concerning fitting as “making fit,” see Goodman and Elgin 1988, 185.
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on the next day, another piglet will be delivered. If, instead, a calf will be delivered, she 
will understand that she has the wrong category. What is delivered is not a piglet or a calf,  
but  a duty and a  duty is  defined according to the rule mentioned above. “Duty” is  an 
entrenched predicate and duty is an entrenched category in this society. An inhabitant, who 
does not understand the predicate and brings a piglet after summer solstice when he is 
asked to bring a duty, causes a problem and his category system will be adjusted. If the 
ethnologist wants to describe the society she has to describe duties as kinds of things that  
exist.
If I said that “the new riddle of induction” is a misnomer, we can now see why. The  
choice of categories precedes every kind of  inference;  it  has consequences  that  go far 
beyond the narrow problem of induction.  As Hacking remarks with respect to the new 
riddle: „It is not peculiarly connected with induction“ (Hacking 1997, 163). Every result of 
a cognitive operation (induction, deduction, abduction, comparison etc.) depends on what 
categories we take as given. The example of inductive inference is just a very powerful 
illustration of this fact: „Induction is no more than a crisp way to pose a general difficulty“ 
(Hacking 1994,  194).  Also Günter  Abel  emphasizes the significance of the new riddle 
beyond  the  problem  of  induction  and  writes  with  respect  to  the  distinction  between 
projectible and non-projectible predicates: „The results of this move are of an importance 
that clearly goes beyond the problem of induction in its narrower sense.  They concern 
fundamental aspects of human cognition and practise“ (Abel 1997, 2). The important point 
is that there are no predicates that stand out from others in that the objects they apply to are 
connected by a closer connection than the objects in the extension of other predicates. If 
predicates have an extension in a given language, the objects are alike in that they fall in 
the  extension.  Predicates  gain  their  projectibility  only  „from  our  practice  of  using 
predicates, from habit, and from the degree of entrenchment in historically and culturally 
given practices and standards“ (Abel 1997, 2). Another way to put it is to say that there are 
no natural categories. Goodman articulates the more general importance of the distinction 
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between projectible  and non-projectible  predicates himself  already in  Fact  Fiction and  
Forecast: 
It may give us a way of distinguishing ‘genuine’ from merely ‘artificial’ kinds, 
or  more  genuine  from  less  genuine  kinds  and  thus  enable  us  to  interpret 
ordinary statements affirming that certain things are  or are not of the same 
kind, or are more akin than certain other things. For surely the entrenchment of 
classes is some measure of their genuineness as kinds; roughly speaking, two 
things  are  the  more  akin  according  as  there  is  a  more  specific  and  better 
entrenched predicate that applies to both. (Goodman 1983, 122) 
This, of course, is a statement with much more far-reaching consequences than only that 
there is no way to know which predicates yields good predictions and which not.
Chapter Conclusion
We saw that  most  forms  of  pluralism available  in  the  philosophy of  the  life  sciences 
literature base the fact of plurality in the complexity of nature, instead of the principal  
openness of human practice. Where does the belief in the fact of complexity stem from? It 
seems that most of the philosophers discussed above do not derive the fact of complexity 
from the fact of plurality in the sciences, because this would be overtly circular. Instead 
they see evolution  as  a  process  that  has  the particular  characteristic  of  bringing about 
complexity,  and they probably think  that  there  are  other  processes  that  are  capable of 
generating complexity as well. Thus the belief in the fact of complexity is dependent on a 
belief  in a particular idea about the process of evolution.  This idea is  grounded in the 
science of biology, thus in one (or rather a bunch) of the perspectives or models that make 
up the plurality of science. This is again a form of circularity. But it is, I guess, even if it 
might be problematic, unavoidable.
Even if  this  form of circularity is  unavoidable,  there are other reasons to reject the 
justification of pluralism through the (evolutionarily informed) belief in complexity. Most 
importantly, as we saw, this view is unable to capture the plurality of decompositions or 
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classifications that applies to objects that are not considered complex by anyone. If we 
instead locate the complexity that gives rise to a plurality in human practice, any object can 
become subject to a variety of perspectives. A pluralism that is grounded in the belief in the 
open-ended creativity of culture instead of evolution is also dependent on one particular 
perspective  on  culture,  among  the  many  available,  and  thus  not  less  circular  than 
evolutionary pluralism. It is just one world-version, although, I hope, a right one.
I  said  that  I  call  my  position,  which  I  take  to  be  in  line  with  Goodman’s, 
“anthropocentric pluralism” (although I do not know if Goodman would subscribe to this 
label), because Goodman’s critique of genuine or natural classifications based on intrinsic 
properties operates with properties that involve human action (the property of a marble of 
being drawn before VE day and found to be red). One might read this as saying that there 
is no reason to exclude such properties (or predicates) from the properties that can define 
relevant kinds. A strong reading would be that any property involves a relation between an 
object and its  human observer.  A weaker reading would allow for having an ontology, 
which  is  independent  of  human  observers,  but  still  include  properties  that  depend  on 
humans as on a par with any other properties and as subject to scientific investigation. One 
cannot have, for instance, an ecology that treats humans as animals and just operates with 
non-anthropocentric categories,  leaving out predicates such as “property.” The fact that 
humans have property systems causally influences their ecologies and it can therefore only 
be described with the help of such categories.
To give an example, and thereby come back, finally, to the question of characters of 
organisms: Shelf life is a character. It is a property of a part of a plant (the fruit) and it  
becomes  recognized  outside  and  inside  the  biological  sciences.  It  can  be  subjected  to 
biological analysis, for instance, when its heritability is investigated. And yet, there is no 
shelf life without a shelf. And there is no shelf in the relevant sense without the whole 
culture of division of labour,  food production,  trade and storage,  without monoculture, 
trucks,  supermarkets and fridges,  without  working hours  and salad recipes  without  the 
40
whole of our culture from the architecture of our kitchens to zucchini-tomato gratins. It is 
in  the network of these symbols,  artefacts  and practices  that  the category of shelf  life 
becomes recognized, relevant and right.  And the fact that  attempts  have been made to 
reduce this character to the activity of certain enzymes only shows that this is actually 
another character. It is a translation, but as every translation it does not go without loss.  
Agriculture will play a role when the history of genetics is discussed below, but it should 
become clear that also in non-applied research — that might appear as isolated from the 
broader changes in life style and culture (which it is not of course), — change and novelty 
in the form of new technology or any form of integration of knowledge from other fields 
results in new perspectives and thus new decompositions and classifications.
Chapter 2. Theories of Representation: Systems, Reference and Dense vs. Articulated 
Symbol Systems
Chapter Introduction
If a part or property of an organism becomes individuated, such that it  can figure as a 
character  in  some  context,  it  becomes  possible  to  refer  to  it  with  a  term of  a  given 
language. The referent of a term can even become individuated through the use of the term. 
Furthermore, many non-linguistic symbols will be involved in delimiting and representing 
parts and properties of organisms. There is, however, much dispute concerning the question 
whether the possibility of using a term to refer to an object is part of its meaning at all, or 
whether there is even nothing more to meaning apart from reference. And if there is more 
to  meaning  than  reference,  is  this  more  a  function  of  the  reference,  or  is  reference  a 
function of these other aspects of meaning. Given that I am interested in the ability of 
language  and  other  symbol  systems  to  refer  to  characters  and  sometimes  even  to 
individuate characters, I will emphasize the referential potential of symbols. I will opt, that 
is,  for an extensional theory of meaning. I contend, however,  that there is more to the 
meaning of  a  term than its  relation  to  its  referents  and that  is  that  terms  are  parts  of 
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systems. The systemic character of language and signs in general has been made prominent 
in  linguistic  and  semiotic  structuralism,  but  has  often  been  neglected  in  the  Anglo-
American tradition of philosophy of language. I will therefore first present the structuralist 
view on signs in its original formulation by Ferdinand de Saussure. The problem with the 
structuralist tradition, however, is that it tends to see words or other sign-vehicles as being 
related to concepts, thereby rejecting the idea of reference, relegating it to pragmatics, that 
is to the use of signs that, on this account, has nothing to do with a theory of meaning. I 
will contrast Saussure’s ideas with Putnam’s account that represents an extensional theory 
of meaning. Unfortunately, Putnam shares with many of his peers the ignorance towards 
the  systemic  nature  of  language  (which  might  stem  from  an  ignorance  towards  the 
structuralist tradition). One author who unites systemic and extensional aspects is again 
Nelson Goodman. His theory of symbols has the additional advantage that it applies not 
only to language, but also to non-linguistic symbols. Given that science operates as much 
with  images  and  diagrams  as  it  operates  with  words,  such  a  theory  is  an  invaluable 
resource  for  the  analysis  of  scientific  practice.  Among  other  things,  I  will  derive  the 
notions of thick and thin concepts from Goodman’s work, which will figure prominently in 
my comparative study on characters in several biological disciplines.
Saussure: Signs are Organized in Systems
Ferdinand de Saussure, the founding figure of structuralism5, was unsatisfied with a view 
of language as a list of words that correspond to things, what he called a  nomenclature. 
First  of all,  Saussure maintains that what is  associated is  the sensual impression of an 
expression (the signifier) – he focuses on sounds, but it might also be marks of ink or many 
other things – and a concept (the signified). Those elements are associated in the brain as 
he puts it (Saussure 1959 [1916], 65-66). Together they constitute a sign. But even on this 
5 Considering that this thesis engages in philosophy of science it should be noted that structuralism here 
must not be confused with the account on scientific theories that is associated with Patrick Suppes and his  
followers.
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account, sounds are not just “means for expressing ideas.” (Saussure 1959, 112) Saussure 
thus opposes a reduction of a theory of language to a theory of names, which he associates 
with philosopher’s accounts on language at his time. Claudine Normand observes that for 
Saussure, philosophers  are unaware “of two important aspects: on the one hand that the 
most important function of language does not consist in designating things, but in relating 
and combining words in different ways; and on the other hand that language is continually 
moving and transforming itself.” (Normand 2004, 97)
With  respect  to  change  in  language  Roland  Barthes  points  out  that  Saussure  was 
concerned with – and we might even say about – the stability of language (Barthes 1988, 
161).  Since  the  connection  between  the  word  and  the  thing,  or,  for  Saussure,  the 
impression and the concept, is arbitrary, it seems to be vulnerable to changes. But instead, 
we observe that language, even if subject to change, is rather conservative. There must be 
something that holds the arbitrary association in place. The solution Saussure finds has two 
dimensions, the social character of language and, – his greatest innovation, – the idea of 
language as relating systems of  pure values.  The first  point  is  rather  clear.  In that  the 
connection between the signifier and the signified is conventional, it cannot be changed by 
the individual speaker (Saussure 1959, 73-74).6 Language does, of course, change over 
time. Saussure speaks about the nature of changes that can occur, and what is systematic 
about them flows from the systemic character of language. He does not say much, though, 
about the causes and conditions of change, because of the great variety of factors involved 
(Saussure  1959,  76-77).  In  any  case,  the  factors  of  change  are  constrained  by  the 
community of speakers. Changes are therefore mostly unconscious gradual deviations that 
6 For  Saussure  the  social  character  of  language  mainly concerns  the  constraints  of  conventions  on  the  
individual speaker. The social determination of language in the sense of language reflecting the life-world  
of  a  people  (the  environmental  circumstances,  the  resulting  habits  and  the  social  order)  that  was 
emphasized by William Dwight Whitney when he speaks of language as  a social  institution, although 
acknowledged by Saussure, for him was not part of the core problem of linguistics, but rather an external  
issue to be dealt with by ethno-linguists (see Normand 2006, 95).
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sweep through a community of speakers. Or they are the result of changes in the cultural 
influence  of  one language community on another.  Accordingly,  they are  always  social 
phenomena. Finally, even if change is due to a conscious act by an individual speaker, such 
a speaker only has the power to change conventions, if she is licensed to do so by the 
community of speakers.  That  is,  when its  members are ready to follow her.  Scientists, 
speaking  to  a  conservative  audience,  but  with  a  certain  authority,  might  under  some 
circumstances be in the position to change language, but just as well might a teenager on 
the streets change the language, speaking without authority, but to an open audience, ready 
to  pick  up  the  new  slang.  Given  the  aims  of  this  thesis  we  shall  come  back  to  the 
conditions that allow a scientist to introduce a new signifier and thus a new signified. But 
authority alone is not sufficient to explain how changes are introduced and convention 
alone is not sufficient to explain stability. This is where Saussure’s concept of languages as 
relating systems of values comes into play.
Languages  combine  systems  of  signifiers  with  systems  of  signifieds.  According  to 
Saussure, what makes a set of signifying or signified units a system is that the units are 
determined only through their  position among the other  units.  That  is  only within the 
system they have a value. The relation they hold to other units is that of being different. 
With respect to concepts, or ideas, the units of thought, he contends:
Instead  of  pre-existing  ideas  then,  we find  [...]  values  emanating  from the 
system. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is understood that the 
concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive content but 
negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their most 
precise characteristic is in being what the others are not. (Saussure 1959, 117)
And with respect to phonemes, the units of sound he writes:
Phonemes  are  characterized  not,  as  one  might  think,  by their  own positive 
quality but simply by the fact that they are distinct. Phonemes are above all 
else opposing, relative, and negative entities. (Saussure 1959, 119)
44
Saussure rejects the notion of a sound expressing an idea; instead it is the sound as opposed 
to other sounds that is capable of expressing the idea as opposed to other ideas. A sign, 
however, the unit of a signifier and a signified, is not defined negatively as what it is not,  
but is a positive unit. It has meaning in that it links a sound to a concept, within the system. 
Nevertheless,  it  stands  in  opposition  to  other  signs  in  that  the  sounds  and concepts  it 
associates do.
Saussure  imagines  sound  and thought  as  unstructured  continua,  which,  using  his  own 
metaphor, later became called the plane of expression and the plane of content (Saussure 
1959, 112). If we look at a sign, however, we can isolate the signifier and the signified as 
units of expression and content. Such units alone have no value, that is, no meaning. The 
value of a unit is not intrinsic and that is to say that the unit itself is not a given. For  
Saussure units of expression as well as content only exist in that chunks of the expression 
or content plane come to stand in certain relations, which means that they acquire a value. 
These relations thus have two dimensions (Saussure 1959, 115). First, a unit of expression 
has a value only in that it is linked to a unit of content and vice versa. Second, it has a 
value in that it is different from the other units in the same plane. The first relation is that  
of signification and the other can be called, with Saussure, the relation of opposition. The 
first  relation is characterized through interchangeability.  In communication,  the speaker 
can,  and  indeed  must,  exchange  the  content  unit  for  the  expression  unit.  The  second 
relation is characterized through the fact that exchange would result in a different sign. If 
we exchange the signifier in a sign with another signifier of the same system, a new sign 
would  result  and  the  system as  a  whole  would  be  changed.  It  follows  from the  first 
dimension of value, that, even if we speak of systems of expression units and systems of 
content units, the systems on each plane are only systems in that they are combined in a 
system of signs (what semioticians later will call a code). 
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The difference between signification and opposition must not be confused with the well-
established difference between the object  a  sign refers  to  and the  way it  refers  to  the 
object.7 First, reference does not come into play here, since Saussure only speaks about the 
relation of an expression (or more precisely the sensual impression of an expression) and a 
concept, which is understood as a mental phenomenon, not an object in the world. Second, 
the two relations apply as much to the signified as to the signifier.
The  way Saussure  argues  for  the  fact  that  units  (of  expression  or  content)  are  not 
determined by their intrinsic properties, but instead have a value only in relation to a unit 
of the respective other plane and to other units of the same system in the same plane, is as 
follows (Saussure 1959, Part Two, Chs. III and IV):
First, isolated signifiers or signifieds have no value outside a system. While the idea of 
an isolated unit of content might be difficult to conceptualize, we can clearly see that a 
sound of which we do not know what it signifies, nor what to compare it with, would give 
no hint on what it signifies or whether it is part of a language at all (the same goes for a 
mark of ink or any other potential signifier). 
Second, while it has been said that units cannot be exchanged with other units to which 
they are opposed within a system, at least for expression units, they can be exchanged with 
other units that are not, but then become part of the system. Imagine a language some 
scientists use in a lab in which the object //red card// applied to a cage signifies  animal  
treated with x, //blue card//  animal treated with y and //green card//  animal not treated. 
If  //red card//  and //blue card//  are  exchanged their  value has  changed.  The system of 
expression units is conserved, but the code has changed. If //blue card// occupies its old 
position plus the former position of //red card//, we have another system of expression and 
another code in which //blue card// signifies animal treated. But if //red card// is exchanged 
by the sound “red”, the later takes on the value of the former, and the sign system remains 
7 This distinction appears in various ways and with different terminology in philosophy (Bedeutung and 
Sinn, extension and intension, denotation and connotation).
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intact. In fact, //red card// could also be exchanged by the sounds “blue,” “Torre di Pisa” or 
“uzdiblak.” The important point is that the signifier is different from all other units in the 
system. We could also exchange the whole system of expression by a system consisting of 
the sounds “red,” “blue” and “green,” or any other set of three distinct sounds. That shows, 
that it is the place in the system that determines the value, or, as we might say, grants the 
functioning of  the unit.  It  is  less clear,  however,  what  it  would mean to exchange the 
content  unit  animal treated  with  x by  the  content  unit  Torre  di  Pisa.  The  first  two 
arguments for a relational view of the value of units therefore seem to reveal a certain 
asymmetry between expression and content that is not fully acknowledged by Saussure. 
A third point applies to both planes: The value of a unit can even be changed if neither 
the unit nor the corresponding unit on the other plane is changed, just by changing any 
other unit in the system on one of the planes. Saussure gives an example:
Within the same language, all words used to express related ideas limit each 
other reciprocally; synonyms like French redouter 'dread,'  craindre 'fear,' and 
avoir peur 'be afraid' have value only through their opposition: if redouter did 
not exist, all its content would go to its competitors. [...] The value of just any 
term is accordingly, determined by its environment. (Saussure 1959, 116)
This means that if the expression unit  redouter gets lost, the content unit 'dread' is not 
signified by the other expression units, but this content unit does not exist any more. What 
happens is that the content units 'fear' and 'be afraid' change their value in that they cover 
more of the content plane. This is also implicit in the above example. If the signifier //red  
card// gets lost from the code, all expression and content units change their value. A similar 
argument can be derived from the comparison of different languages. Saussure goes on: “If 
words stood for pre-existing concepts, they would all have exact equivalents in meaning 
from one language to the next; but this is not true.” (Saussure 1959, 116) The different 
ways in which languages segment a content plane is famously illustrated by a diagram of 
Louis Hjelmlev (1961, see also Eco 1979, 73):
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træ Baum arbre
Holz bois
skov
Wald
forêt
Table 2.1. Different languages segment a content plane differently,  
after Hjelmslev (1961).
The  diagram  shows  how  three  different  languages  (French,  German  and  Danish) 
distinguish different content units. “Bois” for instance signifies  timber and  small forest. 
Even  if  one  maintains  that  here  one  expression  unit  signifies  two concepts,  it  sounds 
plausible to say that the German language does not codify a difference between a large and 
a small forest. Of course, people can make the distinction  ad hoc, using the diminutive 
“Wäldchen” (small forest), but then they would actually introduce a new local code, in 
which “Wald” would indeed have a different value.
The  systemic  character  of  language  contributes  to  the  explanation  of  its  stability, 
because if a change is introduced the whole (sub-) system is changed, which must meet 
much stronger resistance in a community of speakers than a change that only applies to one 
unit.  On the other hand the systemic character explains much of the patterns in which 
change occurs if  it  happens.  It  also makes us sensible  to what happens if  changes are 
introduced, namely that  they never  affect only one sign,  but have repercussions in the 
whole system of systems, which is particularly important if conceptual change in science is 
studied.  This brings us to the other motivation for emphasizing the systemic nature of 
language apart from understanding change and stability. It relates to the first critical point 
against  the  philosopher’s  view of  language  that  Normand  attributes  to  Saussure,  their 
occupation with naming. This criticism is strongly motivated by the observation that there 
are not the same units in all languages or at different times, which was just illustrated with 
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the help of Hjelmslev’s example. Comparing the sets of units given in different languages 
suggests the image of the continuum on both sides, expression and content, that can be 
divided  differently.  Since  the  division  seems  not  to  be  determined  by the  “stuff”  the 
continuum is made of – because otherwise it could not be different in different languages, 
–  the  units  are  not  defined  by  the  chunks  of  the  continuum  they  separate,  but  only 
negatively through their difference with respect to other units. Thus it is the units as having 
a differential value that define the chunks of the continuum. The continuum is segmented 
only in that there is a system of units delineating each other. Saussure writes:
Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor 
sounds  that  existed  before  the  linguistic  system,  but  only  conceptual  and 
phonic, differences that have issued from the system. (Saussure 1959, 120)
Language as a list of names does not fit with these observations about language. But we 
need not follow Saussure in rejecting that signifiers signify things, just because we reject 
the view of language as a list of names for things. Instead we can think of a plane of  
materiality, which is only divided into units, the things, in a system of signs. From this 
perspective,  it  should become clear  why Saussure’s theory is  attractive for the type of 
pluralism envisioned in this  thesis. A good guide of where I  want to go results if  one 
exchanges the terms in Hjelmlev’s diagram for terms signifying characters of organisms, 
and the different languages by different disciplines, research programs or scientific projects 
of whatever scale.8 
Since the goal is to speak of things in the world, in particular, of parts and properties of 
organisms, as units that are not determined by internal features, but delimited by the other 
things and properties that are individuated, it will be necessary to complement the language 
of content and concepts in Saussure’s approach for an extensional language, while at the 
same time retaining the systemic nature of language put forward in structuralism.
8 Again, how local such a system is – that is, how small and how transitory the community sharing the code  
is, — is a matter of degree and has to be determined on a case by case basis.
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Critical Interjection: The World is Around
Before extensionalist theories of meaning are discussed, it is important to understand why 
the structuralist tradition is so reluctant to introduce reference into its theory of meaning 
and to point out what would be the potential benefits of doing so.
Saussure intended to describe  la langue as the conditions for language as abstracted 
from all  langues,  the particular languages that  are given to the linguist  in the form of 
individual speech, parole. As Umberto Eco will put it later, referring to things in the world 
is something that can be done with language and thus belongs to  parole  (Eco 1979, 58). 
And it  seems that Saussure held a similar view.  La langue is the capacity to associate 
systems of differential values. In a given language a semantic field is segmented into units 
differently than in another language. The signs, an expression unit united with a content 
unit, can be used to refer to things in the world. The question whether things in the world 
that fall in the realm of one content unit are of the same kind or not, for Saussure, was not a 
question of linguistics. A Normand puts it: 
Saussure’s concern was not whether or how a language represents the world, 
nor how it is related to thinking. Such philosophical topics were not within his 
purpose. As a linguist, thinking about the nature of language (langue) and how 
best to portray it, his concern was to make apparent how a language works as  
an everyday mechanism, at anyone’s disposal. (Normand 2004, 97)
Saussure rejected a theory of meaning where words are names for things. He seems to 
think that if this would be the case, and concepts would thus just be mental representations 
of the things, then concepts would be given and thus fixed and the same in all languages. 
The only aspect  of a sign that would be different  in  different languages would be the 
sounds that are attached to the concepts that represent things. But since it can be observed 
that languages display different systems of concepts that divide a semantic field differently, 
concepts do not represent things and the meaning of a sign is not given by its function to 
name things, even though, it can be used in this way by the individual speaker. This worry 
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however, only occurs, if the world is though of as consisting of given and fixed kinds of 
things. If things are thought of as being delimited within the system, just as content units, 
the reason for Saussure’s worries disappears.
Umberto  Eco,  writing  within  the  structuralist  tradition,  even  if  he  is  also  strongly 
influenced by Peirce’ pragmatic semiotics, is more explicit about excluding reference from 
a theory of codes. He argues that even if states of affairs in the world might be the reason  
to establish a code, and a sign can be used to refer to them, they are not relevant for the 
functioning of a code. A message containing a term that we take to be referential would  
still  be understood if  the state  of  affairs  would not  be the case.  This  is  shown by the 
possibility  of  lying.  Eco  distinguishes  between  the  conditions  of  signification  and  the 
condition  of  truth,  a  distinction  that  maps  on  the  distinction  between  intensional  and 
extensional semantics (Eco 1979, 58-59).  For Eco, the conditions of truth fall  under  a 
theory of sign production as opposed to a theory of codes. We can reply to this argument 
by saying that telling a lie is in the domain of sign production anyway, but if a theory of  
codes should be able  to  explain why in a situation of  lying the receiver  reacts  with a 
behavior that does not fit the facts, then it must connect the signifier with a state of affairs  
that the receiver expects.
Eco further argues that if a word such as “dog” is used, it refers to all dogs. He writes: 
“But «all existing dogs» is not an object which can be perceived with the senses. It is a set,  
a class, a logical entity.” (Eco 1979, 66) First, it is not clear why a set is not a material 
entity. The set of all dogs is nothing but all dogs. If dogs are material entities, the set of all  
dogs is one as well. Second, a term like “dog” should not be taken to refer to the set as an 
entity,  but  to  every  dog  severally  (at  least  according  to  Goodman,  see  below).  But 
furthermore, it is not clear why what is referred to must be perceptible or even perceived. 
Both  of  Eco’s  arguments  for  content  instead  of  things  as  signifieds  resemble  that  of 
Saussure for sensual impressions instead of the sounds as signifiers. Saussure says that we 
can have the impressions of the sounds in our head (speech-thinking) even if there is no 
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sound. Eco argues we can have the things as concepts in our head without the things being 
around. But that is not an argument against the fact that words refer to things even if those 
are absent when the word is used, as will become clear in the discussion of Putnam’s view. 
One might say with Putnam that referring terms have an indexical component, but they are 
not like deictic gestures (see below). The question is not so much whether we can have a 
satisfying theory of language that can deal with words like “mouse,” – maybe this can be 
achieved without reference to referents – but whether we can have a theory of how mice 
are recognized, as different from, say, rats. Philosophers want to know the conditions for 
knowledge about mice and not only about “mice.” And since language seems to play an 
important role in the generation, acquisition, structuring and maintenance of knowledge, 
they should make their theories of language speak to their epistemology. Now linguists and 
semioticians  are  not  philosophers,  but  if  language  has  a  role  in  epistemology,  then 
epistemology should have a role in a theory of language as well. The world is around and it 
has to be taken into account in any theory of meaning. 
My  main  argument  here,  and  that  goes  orthogonal  to  the  usual  disputes  between 
intensional and extensional semantics, is that the whole idea of segmenting a continuum 
fits better with an extensional theory of meaning. The idea that thought is a “shapeless and 
indistinct mass” is plausible just  because thought is difficult to access and thus can be 
described as anything, even as a “vague, uncharted nebula.” (Saussure, 1959, 111, 112) But 
for the same reason it is not particularly informative. Instead of thinking of a continuum of 
thought that gets  structured into a system of content units  consisting of  forêt and  bois 
delimiting each other, it is easy to speak of a material continuum going from a single tree 
to a group of millions of trees covering many acres of land. Where the idea of a segmented 
continuum of thought becomes untenable is with respect to the differences that define a 
unit. Even if a unit is not defined by some intrinsic property, but instead by its position in a 
system, in the case of sounds, we can still say when two sounds are different. But when are 
two content units different?
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This is why I contrast the structuralist version of an intensionalist semantics with an 
extensionalist  view  presented  below  in  form  of  Putnam’s  account,  instead  of  other 
intensional theories such as those of Frege, Russell or Carnap that are usually contrasted 
with extensional theories such as Putnam’s. Since I am interested in the very notion of 
units delimiting each other in systems of units and intend to apply it to entities in the world  
(which might be objects, events or entities that fall in other ontological categories), I want 
to retain the idea of systems from structuralism, but show that it works also, and even 
better, in an extensionalist framework. A view that combines the virtues of structuralism 
with  extensionalism is  Goodman’s  that  is  therefore  the  last  position  discussed  in  this 
chapter.
Putnam: Signs Refer to Things
Putnam  develops  his  model  of  meaning  in  opposition  to  views  that,  at  least  on  his 
interpretation,  suggest  that  the  extension  of  a  term is  fixed  by its  intension,  which  is 
associated with a psychological state of the person using the term.9 Knowing the meaning 
(intension) of a term, according to this view amounts to the ability to give a description of 
the  objects  the  term refers  to  or  to  name the  properties,  the  possession  of  which  are 
necessary and sufficient criteria for an object to fall in the extension of a term. 10 As an 
alternative to this view, Putnam formulates his socio-linguistic hypothesis, which states 
that someone who uses a word to refer to objects in the world does not need to know of 
9 Putnam’s view is often associated with Kripke’s; Hacking (2007a), instead, argues that what their accounts  
mainly have in common is the rejection of such views and that apart from that they differ in many respects.  
I will not discuss Kripke’s theory here.
10 The view is often called descriptivism and usually associated with the accounts of Frege and Russell.  
Putnam interprets also Carnap as building his account on the speaker’s knowledge. Structuralist semantics 
in the Saussurean tradition, for Putnam would have to be rejected for the same reasons as being mentalistic.  
It would fare even worse in not even giving an account on extension at all. Nevertheless, the amount of 
ignorance it takes to write a paper with the title The meaning of “meaning” and not even mentioning such 
an important tradition in linguistic semantics is surprising.
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any object if it is in the extension of the word. There must, however, be people who are 
experts with respect to the objects that are in the extension of that word. In this way, the 
reference is not fixed through the psychological state of the speaker, but instead through 
the speaker’s membership in a community of language users, which also comprises the 
experts who can fix the reference (Putnam 1975, 227-229). What the experts are capable of 
is to identify objects as being of the same kind. Of any given object the expert must be able 
to decide if it is of the same kind as those objects to which the word applies. This implies 
that objects are the same with respect to a particular property. Putnam’s examples focus on 
“microstructures” or “hidden structures,” (Putnam 1975, 232, 235) because he focuses on 
those words that have a meaning in natural language as well as in science, such as words 
for substances (water, gold) or for biological genera or species (tigers). In these cases the 
experts are the scientists and the properties might be microstructural. 
This view needs not necessarily to be interpreted as essentialist, monistic, or scientistic. 
Putnam is not ignorant towards Goodman’s (e.g. 1972, Ch. IX, 2) remarks that any two 
objects have similar properties. It is not the fact that two objects have any property in 
common that makes them being of a kind, but the fact that the possession of this or that 
property became a reason to attach a label to all possessors. This is compatible with the 
pluralist  conception that  an object can be of many kinds,  or even that objects  become 
delimited differently. Which property is chosen depends on the respective interests.11 There 
is also no need to read Putnam as saying that the expert must in any case be a scientist (as 
e.g. Elgin 1983, 15 does). It can easily be musicians, lawyers, or polo players. Finally, the 
property  that  establishes  the  sameness  relation  is  not  necessarily  a  hidden  or 
microstructural property, neither within nor outside the sciences.
11 Hacking (2007a) emphasizes the non-essentialist and pluralist reading of Putnam (1975), especially in the 
light  of Putnam’s later writings.  There is  also the possibility to advance a less (from my perspective) 
charitable reading, but I am not interested in determining what Putnam actually meant. What is important is  
that if I integrate aspects of his theory in my account then only under the assumption that it is compatible 
with a non-essentialist, pluralistic and non-scientistic account.
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According to Putnam, a (natural) kind term like “water” has “an unnoticed indexical 
component:  ‘water’ is  stuff  that bears a  certain similarity relation to  the water  around 
here.” (Putnam 1975, 234) If someone utters the word “water,” it is not required that she 
has a special knowledge that determines the extension of the term, but instead she uses the 
word to pick out everything that is water, that is, everything that is the same as what is 
called  “water”  by the  linguistic  community she belongs  to,  due  to  its  possession  of  a 
certain  property,  in  this  case  the  chemical  constitution,  which  can,  in  principle,  be 
determined by an expert who is part of that community.12
The  non-expert  speaker  can  use  a  word  to  refer  to  objects  in  the  world,  because 
someone has used the word as a name for things of a certain kind and there is a (causal) 
chain of communication connecting any speaker with the event of naming. Invoking the 
origin of a term in this way is problematic though. It is hard to imagine that there was a  
single event where water was recognized as a substance and given a name. But even in the 
case of relatively recent terms that originated from a scientific context such as “gene” it is 
not straightforward. Even if we know that it was Johannsen who introduced the term in 
1909, the story of the different kinds of entities the term is or was used to refer to and the 
various alternative terms that have been used to name them is quite complicated (Kitcher 
1982). But it can be argued that for Putnam much less hinges on the event of baptizing the 
kind than is often suggested. The recognition of a kind might be a rather blurred process,  
and if there was a single baptist she might have had a very imprecise way of fixing kind 
membership from the perspective of later experts. The important thing is that there are now 
experts in the community who can say if an object belongs to the kind of stuff we came to 
attach a label to. Therefore, Putnam also speaks of collective reference instead of causal  
12 maybe we can compare the situation to a case where a person who was led to a place being blindfolded still 
can meaningfully use the word “here,” relying on the fact that the place can be determined. (Whether there  
is  an  analogue case  where  someone uses  “I”  without  knowing the  referent  depends  on the notion  of  
personal identity one assumes.)
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reference.  What  matters  is  not  the  uninterrupted  causal  chain  from  the  moment  of 
introduction of the term, but the possible chain from a speaker to an expert.
The point in Putnam’s argument that probably lends itself most to an essentialist reading 
is  not  his  constant  invoking of  microstructures,  but  the postulated constancy of  kinds. 
Putnam lets  us  imagine  that  experts  today have  a  better  method to identify gold  than 
Archimedes had (Putnam 1975, 235). Accordingly, there might be some pieces of metal 
that Archimedes called “gold,” but that are, according to today’s standard not gold. Being 
good  pluralists,  we  should  think  that,  since  the  gold  and  non-gold  pieces  had  many 
properties in common, in particular the property that Archimedes used to identify what he 
called “gold,” they were of one kind and Archimedes used the term “gold” (I will use the 
English instead of the Greek term) to  name this  kind.  Today we just  divide the world 
differently,  seeing  a  common  property  among  what  we  call  gold  that  non-gold  lacks. 
Archimedes  categories  are  as  right  as  ours  (fitting  and entrenched).  Putnam,  however, 
argues that when Archimedes applied the term “gold” to what we now recognize as non-
gold, he was wrong. This seems to be in conflict with the pluralism suggested here. But a 
reconciling reading is possible. Archimedes was indeed wrong, if it is assumed that he was 
interested in substances as a natural philosopher. Today’s experts separate non-gold from 
gold, because it “behaves differently” in many (possibly rather artificial lab-) situations. If 
they were now to perform such experiments where gold behaves very differently from non-
gold in Archimedes’ presence, he, being a natural philosopher, could not help but being 
interested in this difference (Putnam 1975, 237). If there is a difference in behavior of a 
substance, there is a difference in kind. There are, of course, differences between any two 
things, but the question is whether these differences have been made visible and if the kind 
of difference is of interest for an observer. Under the assumption that Archimedes had an 
interest in “physico-chemical reactions,” we can say he would agree on the modern use of 
“gold.” 
56
There might be other interests. If one piece of gold has been mined on a Monday and 
the other on Tuesday, there is a difference, but it will not be visible unless the pieces come 
with a paper-label indicating their place and time of mining. If someone were to tell to 
Archimedes that gold mined in place A can be distinguished from gold mined in B, because 
it  has  a  slightly  higher  amount  of  copper  traces,  which  makes  it  more  reddish,  then 
Archimedes, being a polymath and thus also interested in geology as well as trade issues, 
would immediately agree that there are two kinds of gold, gold from A and gold from B 
and he would agree that different names should be used. How the names are applied if a 
new difference is made visible is another story. One can use “gold” for gold or for non-
gold or use it to name the kind made up of non-gold and gold, and use two new names to 
address the difference.13
Returning to the expert/non-expert  relation,  Putnam notes that the non-expert is still 
required  to  possess  some kind  of  knowledge  associated  with  that  term,  which  mainly 
comprises some characteristic properties of the objects in the extension of the term, what 
he  calls  the  stereotype.  It  allows  the  non-expert  to  understand  statements  that  make 
reference to these objects, but it is not what fixes the reference. Indeed it can even be false. 
Though the speaker might use the term in the absence of objects in its extension to refer to 
them, she might also encounter an object, of which she needs to determine of which kind it 
is. She will settle the case by relying on stereotypic properties.
Putnam concentrates on the expert’s capacity to determine kind membership and the 
role of stereotypes for the non-expert language user. It is important, however, to realize that 
also the expert has a specific knowledge associated with the kind, about the properties that 
settle  kind  membership  and  the  operations  that  test  for  these  properties.  Since  the 
knowledge itself is not meant to be the intension of the term, we have to think of it as 
13 Hacking (2007b), commenting on jade as one of the other examples of kinds given by Putnam wonderfully 
shows — drawing on work by La Porte (2004),  — how different  names have been attached to  track 
different types of differences, ranging from differences in superficial color, via place of origin to chemical  
reactions.
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having the same format as the stereotype, just being more refined. Thus on the one hand, 
experts have specific knowledge attached to the name and they also speak about objects 
when they are not present. On the other hand, even if non-experts might often use terms in 
the absence of the objects they refer to, they also apply operations to determine the kind 
membership of an object if they meet one, just not as reliable ones. If a lay speaker uses a 
term like “gene,” she refers to genes, although she will never encounter genes (although 
she might encounter the gene’s effects, which are also the scientists’ access to genes), but 
in the case of a piece of gold, the non-expert speaker has her ways of recognizing the 
object as belonging to the kind, which consist in testing for the properties that are part of 
the stereotype. Imagine a person who encounters a piece of metal and wants to test whether 
it is gold by looking for the property yellow color, which is part of the stereotype. It can 
easily be seen that looking at the object is an operation just as in the case of the expert, just 
an unreliable one. For instance, the person will hold the object in appropriate light, so that 
she will be able to evaluate the color. The operational character becomes even clearer when 
she bites on the object to test the degree of hardness. The relation between the experts and 
the non-experts with respect to their knowledge and operations can be summarized in Table 
2.2.
Expert  → Communication links → Non-expert
Deciding 
operation
 → Simplification or refinement ← 
Hinting operation
Knowledge
Stereotypic 
knowledge
Table 2.2. Comparison and relation between experts and lay speakers
There are two shortcomings of Putnam’s account with respect to an account of meaning 
that is supposed to speak to the problem of the individuation of objects or properties. First, 
the expert’s “ways of recognizing” something as being of a certain kind, that is, the notion 
of operation, is not explicated. Second, the theory of the common knowledge the speaker 
employs (the markers and the stereotype) is not well elaborated. Both shortcomings result 
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from ignorance towards the systemic nature of meaning. I will concentrate on the role of 
operations below. Concerning the second shortcoming, linguists and cognitive scientists 
have very elaborated theories about the format of mental representations to offer, which 
will not be discussed here.
I follow Putnam, however, in maintaining that there are terms that are not only used to 
refer to stuff in the world, but that do refer. Reference cannot be relegated to pragmatics. 
Instead the distinction between semantics and pragmatics should be taken as what it is: a 
broad indication  of  dimensions  of  the  same process,  not  as  designating  two separated 
domains that require separated theories. Putnam’s arguments do not only show, contra Eco, 
that  it  is  possible to refer  to  things  if  they are absent  or make up an indefinite  set  of 
individuals, but that we can even refer to them without having the content unit. A non-
expert can use the term “gene” and refer to genes as what experts would determine to be 
genes, without even having a proper stereotype at all. What terms refer to is part of their 
meaning, even if the kind of object referred to is not around or if the speaker would not be 
able to recognize it if she sees one. I pursued a pluralist interpretation of Putnam, that  
makes his extensionalism more compatible with Goodman’s, which will be discussed next, 
in order to see how the systemic nature of language and other symbol systems that was 
emphasized in structuralist semiotics can be retained in an extensional semantics. The first 
shortcoming of Putnam’s view, a missing explication of operations, is shared by Goodman. 
A fix will be attempted afterwards (Chapter 3.).
Finally,  it  should  be  remarked  that  Putnam’s  sociolinguistic  theory  adds  another 
dimension to language as a social institution, apart from the maintenance of conventions 
that was emphasized by Saussure. In the context of this thesis, I will only speak about the 
limited social group of scientists. But, of course, scientists are always only experts with 
respect  to  some kinds  of  things  and  most  of  the  time  use  kind  terms  as  non-experts. 
Putnam’s thesis of the division of linguistic labour, which on the present account implies a 
division  of  operational  labour,  should therefore  be  kept  in  mind in  order  to  make the 
59
analysis of scientific practice sensible to the question whether a user of terms referring to 
parts and properties of organisms is speaking as an expert or non-expert with respect to this 
term.
Goodman 1: Things in Systems
For  Goodman,  as  for  Putnam,  the  most  important  aspect  of  meaning  is  extension.14 
Reference is the fundamental relation between symbols and the world. It works in both 
directions. Labels (verbal, pictorial or other) denote the objects they apply to and refer to 
them. Objects instantiate the labels they comply with and under some circumstances can be 
used to exemplify the labels. In this case they are samples (or exemplars) and refer to the 
labels.
This is in contrast to the structuralist tradition, where a label (signifier or expression 
unit), or its sensual impression, denotes a concept (signified or content unit), instead of 
objects in the world. Furthermore, the way a sample signifies would be spelled out in terms 
of denotation as well in a structuralist account, such that an object in some circumstances 
would be said to denote the property it exemplifies as a content unit. 
Thus Goodman’s theory of reference does not only warrant to speak about labels as 
applying to things in the world, but also introduces an important difference in the way 
objects  refer  to  others.  Exemplification  is  particularly  important  for  complementing 
Putnam’s theory, because what the expert does when ascertaining the kind membership of 
an object, is to use it to exemplify the kind by letting it exemplify the property that defines 
the kind (or rather the label that applies to all objects that possess the property). But most 
importantly, Goodman, and that distinguishes him from most philosophical accounts on 
meaning in the analytical tradition, especially from other extensionalist  accounts, has a 
notion of system, that was emphasized so strongly in the Saussurean tradition, but which is 
14 To  be  precise,  for  Putnam  meaning  is  extension  plus  stereotype,  while  Goodman  just  speaks  of  the 
extension of a term and reserves meaning for another aspect (see below).
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in his case applied to the relation between labels and objects, and not to that of sounds and 
thoughts.15
Before  we  turn  to  Goodman’s  notion  of  a  system,  some  details  of  his  account  on 
reference are in place (Elgin 1983, 19-23, provides a convenient summary). In the case of 
singular denotation, a label denotes one object or a group of objects. Thus “Mont Blanc” 
denotes the Mont Blanc and “Mont Blanc Group” denotes the 18 peaks of the Mont Blanc 
Group. A general label such as “peak” denotes all the objects in its extension (all peaks). It 
does not denote the class of peaks. If one is not a strict nominalist, as Goodman is, one can 
allow for labels that denote classes. Elgin gives the example of the label “human” that  
denotes all humans severally and “humanity,” which denotes the class of all humans. If a 
label denotes distributively, such as “human” or “peak,” it denotes all humans or peaks that 
exist,  that have existed and that will exist.  If a label denotes an object or event in the 
future, or in the past, such that we have no secure knowledge about it, its extension is 
unsettled. If the future arrives and the object fails to exits, the extension is null.
Exemplification  is  reference  of  an  exemplar  to  a  label  that  denotes  it.16 An  object 
possesses as many properties as there are labels that apply to it, which means, in principle, 
indefinitely many (but of course not all). An object can only exemplify those labels that 
15 Apart  from  remarking  that  his  general  theory  of  symbols  can  be  seen  as  an  extension  to  structural  
linguistics (Goodman 1976, xi), Goodman makes no reference to the structuralist tradition, not in form of 
its American branch, let alone in form of the French (or Italian) heirs of Saussure. In particular, he neglects  
other attempts to construct a general semiotics that is going beyond the linguistic sign systems.
16 Goodman uses “sample” instead of “exemplar,” because he introduces the semantic concept with examples  
that we would readily classify as samples, such as a tailor’s swatch. But once the relation is described, it  
becomes clear that it appears in many contexts where we would not call the exemplifying object a sample, 
such as when a work of art exemplifies. We can, of course, still use “sample” as a terminus technicus that 
has to be understood differently from the ordinary language word (namely in the way Goodman defines it), 
but still, “exemplar” seems more neutral. In science for instance, the term “sample” is used frequently, but  
even if all samples in science exemplify,  not everything that  exemplifies is a sample in the sense that  
scientists use this term.
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apply to it and thereby be an exemplar of the other things to which this particular label 
applies. But it does not exemplify all the labels it complies with in every situation. While 
in the case of labels “to denote is to refer” (Goodman 1976, 52), in the case of objects mere 
instantiation is not reference. An object that complies with many labels might be perceived 
and used for many things, but only if it is used to refer to one of the labels it instantiates, is  
it an exemplar of the kind of thing the label refers to.
Reference cannot only go from labels to objects or objects to labels, but it can also go 
indirectly from objects to objects or more remote labels, or from labels to other labels or 
more  remote  objects.  Goodman  speaks  of  chains  of  reference  (Goodman  1984).  To 
explicate the notion, he introduces a denotational hierarchy. On the lowest level are objects 
and labels with null-denotation (fictive labels);  on the next higher level are labels that 
denote and on the next level labels that denote denoting labels. Above there are labels that 
denote labels that denote labels that denote and so on. Now “any referential chain from an 
element to another at  the same denotational level must pass through at  least  one other 
denotational  level.”  (Goodman  1984,  63)  Take  the  following  example  of  showing  to 
someone the color of one’s house on a card with small fields of sample colors: the label 
“top  right  field”  will  denote  and thus  refer  to  the  actual  field,  while  the  field  in  this 
situation exemplifies and thus refers to the label “red,” which in turn refers to the house.
Having explained how Goodman understands reference, I can now turn to his notion of 
system. In Goodman’s terminology,  labels  belong to families of alternative labels,  that 
form a scheme, which organizes a realm, the part of the world it is applied to, into ranges 
of extension of the alternative labels (Goodman 1976, 71-72).  A realm organized by a 
scheme is what Goodman calls a system. We can clearly see the parallel to Saussure’s 
systems of sounds and thoughts. The labels delimit each other’s ranges of extension, thus 
we might say with Saussure the labels as well as the kinds of objects have a value only 
within the system. The organization of a realm, or field of reference, can be the sorting of 
objects or the individuation of objects (Elgin 1983, 38-39). The realm can be thought of as 
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one object or class of objects  that constitutes the range of extension of one label  in a 
scheme  that  organizes  a  larger  realm,  which  figures  in  another  system,  and  so  forth. 
Concerning the sorting of objects for example, the scheme consisting of the labels “Gram-
positive” and “Gram-negative” organizes the realm of bacteria, which is the extension of 
the label  “bacterium” that  forms  a scheme with  “archaea”  that  organizes  the realm of 
prokaryotes  that  results  from  the  schema  consisting  of  “eukaryote”  and  “prokaryote” 
organizing the realm of organisms and so forth. If we have a eukaryote cell as a realm, 
which  is  the  extension  of  the  label  “eukaryote  cell,”  which  forms  a  scheme  with 
“prokaryote cell,” a sub-scheme consisting of “organelle” and “cytosol” can organize the 
realm in the sense of individuating objects (parts) instead of sorting them (decomposition). 
Though “organelle” can be part of a scheme that organizes the realm in the extension of 
“eukaryote cell,” the labels “organelle,” “cell” and “tissue” could form another scheme, 
organizing the realm of the organism in a hierarchical decompositional fashion.
Accordingly, although Goodman does not make this point, a scheme (a set of labels) can 
be thought of as belonging to another label, which is either a hypernym (rendering the 
labels  in  the  scheme  hyponyms)  or  a  holonym  (where  the  labels  in  the  scheme  are 
meronyms). The first semantic relation pertains to labels that denote objects or properties 
and a label that denotes a more general class (“yellow,” “green” and “blue” are hyponyms 
and  “colors”  is  the  according  hypernym,  but  also  “mice,”  “rats”  and  “squirrels”  are 
hyponyms, where “rodents” is the hypernym). The second semantic relation applies where 
the labels denote parts and the other label denotes the whole (“organelle,” “cytosol” and 
“cell wall” are meronyms of the holonym “cell”). It has to be noted that the hypernym or 
holonym to  which  a  scheme belongs  does  not  necessarily  have  the  realm the  scheme 
organizes as its extension. Thus “yellow,” “green” and “blue” can organize the realm of 
flowers, but “flower” is not the hypernym to the color-terms, but “colors” is. I suggest 
therefore taking “colored” as the hypernym, because in this way the objects sorted by the 
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scheme of hyponyms are in the extension of the hypernym. Since this is not the way the 
term “hypernym” is usually used, I will speak of meta-labels to which a scheme belongs. 
A scheme that functions in a given system can be applied to a different realm. And a 
realm that is usually structured by one scheme can be organized by another scheme. In that 
case the labels are used metaphorically (Goodman 1976, 74ff.). Thus also metaphorical 
reference  has  the  same systemic  nature  as  literal  reference.  Applying  a  folk  botanical 
scheme that usually organizes the realm of indoor plants in a metaphorical way, one might 
say that  one  person instead  of  another  is  a  cactus  instead  of  a  flower.  One  label  can 
function in several schemes, such as when “green” is opposed to other color predicates in 
one scheme and to “ripe” in another. And obviously parts of one realm can also be part of 
another realm. The DNA of an organism is part of the realm of the cell that is organized by 
a complex scheme of labels for cellular constituents, but it is also part of the realm of 
factors influencing ontogeny, which also comprises many labels that apply to factors of the 
environment.
According to the above said, exemplification must be systemic as well. To modify an 
example from Elgin (Elgin 1983, 72): A free sample packet of breakfast cereals might be 
distributed per mail to all households in an area. A customer might understand that this 
sample is supposed to exemplify “crunchy” and “healthy,” and not “arrives by mail” let 
alone  “free.”  This  is  because  the  customer  is  familiar  with  the  convention  of  product 
samples. But if the packet is presented together with the description of its distribution in a 
marketing seminar, the participants might not immediately figure out which of the labels 
that  apply to  it  are  exemplified  until  the instructor  announces  “You have to  bring the 
product to the people instead of waiting for the people to come to the product!” What he 
says is: This object and its mode of distribution by mail instead of another object that is 
given away for free in the supermarket exemplifies “bringing the product to the people” 
instead of “letting the people come to the product.” From this contrast the listener can 
derive the realm (modes of food sample distribution) and the scheme. Grasping the system, 
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she can also make the following contrast: This object exemplifies “mode of distribution” 
instead of “eating experience,” and thereby exclude “crunchy,” as one of the labels that 
organizes the realm of eating experiences.17 What I want to put forward is that no object 
alone is an exemplar, but only an object that is, at least implicitly, in contrast with another 
object (or many), just as no label has an extension except in contrast to the other labels in a  
scheme.
It has to be remarked that the meaning of a label for Goodman cannot be equated to its 
extension (this is why I said he uses “meaning” differently from Putnam). This becomes 
obvious in his discussion of synonymy. Two predicates such as “being gram-negative” and 
“having an outer membrane” are co-extensive, when taken as labels of schemes organizing 
bacteria.  Nevertheless,  they  do  not  have  the  same  meaning.  Goodman  suggests  the 
following test to determine same or different meaning. Two labels have the same meaning,  
if all their parallel compounds, that is all compounds of both labels with a same third label 
are co-extensive (Goodman 1976, 204-205). Consider the compound labels “test for being 
Gram-negative” and “test for having an outer membrane.” Since there is certainly another 
test  for  determining  whether  a  bacterium  has  an  outer  membrane  except  from Gram 
staining, that falls in the extension of the second compound label, the two labels will not be 
co-extensive, and therefore the two atomic labels are not synonymous, that is, they do not 
have the same meaning. Note how meaning, which is used here in a context that is the 
classical motivation for intensional semantics (Sinn and Bedeutung) is, even if not reduced 
to, still spelled out in terms of extension.
The  above  was  mainly  concerned  with  linguistic  labels.  Pictures  and  other  non-
linguistic labels, according to Goodman, represent through denoting as well (they can also 
exemplify, but then they do not function as labels but as exemplars). Similarity has often 
17 Elgin uses the terms scheme and realm in the direction of reference. Thus a set of exemplars is a scheme 
that organizes a realm of labels (Elgin 1983, 122). I will not follow this suggestion, but speak about realms 
always as the extension of a set of labels that make up a scheme. Otherwise the description becomes too 
complicated when speaking of reference from exemplar to label and from label to exemplar together.
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been advanced as a way to explicate the representational force of pictures. Goodman gives 
four arguments against this view (Goodman 1976, 4). First,  the relation of similarity is 
reflexive; the relation of representation is not. Although an object is similar to itself, it does 
not necessarily represent itself. Second, similarity, but not representation is symmetrical. 
An object is always as similar to another object as this latter one is to the first, but still the  
first can represent the second without the second representing the first. Third, things can be 
similar without being in the relation of representation at all. And finally, an object, also a 
representing picture, can be very dissimilar to the object it represents, but still represent it. 
Goodman does not deny that often times there are similarities between a picture and the 
object it represents. His general concern, which underlies his whole philosophy, is not that 
there are  no similarities,  but  that  there are  too many (Goodman 1972,  Ch IX, 2).  His 
mantra goes: Two objects share as many similarities with each other than any of them with 
any other object.18 So the point is, just like similarity between objects does not determine a 
kind and thus the extension of a label, but, instead, the label groups the objects of a kind 
and thus points out the relevant similarities, pictures do not represent due to similarity, but 
instead, in denoting the object can point out the similarities between the picture and the 
object and thereby make the properties in which they are similar obvious, which might 
have gone unnoticed before.19 The argument is important, because images are ubiquitous in 
18 An insight that Peirce attributes to Augustus de Morgan: “A great oversight which had vitiated the entire  
discourse of logicians about marks, and had prevented them from fully understanding what marks are, was 
corrected by Augustus de Morgan when he observed that any collection whatever of individuals has some 
mark common and peculiar to them. That it is so will appear when we consider that nothing prevents a list  
of all the things in that collection from being drawn up. Now, the mere being upon that list, although it has 
not actually been drawn up, constitutes a common and peculiar mark of those individuals. Of course, if  
anybody tries  to  specify a  number  of  individuals  that  have  no common and peculiar  mark,  this  very 
specification confers upon their common and peculiar mark a new degree of actuality.” (Peirce 1905, 43)
19 Goodman’s famously illustrates the point with the following anecdote: “To a complaint that his portrait of 
Gertrude Stein did not look like her, Picasso is said to have answered, ‘No matter; it will.’” (Goodman 
1976, 33; see also Robert Schwartz 1985)
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science  and  also  important  with  respect  to  the  representation  of  characters.  Besides 
similarity (iconicity) there is causality (indexicality) as a candidate to explicate the notion 
of representation in these cases. Goodman is silent about this, but an argument, parallel to 
Goodman’s arguments against similarity as determining representation can be construed 
with respect to causality in indexical representation. An index cannot represent by virtue of 
its  causal relation to the object it  signifies,  because it  might actually stand in a causal 
relation to many objects without representing them and the signified object stands in a 
causal  relation  to  many  objects  that  do  not  represent  it.  Rather  this  particular  causal 
relation becomes salient, because the index is used to represent the object that is because it 
refers to it. In the following, I will discuss the concepts that Goodman offers to analyze 
different symbol systems, including non-linguistic forms of representation, which are so 
abundant in science.
Goodman 2: Dense and Articulated Symbol Systems
Any utterance or inscription or other occurrence of a symbol that is produced or perceived, 
Goodman calls a “mark.” A “character” (a symbol theoretic term used by Goodman, not to 
be confused with biological characters which are the subject of this thesis) is a class of 
marks. Marks can have some features that are constitutive and others that are contingent. 
Constitutive features are those that marks that belong to the same character must share to 
be character indifferent. Marks of the same character might have contingent features and 
even share them, but every such mark could be replaced by a mark that does not posses 
these  additional  features.  Thus  marks  of  a  character  are  replicas  with  respect  to  the 
constitutive features. (Goodman 1976, 131-132; Elgin 1983, 97-98) Characters can also be 
compounds, “if the marks that belong to it are composed of marks that belong to other 
characters,” otherwise they are atomic (Elgin 1983, 99). Words in English such as “do” are 
compounds. The mark “do” belongs to the character [English word do] and is composed of  
the marks “d” and “o” that belong to the characters [fourth letter of the Latin alphabet] and 
[fifteenth letter of the Latin alphabet], respectively.
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Systems (in a broad sense, comprising many scheme/realm systems) can differ in their 
syntactic and semantic properties. In particular they can be disjoint or non-disjoint and, 
independently of that property, they can be differentiated or dense, both syntactically and 
semantically.  On the  semantic  level  they can  also  be  ambiguous  or  not,  while  on  the 
syntactic side they can be attenuated or replete. Thus there are a variety of different types 
of  systems,  although  not  all  of  these  properties  can  be  freely  combined.  The  major 
distinction,  however,  is  that  between  syntactically  and  semantically  differentiated  and 
syntactically and semantically dense systems, which can be captured by speaking of digital 
and analogue systems, or, as I will prefer articulated and dense systems. It has to be noted 
that being dense or differentiated is not a property of marks or their referents. The same 
mark can be interpreted under a dense or under an articulated system (Goodman and Elgin 
1988, 127). For instance, while our Latin letters are usually interpreted under an articulated 
system, such that we can replace a handwritten letter by a printed one, a forensic document 
examiner will apply a dense interpretation to the same letter mark. With respect to the 
different actions that relate to dense and articulated representations, I will later speak of 
thick and thin phenomena as  their  referents.  Now I  shall  explain  in  more  detail  these 
syntactic and semantic properties of systems.
A system is syntactically disjoint, if its characters are disjoint, meaning that none of the 
marks that belong to a character also belongs to another character (this requirement holds 
within a system — a mark might well be additionally interpreted under another system and 
thus belong to another character under this interpretation). Accordingly, if a mark belongs 
to two characters, but its replicas do not all belong to both characters as well (which would 
render the two characters one character) then these two characters would be non-disjoint. 
Syntactic differentiation of a system is the case if “for every two characters K and K’, 
and every mark  m that does not actually belong to both, determination that  m does not 
belong to  K or that  m does not belong to K’” is theoretically possible. (Goodman 1976, 
135-136) This complicated definition is easier to understand if we look at cases of non-
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differentiation or density: Systems are dense if they “provide for an infinity of characters 
so ordered that between any two there is a third.” (Elgin 1983, 99) That is, the system 
allows for the infinite construction of marks such that any of them belongs to a different 
character and this is why it is impossible to determine whether it belongs to one or another,  
as  it  is  required  for  differentiation.  The  ordering  matters  here.  Take  a  gauge  without 
graduating  dots  or  figures  on  the  dial  that  measures  some continuous  quantity.  If  we 
determine  the  position  of  the  pointer  (a  mark),  every  position  constitutes  a  character, 
because every different position would be a mark that differs from another in a significant 
respect and thus belongs to another character. But how can we determine the exact position 
of the pointer? It seems that every time we look more closely, we would assign the mark to 
a new character (is its position at 12° or 12,1° or 12,09° etc.?) and thus between every two 
characters there is a third. Therefore, we cannot determine that the mark belongs to one and 
not  another  character.  There  might  be  perceptual  or  technical  limits  to  our  ability  to 
discriminate the actual pointer position ever more finely, but the symbol system itself does 
not set such limits. Such a meter is analogue, because it is syntactically dense. The fact that 
it is not the mark in itself that is analogue, but the system, is easily illustrated if we imagine 
a dial that has graduating dots and the position of the pointer is interpreted such that it 
indicates  the  position  of  the  dot  closest  to  it.  The  same mark  is  now interpreted  in  a  
syntactically differentiated system.
Differentiation  and  disjointness  are  independent.  Our  letters  (qua characters)  are 
differentiated and disjoint, but if a letter-mark would belong to two letters, but its replicas 
would each belong to only one, the system would be non-disjoint, but still differentiated 
(the examples  given by Goodman and Elgin  are  fairly artificial,  and it  seems that  the 
combination of syntactic non-disjointness and differentiatedness is rather rare). And even if 
we have problems determining to which character a mark belongs in the segmented dial,  
every mark belongs to only one character, thus the system is disjoint even if it is dense.  
(Goodman 1976, 137)
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Concerning semantic disjointness, we have to look at the relation between a mark and 
its extension or compliance class, that is, the class of objects it denotes as well as at the 
relation between an object and the compliance class it belongs to. A system is semantically 
disjoint, if marks of different characters have different compliance classes and if no object 
belongs to more than one compliance class. There can also be a situation where marks of 
different characters have different compliance classes, but there are some objects that fall 
in more than one compliance class. A system where many marks of different characters 
have the same compliance class is redundant. A system is only semantically disjoint if both 
criteria are met that is if it is not redundant and every object is in the extension of marks of 
only one character; otherwise it is non-disjoint (Goodman 1976, 149-152; Elgin 1983, 102-
103).
Ambiguity is the case when marks of the same character differ in extension, that is have 
different  compliance  classes.  The  marks  of  unambiguous  characters  all  have  the  same 
compliance class. There can also be a situation where a single mark has more than one 
compliance class.  Being ambiguous or unambiguous is  a  property of  systems different 
from semantic disjointness (Goodman 1976, 147; Elgin 1983, 101-102).
Semantic differentiatedness requires that “for every two characters of the system, and 
every  object  that  does  not  actually  comply  with  both,  it  is  theoretically  possible  to 
determine that the object in question does not comply with one or that it does not comply 
with the other.” (Elgin 1983, 103) In parallel to syntactic differentiation we can understand 
this  definition  by looking  at  semantic  density:  Here  compliance  classes  (and  thus  the 
characters to which the marks belong that have the compliance class as their extension) are 
again so ordered that between every two there is a third. That means for every object that is 
in a compliance class that we cannot say whether it is not in another compliance class 
instead, if we look more closely. Elgin gives the example of the color of a damson plum. Is 
it purple, dark purple, halfway between dark purple and deep purple, halfway between dark 
purple and the shade that is halfway between dark purple and deep purple and so on? 
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(Elgin  1983,  102)  The  problem is  not  with  plums,  but  with  the  system of  discursive 
language, which is semantically dense in that its characters are so ordered that between 
every two there is another so that we cannot determine that an object does not fall in the 
compliance  class  of  the  one,  or  that  it  does  not  fall  in  that  of  another.  A specialized 
restricted language (or subsystem) that some plum farmers and wholesalers might have 
agreed  on could  provide  only the  characters  “dark  purple”  and “deep purple”;  such a 
language would be semantically differentiated.
Systems that are both syntactically and semantically disjoint and differentiated as well 
as  unambiguous,  are  called  notations  by Goodman.  Western  standard  musical  notation 
comes  close  to  this  type  of  system as  well  as  blueprints  for  electrical  circuits.  Such 
notations are  determining their  compliant  performances or circuits.  Other  notations  are 
determined by what complies with them. This is the case with measurements performed 
with a digital (in the sense of syntactically and semantically disjoint and differentiated) 
gauge and also with diagrams that register such digital measurements. Languages (in the 
narrow sense of ordinary languages such as English) are syntactically differentiated, but 
semantically dense (as shown by the plum example). However, notational systems that are 
semantically differentiated can be derived from languages and often are in more specific 
contexts. In science, language is often used in a notational way, that is, semantic density is 
reduced.  Ordinary  language  with  its  openness  that  stems  from  its  semantic  density 
Goodman  calls  “discursive  language.”  There  are,  as  we  saw,  gauges  that  record 
analogically, and, accordingly, there are diagrams that are syntactically and semantically 
dense. Many pictures (such as paintings and drawings, but excluding notational diagrams, 
of course) are syntactically and semantically dense as well. Here a last distinction is in 
place that Goodman illustrates with the following example (Goodman 1976, 229-230): A 
momentary electrocardiogram and a Hokusai drawing of Mt. Fujiyama could consist of 
indistinguishable marks (black zigzagged lines on white background) but they are still part 
of  different  types  of  symbol  systems.  Both  systems  are  analogue,  but  whereas  in  the 
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electrocardiogram, the only constituent features are the relations of each point in the line to 
the x and y axis (even if we cannot say how many points there are, because the system is 
syntactically dense), while all other features such as the color or thickness of the line or the 
type of ink or paper (within the technically possible limits) are contingent. In the drawing 
all  features  are  constitutive.  Thus  a  drawing  (and  also  a  painting  or  a  sculpture  and 
probably many other symbol systems) has a large amount of constituent features (probably 
indefinitely many, although it still can have contingent features). It belongs to a symbol 
system that is syntactically replete, while an analogue diagram is syntactically attenuated 
in  that  it  has  only  a  few  constitutive  features.  The  difference  is  obviously  gradual. 
Goodman calls  attenuated  systems “diagrammatic,”  although we saw that  some of  the 
symbols  we  call  “diagrams”  are  notational.  Replete  systems  can  be  called 
“representational,” but it has to be kept in mind that the term “representation” is often used 
in  a  broader  sense.  Table  2.3.  summarizes  the rough classification of  symbol  systems, 
although it has to be noted that the combinations of the discussed criteria would allow for a 
more fine-grained classification.
digital (articulated) analogue (dense)
syntactic differentiated differentiated dense dense
semantic differentiated dense dense dense
synt. repleteness attenuated replete
system type notational discursive diagrammatic representational
Table  2.3.  Types  of  symbol  systems  according  to  their  syntactic  and  
semantic properties
Since this is particularly important for my reconstruction of different character concepts, I 
have to explain how these syntactic and semantic features also apply to exemplificational 
systems. Imagine a micrograph of a cell. First I will consider denotation again. The image 
functions as a label, that is, it denotes the cell. We can take the picture as a whole denoting 
the cell as a whole. In this case the image (probably with other images) constitutes an 
articulated system. But usually a scientist will take the structure of the image to represent 
the structure of the cell. In this case the image is interpreted as an analogue system. Every 
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fragment of the image can be a mark so that it is impossible to say that a mark does not 
belong to one character instead of another, for between every two characters there is a 
third. Again, technical resolution might put a limit on the density of the system, but this is 
not part of the interpretation.20 Such a system is also semantically dense, because for every 
object  (fragment  of  the  cell)  it  is  impossible  to  say  that  it  does  not  belong  to  one 
compliance class or not to the others, because the compliance classes, that is the extension 
of the characters of the image are so ordered that between every two there is a third. The 
image is also relatively replete, because many of its features are constituent. But all of this 
concerns the denotation of the cell by the image. When it comes to exemplification, we 
could look at the way the cell exemplifies the image, but this way of symbolization rarely 
takes place, because often the only access to the cell is the image. 
I will instead look at the way the image exemplifies the labels that describe the cell via 
indirect  reference.  Now  the  fragments  of  the  image  are  not  denoting  marks,  but 
exemplifying  marks.  Instead  of  speaking  of  marks  and  characters  in  the  case  of 
exemplifying symbols as well, as Goodman does, I will speak of partial objects and kinds 
of partial objects, but it has to be kept in mind that there are no objects and kinds outside a  
symbol system, whether it is denotational or exemplificational. For every object such as a 
fragment of the image it is impossible to say that it belongs to one kind of object rather  
than the other, because under a dense interpretation, the kinds are so ordered that between 
every  two  kinds  there  is  a  third.  The  system  is  thus  syntactically  dense.  It  is  also 
semantically  dense  in  that,  for  every  object  (for  every  fragment  of  the  image)  it  is 
impossible to decide if it exemplifies one label or the other. The labels that describe the 
objects  are  so  ordered  that  between  every  two  there  is  a  third.  That  is,  the  image  is 
analogue or dense and its description is dense as well. An analogue representation allows 
for an articulated reading. Therefore, in cases where a phenomenon, e.g. a cell or an organ,  
20 The interpretation might be said, instead, to dictate to move to a technique with higher resolution if the 
limit is reached.
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is actually interpreted as exemplifying in a dense system, I will speak of the cell or organ 
as representing as a thick phenomenon, or of a thick concept of a cell or organ (see Chapter 
3).
A diagram of a cell, schematically showing some main components and their relative 
spatial relations (in one of the possible cell states or phases) is articulated. The objects that 
make up the cell in this system can be taken to exemplify in a semantically differentiated 
way the labels that describe it. It is not a property of the world to be dense. If the world is 
represented as consisting of differentiated objects, or as exemplifying differentiated labels, 
then it appears differentiated. If it is represented as undifferentiated and as exemplifying 
labels in a dense scheme, then it  appears undifferentiated.  And articulatedness is not a 
property of denoting labels. Even the schematic diagram of a cell can be interpreted as 
symbolizing densely.  Imagine a  historian of biology,  who wants to  find out whether  a 
certain diagram was drawn by Professor  X or by her  assistant.  The historian will  pay 
attention  to  differences  that  do  not  symbolize  in  the  biological  use  of  the  diagram. 
Concerning the other direction of changing the interpretational scheme, of course,  it  is 
possible  to  arrive  at  an  articulated  representation  of  a  cell,  starting  from an  analogue 
representation  (micrograph),  but  this  means  to  interpret  the  image  under  a  different 
scheme, as differentiated and attenuated. This interpretation could lead to the diagram of 
the cell.  But  obviously this  does  not  go without  many decisions  about  how to fix the 
characters and which aspects to take as constitutive,  and different interpretations could 
yield different diagrams.
The  distinctions  presented  in  this  section  are  of  particular  importance,  because  in  the 
second part,  I  will  analyse the character concepts of the different disciplines mainly in 
terms of the ways characters are represented, that is I will ask whether they are represented 
in dense or in articulated symbol systems. As I mentioned above, if phenomena figure in 
articulated systems, I will speak of thin phenomena, but also if they are represented by a 
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symbol  that  allows  for  a  reading  in  a  dense  system,  but  is  actually  interpreted  as 
articulated. Only if they are represented and interpreted in a dense system, I will speak of 
thick  phenomena.  The  distinction  between  thick  and  thin  thus  covers  more  than  the 
syntactic and semantic properties of representations that figure in concept formation. It 
captures different attitudes towards the represented that articulate themselves in different 
actions that follow the acts of representation. This idea will be elaborated in Chapter 3.3.
Critical Chapter Conclusion: Missing in Action
In this section I want to make the point that all of the theories discussed above are missing 
an account of the role of action in the context of meaning. Saussure’s structuralism has 
been explored in order to gain a sensibility for the systemic nature of signs. However, the 
rejection of the view of words as names for things by Saussure, led to a theory about the 
relation of sign-vehicles and concepts, which is not suitable for my purposes, that is to 
analyze how people speak about things in the world,  in particular,  about  characters of 
organisms. I have argued that things should be introduced in the systemic picture. The 
point is not to keep things outside of representation in order make representation less rigid, 
as Saussure did, but to keep them inside in order to present the recognition of things as a 
dynamic process. Things are only there within symbol systems. And this is to say that they 
exist only in opposition to other things. The system of oppositions imprints on, organizes 
and correlates all layers from expression, via content to behavior and things.
Putnam’s theory emphasizes the role of reference, but lost the systemic perspective. It 
is, however, attentive to the type of knowledge that is attached to a label (the stereotype, 
the expert’s knowledge about defining operations). Goodman instead does not provide the 
means to speak about the conventional knowledge a sender or receiver of a symbol has to 
have and that determines her choice and interpretation of signs. But just because one wants 
a  theory  of  meaning  to  include  things,  one  does  not  need  to  throw  out  thoughts. 
Extensional theories of meaning will not fully get rid of talk implying some form of mental 
content, and they are better off if they make that explicit as Putnam does, than by trying to 
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hide it as an embarrassment. Goodman also does not emphasize the social character of 
language as much as Saussure and Putnam, although it is implicit in his account. 
Goodman  is  not  interested  in  the  genesis  and  maintenance  of  meaning.  He,  quite 
explicitly, rejects a historical perspective on language, looking purely at the synchronic 
relations between symbols and things. But even if there are rarely distinct baptismal events 
of  the  type  that  Putnam  mentions,  descriptive  means  are  needed  to  account  for  the 
generation, maintenance and adjustment of meaning over time, if one analyses science. 
And since Goodman’s notion of entrenchment is diachronic,  and is meant to provide a 
criterion for the rightness of a symbol, a way to describe the history of symbol systems 
should be part of a theory of such systems.
The disinterest in label introducing event, is also the reason that Goodman does not 
provide a way to describe the operations that make an object exemplify what ever it shall  
exemplify. All theories presented so far lack an account of the role of action in meaning, 
that is, its relation to labels, concepts and referents. Before I specify the role of action, let 
me  briefly  use  Putnam’s  gold  example  to  illustrate  why  such  an  account  is  needed. 
Putnam’s expert has to perform certain actions in order to make a piece of gold exemplify 
the  properties  that  define  gold,  that  is,  its  chemical  constitution.  Since  the  chemical 
constitution  is  not  perceptible,  it  will  be exemplified  through other  properties  that  are 
exemplified, which will usually be certain chemical reactions with other substances, that 
only gold can undergo. Or, what makes gold gold is that only gold can undergo those 
reactions,  which  allows  one  to  infer  to  its  chemical  constitution.  A  piece  of  gold 
exemplifies the property to react with another substance if the other substance is applied to 
it. It reacts with the other substance, but since the other substance must be applied, it reacts 
to  human  actions  in  a  way.  It  takes  an  action  to  let  gold  exemplify  “reacts  with  test 
substance” and thus “is AU” and thus “is gold.” A test substance can perform this function, 
because it only reacts with gold and not with other substances. This knowledge implies the 
action of applying the test substance to all chemical elements. In a particular test,  it  is 
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applied  to  all  candidates  of  goldhood.  The  test  is  a  differentiating  action  in  that  it  
implements the scheme consisting of “gold” and “other substances,” organizing the realm 
of chemical elements in gold and other substances. Once these categories are in place,  
differential action can become attached to them. For instance, in some situations, someone 
might keep gold and discard other substances. The action of applying the test substance to 
a  realm  of  substances  introduces  a  difference  between  things  in  the  world  and  thus 
different categories. The actions of keeping or discarding are applied differentially, that is 
the things are treated as something different. Thereby the categories become entrenched. 
Actions, it becomes clear, just like labels and the objects they apply to come in families of 
alternatives that map on the semantic systems. They are indeed part of those systems. Very 
roughly,  and omitting the content level, a system in a unified account of reference and 
action can be represented like this (Table 2.4.)
differentiating action applying substance to A applying substance to B
realm (metal pieces) gold other metal
scheme (labels) “gold” “other substance”
differential action keep discard
Table 2.4. The places of action in semantic systems.
Other  actions  will  render  other  labels  as  exemplified  and  thereby  divide  the  realm 
differently. Applying the action of tracking their provenance to gold pieces, for instance, 
could make them exemplify “being from country A” and “being from country B” and, if 
the  appropriate  knowledge  is  available,  “being  mined  exploiting  children”  and  “being 
mined in a fair way.” Things that were of one kind under the other scheme are now in the  
extensions of different labels. These new categories might catch on in the sense that the 
actions of buying/not-buying become attached to them differentially. If nothing like this 
happens,  the  categories  will  not  become entrenched  and  the  differentiating  activity  of 
provenance tracking will probably be abandoned. The example makes clear that the fitting 
and entrenchment, the two factors that contribute to rightness or relevance, do not apply to 
single  labels  or  kinds,  but  to  symbol  systems  including  sets  of  action  alternatives. 
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Entrenchment can be spelled out not only as a history of labeling things differentially, but 
also as a history of treating things differentially. Fitting implies that a system of categories 
fits in a network of many other categories, such as “child labor” in the example. 
With  respect  to  gold,  I  spoke  of  the  expert’s  activity  in  determining  the  kind 
membership concerning already entrenched kinds, but the example suggests that the same 
structure underlies the discovery of new kinds. In the following chapter, I shall elaborate 
further on the structure of differentiating and differential action and show how they give 
rise to thick and thin representations of phenomena. This will be the last step in setting the 
stage for the comparative analysis of character concepts in biology. 
Chapter 3. Towards a Systemic Account of Practice
Chapter Introduction
David Gooding in his book  Experiment and the Making of Meaning (1990) calls  for a 
theory of observational practices that explains how scientific terms are meaningful:  “A 
theory  of  the  meaning  of  scientific  terms  should  show  how  scientists  invent  new 
representations of natural phenomena.” In the following I sketch an account on scientific 
practice  that  differs  from  Gooding’s  in  that  it  emphasizes  the  systemic  character  of 
meaning that was discussed in Chapter 2. Additionally, it will not only account for actions 
that bring about new representations of phenomena, but also for those that relate to known 
phenomena.
In Section 3.1. I will first specify the distinction between differential actions, which are 
alternatives  of  actions  that  apply  differentially  to  different  objects,  and  differentiating 
actions, which are those actions that lead to the recognition of differences and thus enable 
the organization of a realm by a scheme, that is, actions that introduce systems. Differential 
action  will  be  explicated  in  terms  of  affordances.  In  section  3.2.  I  will  then  discuss 
ostensive definitions and experiments as two closely related types of differentiating actions 
or procedures, as I will call them, to acknowledge the structural complexity of this type of 
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actions. In particular, I will show how these procedures share a contrastive structure – that 
is why I will call them contrastive procedures –, and provide a more fine-grained typology 
of such activities according to their aims, focus and use. The main argument is that with 
respect to the systemic nature of knowledge, those actions that generate knowledge must 
be regarded as system introducing (rather than mere baptizing) events. 
In the course of section 3.3. I will discuss in which sense contrastive procedures, enable, 
bring about and relate to various ways to represent phenomena. In particular, I will use 
Goodman’s distinction between dense and articulated symbol systems, which are taken as 
results  of  contrastive procedures,  as  the  basis  for  a  distinction  between thick and thin 
phenomena.  The  latter  distinction  reflects  also  the  affordances  of  objects  that  become 
represented  through  contrastive  procedures,  that  is,  it  is  a  distinction  in  terms  of  the 
differential follow-up actions.
The account of scientific practice sketched out in this chapter will provide an analytic 
instrument to investigate how characters are represented in different fields of biological 
research and at different times in the history of biology.
A Caveat: Philosopher’s Language and Ontological Categories
We have to  distinguish the  descriptive  language of  a  philosopher  from the  descriptive 
language  in  other  fields  such  as  art  or  science  that  might  come  under  philosophical 
investigation.  When it  comes to ontological categories,  such as object,  property,  event, 
process, state, class, whole etc., they have to be taken not as features of the world, but as 
features of representations, because the world appears only in representations. Whether we 
describe the world such that there is one object that over time goes through different states, 
or such that there are two or more different objects encountered at different times does not 
depend on the world,  but on the way a representation is constructed.  Take the famous 
children’s book The Very Hungry Caterpillar (Carle 1969). It tells the story of a caterpillar 
that hatches, eats a lot, forms a cocoon and emerges as a beautiful butterfly. This is a kind 
of biographical narrative, focusing on the individual life history. We could imagine another 
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children’s  book,  that  focuses  more  on  the  relations  and  conflicts  among  the 
(anthropomorphized) inhabitants of a garden, where a caterpillar and a butterfly are two 
different characters in the narrative (which is not absurd, given that life cycles of different 
species  need not  be  synchronized).  Scientists  construct  narratives  as  well  and while  a 
developmental biologist will clearly speak of the caterpillar and the butterfly as states of 
the  same  organism,  an  ecologist,  being  interested  in  the  synchronic  relations  among 
organisms might speak of caterpillars and butterflies as different types of organisms, even 
though he will, of course, be perfectly aware of the fact that caterpillars become butterflies. 
In a similar way, properties might be represented as objects or objects  as properties 
(“red”  becomes  “pigment”  and  “wing”  becomes  “winged”).  These  different  ways  of 
putting things are not true or false, but right or wrong, where the latter distinction pertains 
not  to  the relation between a representation and the world,  but the relation between a 
representation and other representations and the particular overall purpose of constructing 
representations in a given situation. But this means that the different ways of representation 
are not just matters of picking different grammatical forms, such as adjectives instead of 
nouns.  The  adequate  form  has  to  be  picked  to  construct  a  narrative  that  fares  well 
according to Goodman’s various criteria of rightness, alluded to in Chapter 1. Thus if we 
want to investigate science in order to see how interests develop, how they interact with 
technologies, how certain entities appear and vanish in these contexts and how they are 
explained or ordered, we have to be attentive to the way scientists use language beyond 
single terms or predicates. To realize whether they speak of different states of one object or 
rather of two different objects will give us an indication on how their interest is structured 
or in which way their perception is influenced by the instrumentation they use. If they 
switch from one type of narrative to another, this might indicate some important change in 
practice or theory, but it might also just indicate a more local switch between sub-tasks that 
are guided by the same aim. 
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Here, I will not provide an account on how grammatical forms are used, how discourses 
can  be  classified  (e.g.  diachronic  vs.  synchronic  narratives)  etc.  The  reason  I  am 
mentioning this grammatical aspect of representation through language is that, if the way 
that scientists speak is described, there is always also the language of the describing author, 
whether she is philosopher, historian or sociologist. A commentator on science has her own 
descriptive goals and constraints. For instance, she might write about different scientists, 
one  of  them  using  an  object/state  description,  while  the  other  uses  a  two  objects 
description.  In  order  to  make the  two scientific  accounts  comparable  and increase  the 
coherence and tractability of her text, she will restrict herself to one type of representation, 
for  instance she might  always  speak of  distinct  objects.  This  will  yield sentences  like 
“Scientist  X describes the objects  A and B as different  states of the same object.” By 
writing this, she would not say that scientist X is wrong and that there are actually different 
objects in the world that are mistakenly perceived as different states of the same object.  
Instead, she is just applying her own style of description that serves different purposes than 
the description of the scientist.
Especially when philosophers of science speak very generally about things that are also 
investigated by scientists – though by the latter in form of particular occurrences – such as 
causal relations, the philosopher will usually start with sentences like “I take the relata of a 
causal  relation  to  be  …,”  where  “...”  can  be  objects,  events,  variables  or  whatever  is  
considered most suitable. Philosophers might actually dispute among each other which is 
the  best  way to  go,  and some of  them even seem to  imply that  their  ontology is  the 
ontology, that their way of describing causality captures the right ontological categories 
and any other talk of causes is just imprecise  façon de parler. But usually, they will just 
imply that their way of speaking is the best for the purposes of philosophy, leaving the 
language of scientists who investigate causal relations, let alone the world, untouched. It is 
important to make this distinction here between a philosopher’s descriptive language and 
the descriptive language of a field that is subject to the philosophical analysis, such as the 
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biological  sciences,  because  sometimes  confusion occurs  concerning this  point  (that  is 
because some philosophers actually make strong ontological claims and others do not and 
this  is  not  always  indicated).  In  the  following,  I  will  say  some  general  things  about 
meaning,  action  and  causation,  and  I  will  use  a  particular  language  to  express  some 
structural features of the ways they are represented and used to represent. I want to avoid 
the  impression  that  I  think  that  the  biological  world  has  to  be  described  using  the 
ontological categories that I use here. The same goes for the terms I use to describe actions, 
such as the term “experiment.” Biologists will use the ontological categories that they find 
appropriate.  Sometimes  they will  have  disputes  about  the  right  way of  putting  things. 
Scientific work is a collective endeavor and therefore, there is a continuous negotiation and 
adjustment concerning different modes of representation that can certainly be as abstract as 
discussing whether something should be considered an object or a property.  The way I 
understand philosophy of science implies to analyze the underlying differences, but not to 
take a stance on such disputes.
3.1. Differential Action and Differentiating Action
Terminology
In this sub-chapter, I shall first show that there are actions or behaviors attached to objects,  
or, to put it differently, that actions or behaviors always stand in some relation to objects. I 
said that objects have to be understood as units in a system in which labels organize a 
realm. And if we want to speak of concepts, they too have to be construed as units in the 
system. If  this view is  accepted,  then actions or behaviors just like objects, labels and 
concepts have to be considered as units in such systems as well. I will further argue that 
there is a special class of actions that result in recognition of new objects that introduce or 
change the systems. These usually quite complex actions all have a contrastive structure 
that allows new differences to become recognized and therefore will be called contrastive 
procedures.
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“Action” usually connotes intention, while “behavior” connotes conditioning. These can 
probably be seen as extremes on a gradual scale. Since what I say in this chapter applies to 
both, I will use the terms largely interchangeably, although in the case of differentiating 
activities, action seems more appropriate; there will in most cases be an intention involved. 
However, the actual result might be quite different from the intended one, for instance, 
when a scientist stumbles upon a causal effect when handling some material for different 
purposes than finding its effects. And even if effects are sought they might be investigated 
in an explorative manner, without any preceding idea about what the effects are. I will later 
introduce contrastive procedure as the appropriate term for differentiating action. In the 
case of differential actions, I tend to use the term “behavior,” because they are usually 
strongly conventionalized.
Many thinkers in many different contexts have emphasized the role of action in theories 
of  meaning  and  in  epistemology.  Usually  philosophers  of  language  focus  on  the  way 
actions reveal what words refer to. This reasoning is often closely linked to behaviorism 
(see e.g. Quine 1960). They usually have not much to offer when it comes to those actions 
that introduce meaning, except that they speak of “baptizing” events and discuss the role of 
deictic  gestures,  as  we  will  see,  without  paying  attention  to  the  systemic  nature  of 
language.  Philosophers  and historians  of  science instead  tend to  focus  solely on those 
practices that generate knowledge (for a position that emphasizes the role of action for a 
theory of the meaning of scientific terms, see e.g. Gooding 1990), but pay less attention to 
actions that relate to objects as already known. I will not review every such theory here,  
but focus on the constructive task of sketching a perspective on action that best fits with 
the  systemic  view  of  representation  introduced  above.  I  will  speak  about  actions  as 
coordinated with objects and labels in terms of affordances and about actions that yield 
new knowledge in terms of contrastive procedures.
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Affordances
Every action is related in one way or the other to the kinds of things and relations between 
things that are recognized as existing in the world and thus also to labels and concepts. And 
if the latter come in alternatives, actions have to come in alternatives as well that map on 
these three partite systems of units. Units in the system have to be used, either by using the 
words, which is an action, or by using the things. But "using" here can mean many types of 
possible  relations  in  which  things  and  actions  or  behaviors  can  stand,  including,  for 
example, running away from something, which we usually do not call a use. maybe the 
best notion available in the literature to cover them all is that of affordances (Gibson 1986). 
Even  though  the  connotation  of  the  actual  verb  “afford”  equally  rules  out  actions  or 
behaviors like running away from something, let alone falling off a cliff, the noun, being a 
neologism, can be taken as what it is defined to mean.
Gibson characterizes an affordance as a relation that holds between an organism and its 
environment. The environment can be natural or artificial, but this is a distinction Gibson 
wishes  to  overcome,  arguing that  the  artificial  world  is  not  a  separate  world,  but  just 
manipulated areas of the natural environment (Gibson 1986, 130). The important point is 
that the environment has several perceptual dimensions. It consists of substances, which 
are not the pure chemical substances, but the actually occurring mixtures and compounds 
that have various qualities (such as soft, hard, solid, fluid, and infinitely many more). The 
substances are organized such that they have surfaces. Any region of substance has, of 
course, interfaces with other substances, depending on where the boundaries are drawn, but 
the  perceptually  most  important  interfaces,  which  are  called  surfaces,  are  those  that  a 
region of substance has with the medium that fills the space in which the organism can 
move or perceive, such as air for human beings. Surfaces have layouts, which means that 
they have geometrical properties such as being horizontal or vertical, flat or rugged, and 
many more. Now the properties of the substances and surface layouts combined are such 
that they afford certain behaviors. The terrestrial surface, for instance, being horizontal, 
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extended and rigid, affords support and is thus perceived as ground. The ground, similar to 
the medium, has a special role, because it is the basis for all other behavior. But there are 
also all kinds of objects in the environment, some of which are attached to the terrestrial 
surface, while others are detached. Such objects again have many properties according to 
substance and surface layout and therefore, can afford various behaviors that can be as 
general as being graspable or portable, or more specific. One of Gibson’s examples is that 
“a rigid object with a sharp dihedral angle, an edge, affords cutting and scraping; it is a 
knife.”  (Gibson  1986,  133)  The  affordances  can  be  benefits  or  detriments.  The  knife 
affords cutting or being cut.
It can be asked why one should speak of “being cut” as a behavior at all? But it is  
exactly this kind of passive affordance that points to the symmetric relational character of 
affordances. “An affordance points both ways.” (Gibson 1986, 129) An object can possess 
properties that can potentially affect humans, but affordance is only given if the human 
agent recognizes the object as having these potential effects. If the knife affords being cut, 
this relation only holds if the actor knows that she can be cut. The interaction of the object 
with the agent does not need to become realized, the important point is that it is perceived.  
But, apart from knowing that the interaction of being cut can happen, the actor will also 
display a behavior of taking care. One could also say that the knife affords taking care not 
to  be  cut  or  acting  at  the  risk  of  being  cut  etc.  Gibson  wants  to  avoid  presenting 
affordances as something merely subjective. What an object affords is constrained by its 
properties. One of the characterizations that Gibson provides goes: “These positive and 
negative affordances are properties of things  taken with reference to an observer but not 
properties of the experiences of the observer.” (Gibson 1986, 137)
Though Gibson does not explicitly say so, it seems thus that affordances cannot only be 
classified  as  positive  or  negative,  but  also  according to  the  activeness  (as  opposed  to 
passiveness) of the behavior and the direction of affecting. Humans can be affected by an 
object (e.g. being cut), behave in a particular way in the face of an object (run away),  
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acting on an object (sit on it), or properly manipulate it (cut it). If manipulation results in 
an object with different affordances, Gibson calls the activity manufacture (Gibson 1986, 
133). Thus some objects or substances afford being manufactured and the result of the 
behavior, if actually applied, is another object or substance, where the change indicated by 
“another” is a change in what the matter involved affords.
Affordances are obviously relative to the particular organism. What affords support for 
a water bug does not afford support for a human being. The concept is thus thoroughly 
pluralistic; an environment “offers many ways of life.” (Gibson 1986, 128, 138) There will 
be different sets of affordances specific to a species, to a society and maybe also to an 
individual. And always-new affordances can emerge (evolutionarily or culturally) if the 
environment or the behavior changes (Gibson 1986, 129).
Gibson  develops  his  theory  in  the  context  of  an  ecologically  informed  theory  of 
perception. In the sense that he takes affordances to be directly perceived as such, instead 
of being derived from the perception of isolated qualities, his theory is a descendant of 
Gestalt psychology (Gibson 1979, 134, 138). This notion of direct perception is in line 
with the view that  the objects  are  recognized as parts  of a  symbol system that  relates 
objects, labels, concepts and behaviors (although there need not always be a label if there 
is a behavior). I will not enter the debate on the nature of perception here, but suggest that 
some elements  of  the  environment  that  were  either  significant  in  the  evolution  of  the 
species or are sufficiently conventionalized, are perceived immediately as objects affording 
certain behaviors. But perception will be more analytic in unfamiliar circumstances or can 
be purposefully be put in an analytic mode. This can lead to the recognition of new objects 
that can again become conventionalized, which implies that they acquire affordances. In a 
way, entrenchment can be described psychologically as the genesis of Gestalt.
Gibson’s explication of affordance is very general, because it is meant to apply to many 
(though probably not all) organisms. I am interested in human action and behavior and I 
will  interpret  Gibson  as  implying  that  there  are  also  purely  conventional  affordances, 
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which are in no way determined by the properties of the substances or surface layouts of 
the objects in question. If in a given culture a kind of object that is identified by certain 
properties is taken to be valuable, it affords such activities as buying, selling, collecting 
etc., while the same kind of object might not be considered valuable in another community 
and  therefore  not  afford  the  same  actions.  But  even  here  affordances  are  not  merely 
subjective.  First,  the  object’s  properties  still  constrain  the  affordances.  Mountains  and 
rivers  will  not  serve  well  as  collector’s  items.  Second,  such  affordances,  though  less 
physically constrained are more socially constraint. Selling and buying require a mercantile 
culture.
If affordances can be conventional, a distinction between sub-classes of objects or parts 
of  a  whole  can  also  be  enforced  by  activities,  even  if  no  difference  in  properties  is  
recognized. If, for instance, members of a community come to treat some objects in a class  
as the property of group A and the other objects as property of group B, there will be two 
sub-classes. The objects in these sub-classes can become subject to very different causal 
interactions  and in the long run,  the objects  in  these sub-classes will  probably acquire 
distinct properties apart from being owned by one or the other group. The belonging of the 
objects need not be declared verbally. It is sufficient that a pattern of behaviors gradually 
becomes established in which members of group A do use some objects and do not use 
some others, which in turn are used by members of group B, who in turn do not touch the 
objects  the A group uses,  or at  least  not  without  permission.  We can call  this  process 
coordination (see Lewis 1969), and it establishes affordances and kinds; it establishes a 
system.  The interesting  point  to  observe  is  that  affordances  are  not  only relative  to  a 
community, but also to the roles that different individuals or groups take in a community. If 
we go back to the example of valuable objects, there are different roles, such that between 
the objects and people in different roles different affordance relations hold. A piece of gold 
affords  selling  to  a  jeweler,  buying to  a  customer  and stealing  to  a  burglar.  This  also 
requires the reciprocal understanding of what an object affords to the respective others. 
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This understanding is part of human interaction that Gibson describes in a way that renders 
people as parts of other people’s environment that afford certain behaviors just as other 
objects  and also  animals.  In  general  organisms have  affordances  with  respect  to  other 
organisms, which can be reciprocal or not (Gibson 1986, 135).21 Affordances can also be 
relative to contexts. If certain context markers are present, an object might afford behaviors 
that it does not afford if the actor perceives other context markers together with the object. 
Affordance  can  thus  also be  described as  perceiving an object  in  the context  of  other 
knowledge, for instance, about other objects.
The  term  “affordance”  became  used  in  many  contexts,  ranging  from  sociology  to 
product design. Many uses of the term deviate from Gibson’s original characterization. The 
way I use the term here is also not fully licensed by Gibson’s text, but it shares the major 
intuitions. Objects do not come in “fixed classes” (Gibson 1986, 134). They are recognized 
by a population of actors and different populations can come to recognize different objects 
in the same material region of the world. Any object has a bundle of properties that have to 
be sensually perceived in one way or the other, even if the perception is very indirect, and 
the properties often explain the affordances, even if they are not perceived separately. I 
possibly start to deviate when I say that objects have affordances that are not explained by 
their properties, but coordinated with some properties. And further, that yet other objects 
have affordances that do not even apply uniformly to the objects in the class to which the 
affording object belongs due to its recognized properties. In these cases, I will say that 
differential behavior has been imposed on them by fiat. 
The recognition of distinct  objects  is  always connected to  the behavior it  allows or 
requires. The affordance perceived in a context determines that the object is perceived as 
this rather than that. One object can have general affordances and various more specific 
affordances. A stone can be graspable and moveable, but it can also be “a paperweight, a 
bookend, a hammer, or a pendulum bob.” (Gibson 1986, 134) So one object can afford 
21 To be clear: affordances do not explain conventions or social roles, but they help to describe them.
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several behaviors, but a given behavior can also be afforded by many objects (pieces of 
wood  can  be  paperweights  as  well).  This  is  analogue  to  the  fact  that  one  object  can 
exemplify many labels and a given label can be exemplified by many objects.
But the most important analogy between the relation of objects and labels and objects 
and behaviors, between reference and affordance22, is that behaviors like labels come in 
sets of alternatives that delimit each other in their range of application. Gibson alludes to 
this fact several times without making it explicit. For instance, when it comes to resting (a 
class of behaviors),  some layouts (from the realm of reachable surfaces) afford sitting, 
while others afford kneeling or squatting (Gibson 1986, 128). In the context of the question 
of direct perception of objects as opposed to the perception of distinct qualities, he states: 
“Those features of a thing are noticed which distinguish it from other things that it is not –  
but not all the features that distinguish it from everything that it is not.” (Gibson 1986, 135) 
This can be read as saying that from the perspective of perception in terms of affordance,  
objects are contrasted with those objects that are in the same realm but afford different 
behaviors, not with every other object.
At least most affordances need to be learned. Instructing someone to answer to an object 
with a certain behavior can be compared with instructing someone to use a label. This 
procedure of introducing or teaching a label is usually called an ostensive definition and it  
involves objects as exemplars. I will discuss ostensive definitions in detail below. Here I 
will just quickly point out that in an ostensive definition of a label and also in an ostensive 
instruction, as we might say for behaviors, not single labels or behaviors are taught, but 
schemes of labels or behaviors. This object rather than that object is called X rather than Y. 
And analogously: This object rather than that object allows or requires this action rather 
than that action.
22 Reference has two directions: Denotation goes from the label to the object, while exemplification goes  
from  the  object  to  the  label.  Since  affordance  goes  from  the  object  to  the  behavior,  I  will  call  the 
complementary relation “answering.” A behavior will be said to answer to an object if the object affords the 
behavior.
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The parallel between schemes of labels and schemes of behaviors organizing realms of 
objects should make clear why such a view on actions and behaviors is important for the 
study of science, if one has already accepted that the study of reference is. But let me be 
explicit about why this can be an important tool in the analysis of scientific practice. In 
short, Gibson’s theory is interpreted in a way here, that warrants speaking of objects like 
electrons  and  genes,  but  also  human  livers  and  Drosophila’s  white  eyes,  as  affording 
certain  actions  in  certain  disciplinary  contexts.  Many  actions  in  science  result  in  the 
recognition of new objects and I will speak about these actions soon. But there are many 
other actions that have to be accounted for if scientific practice is analyzed, actions that are 
performed when objects are encountered that are already known. Observing differential 
behaviors  of  scientists  can  help  to  understand  which  objects  they  recognize,  which 
categories they have formed, just like observing the way they use labels does. And it can 
help  to  make  pluralism  explicit  by  showing  that  different  groups  of  scientists  either 
recognize different objects, or answer with different behaviors to commonly recognized 
objects. Without explaining how different disciplines, interests or perspectives in science 
come about, the notion of affordances as interpreted here, can still help to describe how 
they manifest themselves in patterns of action. An object that affords throwing-in-the-trash 
for  one  scientist  can afford further-investigation for  another,  according to  the different 
interests. An object that affords further-investigation for one scientist can afford using-as-a-
tool (or instrument) for another, according to the point in history. An organism might afford 
contrasting-with-an-organism-of-another-species for one scientist, but contrasting-with-an-
organism-of-the-same-species-in-a-pathological-state  for  another,  according  to  the 
respective perspective. A cell might afford observation-with-a-microscope to one scientist 
and homogenizing-for-biochemical-analysis to another, according to the methods available, 
and so on. 
But it is important to get the roles of alternatives right. Here I presented the situation 
from the perspective of the object. If we look at one object, different actors answer with 
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different actions to it. However, that implies that from the perspective of one actor, she has 
alternative actions to apply to different objects. If one scientist throws away one object, she 
will keep another. The alternative actions are afforded by distinguished classes of objects 
that form one realm that is thus organized by the scheme of alternative actions. It will most 
likely also be organized by a scheme of labels.
These different pathways of actions could, of course, be described without referring to 
affordances. But I want to address any action as part of a family of alternative actions that 
maps on a system of objects, labels, and concepts. To emphasize this systemic nature of 
actions that is not always recognized, it is appropriate to employ a special terminology. 
Gibson’s approach suits my purpose, because he makes clear that actions do not just apply 
to objects, but are part and parcel of the very concept of the object in question and, most 
importantly, he provides us with a term for the relation between the object and the action, 
analogue to reference as the relation between objects and labels. And even if he does not 
make the systemic character of actions or behaviors explicit,  and does not mention the 
according contrastive character of actions that introduce new objects, he seems to imply at 
least the former. I will now turn to the particular kinds of actions that can bring about new 
categories.
Contrastive Procedures
Action is always reaction to some environment in a particular situation. When acted upon, 
parts of the environment react and they might react differentially, although having been 
perceived as uniform, or at least heterogeneous in an unspecified way before. In this case 
new classes of objects are recognized. Since differences appear in contrasts, differentiating 
actions  must  be  contrastive  and  I  will  refer  to  them  as  “contrastive  procedures.” 
Concerning this terminology it should be said that there are alternatives. Above, following 
Putnam, I spoke of operations. However, the term might be associated with the program of 
Bridgman’s operationism, which was prescriptive rather than descriptive, in that it aimed at 
fixing the meaning of scientific terms through describing an operation that defines the term 
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(Bridgman 1928). The account offered here, instead, is meant to allow for the analysis of 
the  dynamic  establishment  and  vanishing  of  systems  of  objects,  labels  and  actions. 
Whereas Chang (2009, 27 ff.) suggests to read the term “operation” more liberally in order 
to understand the role of actions in discriminating objects and thus in fixing the reference 
of terms in science, Gooding rejects the term due to its problematic history and suggests 
“procedure” instead (Gooding 1990, 8). Before I turn to this term, I shall mention another 
term that has been used in this context, namely “intervention.” Hacking (1983) uses the 
term very broadly, to indicate that human actors affect and are affected by the world and 
then discusses specific forms of interventions separately under various headings. This use 
of the term is not specific enough to characterize the actions I have in mind and it is also 
too much connected with the discussion of scientific realism, which I  intend to  avoid. 
Woodward (e.g. 2008) and others use the term more narrowly to refer to the coming about 
of  changes  in  a  variable  that  reveal  causal  dependence  between  variables.  Woodward 
prefers the term over another term used in this context – “manipulation” – because for him 
the change in a variable cannot only be brought about by a human actor, as manipulation 
traditionally is taken to imply, but can also be the effect of a cause that is external to the 
causal relation studied. Both terms, however, are strongly connected to the detection of 
causes and – even if  causal dependence will  play an important  role in my account  on 
contrastive procedures – an appropriate term shall cover also actions that contrast objects 
to discover properties apart from their causal powers. I will use “intervention” to designate 
parts  of  complex  actions,  in  particular  in  the  context  of  causal  analysis,  but  opt  for 
“contrastive procedure” as the more comprehensive term.
Gooding’s “procedure” seems appropriate for two reasons. He defines a procedure as “a 
sequence of acts or operations whose inferential structure is undecided,” which means that 
“rationales for actions often emerge as the account unfolds.” (Gooding 1990, 8) First, this 
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definition  emphasizes  that  actions  are  usually  decomposable  in  series  of  sub-actions.23 
Second, it takes into account that sometimes the goal of the actions change along the way 
in the context of scientific investigations. 
Gooding, however, even if he talks about concept formation, that is, about how labels 
come to denote phenomena in science or how the phenomena become known phenomena, 
and even if he rightly emphasizes the role of human agency, still fails to do justice to the 
contrastive  nature  of  scientific  practice,  which  stems  from  the  systemic  nature  of 
knowledge.  Phenomena  –  objects,  their  properties  and  capacities,  the  events  they  are 
involved in,  are  what  they are  in  that  they are different  from other  phenomena.  What 
becomes a referent is referred to as part of a realm that becomes organized by the schemes 
of labels and behaviors when differences become recognized. If the labels and behaviors 
that the objects exemplify and afford come in families of alternatives, then the actions that 
introduce phenomena must introduce them as different from other phenomena. They must 
not only connect an object with a label or a behavior, but also organize a realm of objects  
into  ranges  of  extension  by  connecting  it  with  a  scheme  of  labels  or  behaviors. 
Accordingly,  the  procedures  of  introducing  and  teaching  labels  through  ostensive 
definitions, identifying causes and effects in experiments and transferring the knowledge in 
demonstrations, introducing a behavior and instructing someone to behave appropriately, 
all must have a contrastive nature. Because knowledge is symbolically constituted and has 
a systemic nature, knowledge-generating actions introduce systems in the sense discussed 
23 The action of performing a PCR, for instance, usually includes running an agarose gel electrophoresis,  
which includes preparing the gel, which includes adding agarose powder, which includes taking it from the  
place where it is kept, which includes grabbing it etc. What is the appropriate level of analysis depends on 
the context. A protocol shared by practising scientists will probably just mention, “run a gel,” while a  
students  manual  will  go  through  the  steps  of  gel  preparation.  On  the  level  of  taking  the  agarose,  
idiosyncrasies come into play concerning the particular place in the lab where the agarose is located. This  
will therefore not appear in any protocol, but might become relevant if mistakes have to be detected. (Did 
you take the right container? etc.)
93
above. I will start to gather some features of contrastive procedures by discussing what 
philosopher’s have said about ostensive definitions and experiments.
3.2. The Contrastive Nature of Epistemic Practice
Classification and Ostensive Definitions
Contrastive procedures aim at finding similarities and differences. These define classes. 
This  is  to  say  that  these  procedures  result  in  recognizing  classes  of  objects,  whose 
members usually become denoted by a label or answered to by a certain type of behavior. 
There are as many classifications possible as there are similarities and differences to be 
found. What similarities and differences become noticed depends on the schemes already 
in use and the technologies available. But not every similarity or difference that becomes 
recognized will be useful or important from every perspective. A classification is useful if 
it “resonates” with other classifications.24 In Goodman’s terms one can say that only if it 
fits, the scheme will become entrenched. Classifications then point out relevant kinds. If a 
classification  is  performed  and  the  similarities  and  differences  resonate  with  others, 
someone  acquired  some unit  of  knowledge,  what  I  call  a  concept.  The  similarity  and 
difference relations can be demonstrated to other people in that the labels in a scheme can 
be exemplified by the objects in their respective ranges of extension, such that a collective 
of  actors  possesses  the  concept.  Since  the  detection  of  a  relevant  kind  and  its 
demonstration both have to make the same contrast, I will talk about both situations.
The upshot of Chapter 2. was that, if we look at meaning, we cannot look at the relation 
between single labels and their referents. We have to take the system into account in which 
they function. This means two things, first, we have to take into account the syntactic and 
semantic properties of the system and second, we have to take into account the other labels 
that constitute the scheme together with the label in question, as well as the other referents 
that are in the realm that is organized by the scheme. I will come back to the difference 
24 The notion is Rheinberger’s (1997) and will be further discussed below.
94
between dense and articulated representation later. Here, I will focus on how the relation 
between labels and referents depends on the relations among labels and among referents, 
that is, I will focus on the systemic nature of reference and affordance that corresponds, as 
will be shown, to the systemic nature of causal concepts. Because labels and behaviors are 
parts  of  schemes,  the  introduction  and  teaching  of  labels  and  behaviors  must  be 
contrastive.
Discussions of meaning, like Putnam’s, focus on the label as referring to an object. But 
when they speak of baptismal acts, they implicitly not only acknowledge the role of action, 
but that the object plays a particular role in such a situation. Goodman has pointed out that 
reference can also go from objects to labels and I suggested that this way of symbolization 
must  be  in  place  when  new terms  are  introduced,  as  well  as  in  cases  where  a  given 
conventional relation between a referent and a label is learned.25 If we want to know how 
labels can be about the world we need to make the world part of the language and start our 
thinking from the direction of the object towards the label. The relation between a label 
and an object, which is introduced in baptismal acts, restated in an expert’s test procedure 
or taught through ostension, will  therefore be expressed as exemplification. The use of 
exemplars  to  explain  how  a  label  is  to  be  used  in  general  will  be  called  ostensive 
definition.26 
25 A special case of learning is given, when the use of the label is not taught, but has to be derived from its 
use. I suggest that the way an observer has to sort her various observations recapitulates the structure of  
ostensive definitions.
26 Goodman seems to imply that in ostensive definitions objects function as exemplars (samples as he says,  
Goodman 1976, 53, fn. 5). Wittgenstein also emphasizes that in ostensive definitions, objects figure as 
signs, as part of the language. As he puts it: “It is most natural, and causes least confusion, to reckon the  
samples among the instruments of the language.” (Wittgenstein 2001, § 16) His idea seems to be that one  
states synonymy in an ostensive definition (i.e. one makes a grammatical statement that is about signs)  
rather than referring to the object. The approach followed here is different, but this might after all be just a  
terminological matter.
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It  does not matter whether the label (and the class) is  already conventionalized,  but 
taught to a novice, or if a new class of objects is baptized and introduced to a community. 
In any case, one takes an epistemological stance towards language. Either one wants to 
create connections a concept, or makes other people acquire a concept, by representing the 
object and the label as standing in a reference relation that shall become or is a convention.
To say that  something is  represented  requires  some representational  act.  The act  in 
question, the ostensive definition, is in itself a complex procedure; it involves activities on 
both sides of the relation. On the one side it requires to refer to an object, and on the other 
to refer to a label. The former act might involve a deictic gesture (holding up an object, 
pointing to it etc.),  but not necessarily has to, since any deictic gesture is conventional 
anyway, and referring to the object with another conventional label that is “appropriately 
exogenous,”  will  perform the same function.27 The referential  act  concerning the label, 
might  simply  be  its  mentioning28,  however,  a  phrase  like  the  “the  word  I  told  you 
yesterday” might also work under the appropriate circumstances. Since a deictic gesture or 
the act of mentioning, as opposed to the use of the word, are not automatically understood, 
but have to be learned as conventions, they can be misunderstood (on misunderstanding 
pointing gestures, see Wittgenstein 2001, § 185). It is unproblematic, however, to assume 
that ostensive definitions only work if these conventions are known. But even if someone 
understands  the  gesture  of  pointing  (that  she  is  not  supposed to  look at  the  hand,  for 
instance), she does not necessarily understand what the gesture points to.
The argument I want to make in this section is that an ostensive definition requires a 
contrast. If someone wants to establish or teach (or discover in a foreign language) what 
gold is or what “gold” refers to, she needs to establish or teach (or discover) what is  not 
gold and what alternative labels are used to refer to things that are not gold. 
27 The expression is Woodward’s (2008) and will be explained later.
28 If a label is mentioned it refers not to the referent of the label, but to the label, e.g. >>”gold”<< refers to  
“gold” (Goodman 1984, 62).
96
Since I said that in ostensive definitions objects figure as exemplars, the notation used 
for the relation that is established or taught will be “is the exemplar for”. (The finite article  
is necessary, because there are other objects that could be used as exemplar as well, namely 
all  other  instances  of  the  label.)  It  has  to  be  remembered  though,  that  the  relation  is  
symmetric. What exemplifies a label is also denoted by it and even if an object that is  
denoted by a label does not automatically exemplify it, it still could be used to exemplify. 
An ostensive definition establishes the relation in both directions. The object will figure as 
exemplar (E) and the word as label (L) (especially, because the exemplar need not be an 
object, but could be an event, and the label need not be a word, but could be a picture or  
something else). 
Now, if an ostensive definition requires to show what the object in question is not, if it 
requires  to  introduce  a  scheme  instead  of  a  single  label,  a  procedure  is  needed,  that 
contrasts at least one reference relation,  ε1, between E1 and L1 with another relation,  ε2, 
between E2 and L2. A full ostensive definition, understood as a contrastive procedure would 
thus  consist  of  four  acts.  1)  Referring  to  an  object  E1,  say with  a  deictic  gesture;  2) 
referring to a label L1, say through mentioning it. Together 1) and 2) form one ostensive 
exemplification,  OX1,  which,  however,  does not  count  as a full  ostensive definition.  A 
second pair of acts is required. 3) Referring to an object, E2; 4) referring to a label, L2. 3) 
and 4) form a second ostensive exemplification, OX2. The four referential acts have to be 
appropriately coordinated, of course, in order not to confuse OX1 and OX2. The question is 
how E2 and L2 need to be chosen such that the contrast between OX1 and OX2  introduces 
the relations ε1 and ε2 and thus the system in which the scheme L1/L2 organizes the realm to 
which E1 and E2 belong.
It is interesting to look at Wittgenstein’s discussion of ostensive definitions in order to 
understand  why  they  must  be  contrastive  and  how  the  contrast  has  to  be  construed.  
Wittgenstein never fully acknowledges the contrastive nature of ostensive definitions, but 
97
he seems to grasp its necessity and hints in that direction. Thereby he also hints at what  
needs to be contrasted. He writes:
So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use — the meaning — 
of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. Thus if I 
know  that  someone  means  to  explain  a  color-word  to  me,  the  ostensive 
definition  “That  is  called  ‘sepia’”  will  help  me  to  understand  the  word. 
(Wittgenstein 2001, § 30)
The problem here is, of course, that, if the sender points to an object and mentions “red,” 
the recipient of the ostensive definition cannot know if the sender points to the color, the 
object itself,  its shape, its position or whatever properties it has. Since, as Wittgenstein 
argues, the problem cannot be solved by assuming that the sender means the color and not 
the shape or any other property when pointing to the object, this information has to be 
given.  “Color-words” is  a  label  that  denotes  labels such as “red,” “green,”  or “sepia.” 
Above I have interpreted a scheme in a way that its members to a meta-label which is a 
constituent  of  another  scheme.  Accordingly,  I  will  say  that  what  the  recipient  of  an 
ostensive  definition  needs  to  know  is  the  meta-label  to  which  the  scheme  the  label 
introduced, taught, or discovered is part of belongs. This does not imply to know the full 
scheme however, because one does not know the other labels in the scheme if one knows 
one label and the meta-label. 
Usually,  labels  and objects  (or  their  relation)  will  be  introduced in a  more  specific 
context,  or  as  a  particular  language game in Wittgenstein’s words,  and not  as parts  of 
language as such. One might introduce, teach, learn or discover how color words are used 
in house painting, for instance, because one is the product developer of a paint company, 
an apprentice of a painting firm, a customer of the firm or just an observer. Accordingly, 
the realm that is organized by the scheme of which the label is part is that of wall paints. To 
take another example that involves parts instead of properties, and which brings us closer 
to the subject of this thesis, let us imagine a person who teaches the body parts of a beetle 
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to someone else. The label taught might be “antenna” and it will form a scheme with other 
terms such as “eye” or “leg.” (We are talking folk entomology here.) The meta-label that 
someone has to know in order to understand what the teacher is pointing to would be 
“beetle parts” or “beetle  organs.”  These meta-labels could form a scheme with “beetle 
behaviors,” but just as well be part of another scheme with, say “fish parts.” The scheme 
could also belong to the holonym “beetle body.”
But Wittgenstein’s solution to the problem of specifying the gesture, to assume that the 
person who is taught the label has to know label denoting the words in the scheme, or, 
alternatively, the meta-label, is unsatisfactory. We already had to grant that the conventions 
of the deictic gesture and of mentioning have to be known. But these at least apply to all 
ostensive definitions. In this case, the convention that has to be known to understand the 
definition is different for every definition. It would be more satisfying to have a picture, 
where the meta-label, to which the scheme belongs can be inferred by the recipient, in 
order  to  account  for  the power that  ostensive definitions  have in  acquiring  knowledge 
about conventions and producing them. 
An alternative solution might be implied in the suggestion that full ostensive definitions 
are contrastive (consist of at least two ostensive exemplifications). The receiver needs to 
know other labels from the scheme and other objects from the different ranges of extension 
into which the realm is organized by the scheme, such that she can infer the realm and the  
meta-label to which the scheme belongs from the contrast. 
There are several occasions where Wittgenstein suggests that expressions are parts of 
systems, where “system” can be interpreted as scheme (he uses the term system in several 
ways, however), and that to know the meaning of a label requires that we know which 
other labels are in the scheme. In this section, for instance he emphasizes the fact that 
terms belong to a “system of expressions”: 
In a particular system of expressions we can describe an object by means of the 
words “satisfied” and “unsatisfied.” For example, if we lay down that we call a 
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hollow cylinder an “unsatisfied cylinder” and the solid cylinder that fills it “its 
satisfaction.” (Wittgenstein 2001, § 439)
In other words, the labels “satisfied” and “unsatisfied” form a scheme that can be used to 
organize a realm of objects, in this case the class of cylinders. On other occasions he seems 
to suggest that to understand how a word is used requires knowing in “opposition” to what 
other words it is used. For instance, if one wants to understand how someone uses the word 
“sentence,” denoting everything that is a sentence, in order to understand if  she would 
count a valid mathematical expression in the extension of “sentence,” (that is, to know how 
she  draws  the  lines  around  the  classes)  one  needs  to  know  if  she  uses  the  word  in 
opposition to “mathematical formula” and maybe some other terms like “logical formula,” 
or instead only in opposition to something like “string of signs without meaning.” (See 
Wittgenstein 1984, § 80)29 If this implies, however, that one has to learn all the other labels 
in the scheme of which a label is part, the requirement is too strong. Indeed, to fully grasp 
the extension of a label, one would need to know all labels in a scheme, but most ostensive 
definitions are more modest. They introduce labels as parts of a scheme, but not the whole 
scheme.  They  are  steps  towards  a  complete  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  labels. 
Sometimes however,  ostensive definitions  can also be complete.  In order  to derive the 
meta-label  to  which  the  scheme  in  question  belongs  and  the  realm it  organizes,  it  is 
sufficient to contrast two objects and two labels in a particular way. 
Wittgenstein alludes to, but does not make perfectly clear that the ostensive definition 
relies  on  contrasts,  when  he  says  that  it  depends  on  “what  happens  before  or  after.” 
29 Another interesting passage that brings together the notions of system and opposition is the following: 
“‘Now’ is a word. For what do I use the word? ‘Now’ — in opposition to what? — In opposition to ‘in one 
hour,’ ‘half an hour ago’ etc. etc. ‘Now’ does not stand for a system, it belongs to a system. It does not  
function  magically;  like  no  word  does.”  (Ms-153a,67v,  http://wab.uib.no/cost-a32/153a/Ms-
153a_norm.html, my translation.) Indexicals like “now,” one might say, like other labels refer to the object 
(time slice) as parts of a scheme. Only the scheme will tell the receiver how the object is construed (e.g. 
how large the time slice is).
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(Wittgenstein 2001, § 35, see also 1984, § 27) The point is made more clearly, though also 
not fully appreciated in its function for the ostensive definition, in Baker and Hacker’s 
comment on this paragraph. They write: “So, the learner may have asked «I know that that 
F  is called ‘square,’ but what is that F  called?»” (Baker and Hacker 2005, 109) I 
will understand ostensive definitions as including the contrast, instead of referring to the 
contrast as the right context for the ostensive definition to work (single ostensive acts I 
have  called  ostensive  exemplifications).  I  shall  now  clarify  how  the  right  contrast  is 
picked. With respect to the different possible contrasts Baker and Hacker write a few lines 
later: 
The contrast between pointing to the table and pointing to the chair is between 
pointing at two different objects of the same general type (pieces of furniture, 
material  objects).  But  to  point  to  a  color  rather  than to  a  shape involves a 
contrast in category. In the first case we change the direction of our gesture. In 
the second we need not, just because to point to the color (shape) is to point to 
the object which has it, and the same material object may exemplify both color 
and shape in question. (Baker and Hacker 2005, 109)
What they call “category,” on my account is captured by the meta-label to which a scheme 
belongs  or  the  realm  that  is  sorted,  which  makes  no  difference  if  the  meta-label  is 
construed such that it has the realm that is organized by the scheme that belongs to as its 
extension (e.g. if the meta-label for color terms is not “color”, but “colored”). Pointing at a 
table and a chair could, of course, involve a change with respect to the meta-label as well,  
if the meta-label in question would be “chair” not “furniture” and in this case a contrast 
that would not involve a change with respect to the meta-label could be that between a 
kitchen  chair  and office  chair.  To point  at  color  and shape,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not 
necessarily a change with respect to the meta-label, if the latter is something like “having 
determinable  properties.”  The  contrast  of  different  objects  of  the  same “general  type” 
(denoted by labels that belong to the same scheme and thus to the same meta-label) indeed 
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requires a change in direction of the gesture, which is just to say that the contrast has to 
involve  two objects  (which  could  also  be  two parts  of  an  object).  But  “a  contrast  in 
category” is not a contrast at all. Only objects can be contrasted and then the labels that 
denote them are automatically belong to the same scheme. 
If we introduce, teach or discover the relation between an object an a label, we need to 
do this with respect to a meta-label and a realm, which is just to say we introduce it the 
label as part of a scheme that organizes the realm in question. Thus we have to make the 
contrast such that we do not make a change with respect to the intended meta-label, or, put 
differently, that we do not exemplify a label outside the scheme we wanted to introduce. 
We cannot introduce a label by contrasting it with a label of another scheme. However, if 
someone points at two objects separately, one of them being yellow, the other being blue, 
and mentions the labels “yellow” and “blue” accordingly, the receiver still cannot know 
whether she points to the colors or shapes or any other property of the objects, unless the 
objects are the same in all properties except color.  And this is indeed the requirement, 
although it is an ideal that cannot be reached, and if it is only because two objects are 
either  at  different  places  or pointed to  at  different  times.  Nevertheless,  if  an ostensive 
definition should be successful, this ideal has to be approached. In cases were a restricted 
realm is given, such as when the labels denoting different wall paints are introduced with a 
collection of single bricks painted with the different colors, the realm can be appropriately 
uniform. The bricks have the same shape, size and weight and are alike with respect to 
many other properties. If the teacher points to two of them and mentions the color-labels it 
is very likely that it will be realized that she points at their color. She does not have to  
announce that she will now teach color words as Wittgenstein suggested. Instead, even if 
the  receiver  does  not  know  the  word  “colored,”  she  can  derive  the  concept. 
Misunderstanding can never be ruled out. This is not a problem in so far as labels (and 
classifications)  are  used  in  practical  contexts.  If  those  fail  to  function  smoothly, 
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misunderstandings  will  become  obvious  and  the  interpretation  of  the  labels  will  be 
adjusted. 
Usually, ostension works, often even without making the contrast explicit. But there are 
always  reasons  why  an  ostensive  definition  works.  With  respect  to  the  contrast,  the 
instructor may rely on the receiver grasping “what happens before or after.” Concerning 
the  uniformity  of  the  contrasted  exemplars,  it  can  be  said  that  strictly  speaking,  the 
contrasted  objects  can  never  be  more  or  less  uniform,  because  no  matter  how  many 
similarities they exhibit, they will still be different in innumerable respects. But first, the 
salience of properties can be exploited. In the above example, the bricks are uniform with 
respect to the salient properties. They still  can differ with respect to properties such as 
having been painted on a Wednesday and a Thursday, respectively. Usually, the instructor 
can rely on the fact that the receiver has no access to this information. This will never be 
save, however. If the receiver was present when the two exemplar bricks were painted, 
recognizes  them  as  such  she  might  interpret  the  pointing  gesture  as  indicating  the 
difference concerning the day of the week where the bricks were painted. Secondly, if the 
exemplars are not uniform, the instructor can retreat to Wittgenstein’s solution and make 
the receiver understand that a scheme that belongs to the meta-label “colored” is explained, 
in the hope that the receiver already knows what it means for objects to be colored.
In many cases the properties concerning which objects are similar or different will not 
be salient.  That is that they are not properties that humans happen to be receptive for.  
Humans are visual animals. They will easily grasp differences in color or shape. When it 
comes  to  weight,  the  instructor  would  have  to  let  the  receiver  hold  the  objects,  or, 
alternatively, let him look at the scale of an instrument, which of course requires that the 
receiver is familiar with reading such instruments. Here properties are made perceptible. 
The advantage in such situations is that the receiver is more likely to grasp the relevant 
difference  because  of  the  procedural  character  of  making  it  visible.  If  the  instructor 
operates  the instrument  the receiver  is  likely to guess  that  she is  not  supposed to  pay 
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attention to the color of an object. Still she requires the contrast to understand what the 
instrument shows. Such complex ostensions are often performed when scientific objects 
are introduced. Therefore, I will pay closer attention to the case.
Ostensive Definitions and New Scientific Objects
I have drawn a parallel between situations where a competent speaker teaches someone to 
use a label and thus to recognize the objects in its extension and situations where a scientist 
recognizes and introduces a novel phenomenon and attaches a name to it. But I maintained 
that what actually happens in the first situation is that a scheme is taught and thus a way to 
organize a realm of objects into ranges of extension. Accordingly, in the second type of 
situation  differences  are  found  among  objects  in  a  realm  and  also  here  a  scheme  is 
introduced, instead of a single label. The latter situation is thus not well characterized as a 
baptizing event.
Gooding (1990, Ch. 3), in discussing the difference between the two types of situations 
additionally  emphasizes  the  point  that  the  recognition  of  new objects  is  often  a  long 
process of stabilizing certain experiences, rather than a single event. And this process often 
involves  various  scientists.  This  offers  another  solution  to  the  problem of  ostensively 
picking out one property. If someone points to objects in a contrastive manner, another 
person does  not  necessarily  have  the  same experience  as  the  former,  that  is,  she  will 
probably not pay attention to the same properties. If we speak of two or more observers 
instead of one, communicating their findings, then we can say that the observers negotiate 
what there is to see, which differences are interesting.
More  importantly,  however,  Gooding  emphasizes  the  role  of  agency in  discovering 
novel phenomena. “The  ‘act’ of observing something for the first time presupposes the 
activity that rendered it visible.” (Gooding 1990, 74) It is the active interaction with objects 
that draws attention of the observer to some properties instead of others. And it is also this 
interaction with objects that draws the attention of those people with whom an observer 
shares her experiences. “Where the manipulation of an image or object conveys just that 
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aspect of a phenomenon intended by an observer, this makes it  possible for observers to 
share  a  way  of  seeing  the  phenomenon.”  (Gooding  1990,  71)  If  someone  applies  a 
substance to several pieces of metal and observes that they react differently, it is likely that 
another observer’s attention is also drawn to this difference, instead of, say, to the different 
shapes of the metal pieces. This is not only because the chemical reaction is an event that 
as such draws more attention than a steady state, but also because the agent applied the 
substance so what happens with respect to the substance must be important,  under the 
assumption that the observer aims at establishing a shared experience. The application of 
the substance in this situation is a communicative act and it is received as such by the other 
observer.
One might ask if contrast is still that important if a procedure involves a manipulation of 
objects. If someone applies a substance to a single piece of metal and observes a reaction, 
another observer’s attention will be drawn to the property of the metal to react with that 
substance (instead of its color or shape). However, the second observer will not know if 
she  is  supposed to  learn something about  the  metal  or  the  other  substance  (the active 
observer instead might have started her investigation from an interest in the metal) and 
both observers will not know if any metal reacts with the substance in this way. The act 
does not convey any such information. This is not to say that it conveys no information at  
all. Indeed something can be learned about the reaction between metal of this kind and this 
substance (no matter whether the same reaction will take place with every metal or not). 
But this implies that a contrast actually has been made. The metal without contact to the 
substance and the metal in contact with the substance have been contrasted. A classification 
can be established according to which contact situations differ from no contact situations in 
that the former but not the latter lead to the observed reactions.
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Scientific practice and the observational or experimental systems in which it is organized 
can be described as a “groping and grasping for differences.”30 (Rheinberger 1997, 75) And 
often the differences are hoped to match those already established. To put it differently, it is 
hoped  to  find  a  scheme  that  organizes  a  realm of  interest  in  the  same way that  it  is 
organized by a scheme that already organizes the realm according to certain interests. For 
instance, Rheinberger discusses a case where the realm of tissues is already organized by 
the  scheme  healthy/malignant  and  differences  are  sought  that  map  on this  distinction. 
Those  new  properties  might  have  some  explanatory  force  with  respect  to  the  known 
properties and potentially serve as a handle to alter them, or at least serve for predictions. 
But as Rheinberger also points out, the differences that are found in such an investigation 
might  split  the realm differently or apply to  a  different  realm.  This  can “reorient”  the 
research program in question (Rheinberger 1997, 97)
Even if the same kind of contrast that is involved in instructive ostensive definitions is 
involved in knowledge-generating actions, we can only call them ostensive definitions if 
labels are applied to the recognized differences and if they are communicated. But unless 
they are  communicated  they will  not  be  relevant  at  all,  because  science  is  after  all  a 
communal activity. The question rather is, if the procedures provoke differences or require 
instruments to render them visible, why not call them operational definitions? Apart from 
the mentioned history of the term that loads it with the connotation of normative definition, 
the  reason  is  that  this  would  introduce  an  undue  difference  between  ostension  and 
interventions. The point is that even simple ostensions are operations so they should not be 
treated  separately from the  complex  operations  discussed  in  this  section.  Whether  the 
difference is in color that is visible, in weight that requires a balance or in reactivity, which 
requires the application of  a  test  substance,  the teacher  or introducer  of a  label  (i.e.  a 
30 To find similarities can, of course, also be part of scientific concept formation. I will argue below that 
finding similarities depends on finding differences, because only differences make properties salient and 
delimit their scope.
106
scheme) will  have to  make a  contrast  and channel  his  and the other’s  attention to  the 
difference in question.
Contrastive  ostensive  acts  might  involve  all  kinds  of  complex  procedures,  such  as 
dissecting a whole animal to derive parts (ostension as isolation) or juxtaposing carefully 
prepared and tagged specimens from a botanical collection (ostension as filing), or relying 
on the differential ways the objects are affected by a cause or cause effects (ostension as 
experimental manipulation) etc. One could classify ostensive procedures by all kinds of 
criteria, but the important point is that they are always contrastive.
If reactions are tested or instruments applied to discover differences, there are causal 
relations involved. These causal relations might be of interest in themselves, but they might 
also be only vehicles to establish some difference. If a biologist weights the seeds of a 
plant, the causal relation between the seed and the balance will not be of any interest. The 
type of causal interaction is studied in physics, is well known, and taken for granted. They 
belong  to  a  background  observation  theory.  If  the  seeds  have  a  differential  effect  in 
attracting birds that feed of them, this causal relation might instead be very important to the 
biologist.31 I will call contrastive procedures that aim at discovering causal relations that 
are explanatorily relevant in a given context experiments in the narrow sense (although the 
term is usually used in a much broader sense, including all kinds of procedures).
Before I turn to experiments, I shall mention again that I consider those procedures that 
introduce  classes  of  objects  that  afford  certain  behaviors,  or  instruct  someone  how to 
answer  appropriately  to  certain  objects  as  analogous  to  the  procedures  that  introduce 
classes  of  objects  that  instantiate  certain  labels,  or  teach  someone  to  denote  objects 
appropriately with certain labels. That is they have to be in the same way contrastive.
31 The boundary between these types of situations is blurry, though. A dye might be used to make different  
structures visible, but the fact that it stains a structure will also contain information about the chemical  
features of the structure.
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Experiments and Causality
Some contrastive procedures aim at differential causes or effects, that is, at highlighting 
causal relationships. Causation is a notoriously difficult concept. This also has to do with 
the fact that the noun “cause” and the verb “to cause” are ambiguous, with respect to what 
kinds  of  entity  they  apply to.  Accordingly,  much  has  been  written  about  causality  by 
philosophers  as  well  as  scientists.  These  groups  typically  pose  different  questions. 
Philosophers  typically  ask  "What  does  a  claim  such  as  “A causes  B”  mean?,"  while 
scientists  ask,  "When  has  an  experiment  shown  that  A causes  B?"  Although  distinct, 
answers to both questions have benefited from answers to the respective other. My focus 
with  respect  to  causality  is:  How  does  the  detection  of  causal  relations  contribute  to 
classification and decomposition? That is: How does it contribute to the identification and 
individuation  of  objects  and properties?  The procedures  that  allow the  discovery (and 
demonstration) of causal relations are contrastive procedures,  whether the focus on the 
causal relation itself or on the classification of causes and effects. I will discuss causality 
only  to  the  extent  that  allows  me  to  compare  its  experimental  investigation  to  the 
procedures of classification by finding similarities and differences. The motivation for this 
interest in causation is, of course, that biological characters appear in many contexts where 
they are seen either as being caused by certain factors (evolutionarily or developmentally) 
or where they are causes themselves (as e.g. in ecological interactions). As we will see, 
sometimes they are seen as effects in the sense that instrument readings are seen as effects 
of a measured object.
One  way  to  clarify  the  meaning  of  causal  claims  is  through  counterfactual  analysis. 
According to this approach, A is a cause of B, if it is true that if A had not occurred, B had 
not occurred. This analysis, however, is not restricted to presences and absences. It became 
common to  articulate  causal  relations  as  holding  between  variables.  If  V1 and  V2 are 
variables that pertain to the same or different objects, we can say that V1 having the value x 
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causes V2 having the value y, if it is true that if V1 would have a different value x’≠ x, V2 
would have a different value y’≠y. But this formulation still leaves open the possibility that 
the changes in V1 and V2 are due to a change in a third variable, that is, that V1 and V2 are 
merely correlated. One can rule out this possibility, by stating that V1 having the value x 
causes V2 having the value y, if it is true that if V1 were to be changed by an intervention 
from the value x to x’, the value of V2 would change from y to y’. Intervention here does 
not  imply  a  human  intervention,  but  just  refers  to  another  causal  relation  that  holds 
between V1 and another variable V3, which should be “appropriately exogenous” to the 
causal relation in question,  which means that it  can change the value of V1,  while not 
having an effect on V2 except via V1 (Woodward 2008, 1, 28-30). If such an intervention 
on V1 would change the value of V2, then V2 is causally dependent on V1.
Note the implicit contrastive character of causal statements. We can only understand A 
as causing B or V1 having the value x as causing V2 having value y, if we contrast this fact 
with the counterfactual situation of the absence of A or V1 having another value x’ (on the 
contrastive nature of causation see also Schaffer 2005). The situation is counterfactual, 
because A cannot at the same time be present and absent and V1 cannot at the same time 
have value x and x’. In an actual experiment, we can only observe two distinct situations, 
and  the  experimenter  has  to  create  a  situation  that  approximates  the  counterfactual 
situation. If in one situation V1=x and V2=y, while in another situation V1=x’ and V2 =y’, it 
is  possible that  it  is  one of the other circumstances  that  are different between the two 
situations apart from the changed value of V1 that causes V2 having the value y’. This 
uncertainty can in fact never be avoided; this is why experiments, or quasi-experimental 
observations32 have to be so carefully controlled. For a philosopher like Woodward, being 
interested in the analysis of causal claims, “the characterization of an intervention tells us 
what should be envisioned as changed and what should be held fixed when we evaluate a 
32 Quasi-experiments mimic an experiment by choosing two situations suitable for contrast, without creating 
them  through  the  experimenter’s  intervention  (the  classical  text  on  qausi-experiments  and  natural 
experiments is Campbell and Stanley 1963).
109
counterfactual.” (Woodward 2008, 29) But the notion of intervention also provides a guide 
for approaching the ideal contrast expressed in the counterfactual in an actual experiment. 
An  intervention  is  understood  to  be  “surgical,”  which  means  “that  no  other  causal 
relationships in the system are changed” (Woodward 2008, 16). Usually the way this ideal 
is approached in laboratory sciences is through standardization of research environments 
and  materials  that  allows  the  researcher  to  interpret  the  variable  V1 in  one  object  as 
identical to the variable V1’ in another object or at another point in time and thus contrast 
different values in that variable.
Although there are many intricate philosophical problems related to the issue, this brief 
glimpse on the analysis of causality and the experiments through which causal relations are 
detected should be sufficient to see some similarities to the case of classification through 
detecting differences and the procedure of ostensive definition through which the classes 
are fixed. We saw that pointing to a property, the value (e.g. yellow) of a variable (color) as 
we can  also  say,  requires  contrast,  and  the  same is  true  for  the  detection  of  a  causal  
relation. This is not surprising since every property can only be perceived if it somehow 
(even if very indirectly) has a causal effect on the observer. On the other hand, being-
caused-by-A, or affecting-B are properties of B and A, respectively. 
Often when causal relations are investigated, the purpose is to learn something about the 
function of the causing object or variable in a larger system, or to explain the object or 
variable affected, even if it has to be said that stating a single causal relation rarely counts 
as a full explanation. It can, however, justify predictions. But it is important to see that 
there are also many occasions where a causal relation is established, but the investigator 
has  no interest  in  explaining the effect  or  investigating the function of the cause with 
respect to the effect. The causal relation can be used to differentiate a class of objects, in 
those that have a certain effect and those that do not, or that have another effect. It can also 
be used to sort another class of objects, in those that are affected by a certain causal agent 
and those that are not, or that are affected by other causes. Then these classes might be 
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investigated in other respects, for instance, by looking for other properties the objects in 
the thereby established classes share.
Having thus pointed out the close link between investigating causes and investigating 
properties as motivating classifications, we can further see a parallel between the kinds of 
contrastive procedures of ostensive definition and experiment. What is an intervention in 
causal experiments is the referring act (e.g. deictic gesture) in ostensive definitions. The act 
of referring to the exemplar in a single ostensive exemplification must be “appropriately 
exogenous” to the referential relation between the label and the exemplar, in the sense that 
it should not refer to the label at the same time (for instance, if the label is written, the  
exemplar and the label  should not be held up at  the same time).  The whole ostensive 
definition, as we saw, has to be understood as consisting of two referential acts (belonging 
to the two ostensive exemplifications). The shift between referring to the one exemplar and 
referring to the other must be “surgical,” in that the second exemplar should ideally differ 
in nothing but the property that motivates the classification that is captured by the scheme 
of which the labels in question are part.
Ostensive  definitions  and  experiments  are  thus  both  contrastive,  require  an 
“appropriately exogenous” act of establishing the contrast and aim at the ideal of a surgical 
contrast. Again, this must be the case, because after all, all ostensive definitions involve a 
causal relation between the contrasted objects and the sensual system of the observer or an 
instrument, test substance, or whatever renders a property perceptible. And on the other 
hand, every causal relation is a form of classification. It ascribes the property of causing 
this or that effect to an object  qua cause or the property of being affected by this or that 
cause to an object qua effect. Nevertheless, it is useful to keep the situations apart, because 
it is important for the analysis of scientific practice to be sensible to the different foci of 
contrastive procedures that indicate different broader goals of the application of contrastive 
procedures. The different foci will be compared in the next section.
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The Aims and Foci of Contrastive Procedures
Every time a difference is found between two objects that belong to the same realm, a 
scheme can be applied that organizes the realm into ranges of extension. Thus the detection 
of a difference automatically gives rise to a classification. The class that constitutes the 
realm now contains sub-classes that constitute the ranges of extension under this scheme. 
But the goal of a contrastive procedure need not always be to classify the objects in a 
realm. Sometimes the contrast will just serve to make the properties of an object visible, 
the focus is not on the realm that becomes organized, but on the objects to which parts and 
properties are attributed that become salient in the contrast with other objects. One of the 
objects  in  a  contrast  might  be  a  mere  vehicle  to  contrastively  investigate  the  other. 
Sometimes  both  objects  will  matter,  but  the  resulting  classification  is  still  only a  by-
product.  Comparative  anatomy,  for  instance,  need  not  always  serve  the  aims  of 
taxonomists, let alone indicate phylogenetic relations. It can simple be a strategy to make 
parts and properties of organisms salient, e.g. in order to investigate their function. I will 
call this non-classifying mode of contrasting “analysis.” It is about the relation between an 
object and its parts and properties. 
A note on properties is in place: In that a property becomes visible in a contrast,  it 
becomes perceived as a determinate state of a determinable, which is to say that the label 
becomes introduced as part of a scheme that belongs to a certain meta-label. In fact the 
word “property” is used for both determinables and determinates.33 The knowledge gained 
33 The distinction is due to Johnson (1921-1924). The stock example is color, which is a determinable, while 
red, blue, green etc. are determinates. As opposed to the distinction between hyponyms and hypernyms or 
labels  and meta-labels,  which are a semantic relations,  this is  a logical  distinction. “Species  are often 
thought to be definable in terms of a genus and a differentia. But determinates are not definable in terms of  
a  determinable  and  a  differentia;  indeed,  they  are  not  conjunctive  properties  of  any  obvious  sort. 
Determinates under the same determinable are incompatible; nothing can instantiate both of them at the 
same time, and anything that exemplifies a determinate must exemplify its determinables as well.” (Swoyer 
and Orilia 2011, 42)
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is not only that a certain object has a certain property (determinate), but also that there is 
that kind of property (determinable). 
If the aim of a contrastive procedure is to make salient properties of the type being the  
cause of a certain effect, or alternatively,  being the effect of a certain cause, that is to 
establish causal relations, I will call it “analyzing experiment” (again, this is a narrow use 
of the term “experiment”,  not everything that  is  usually called experiment  falls  in  this 
category). In the former case, where the causing object is in focus, I will call the procedure 
“analyzing intervention,” because the intervention part of the procedure lies on the side of 
the cause. When the effect is in focus, I will speak of “analyzing observation,” just because 
the effect is what must be observed in an experiment (but, of course, also in an analyzing 
intervention the effect needs to be observed, and in an analyzing observation causes have 
to  be intervened on).  These activities  aim at  highlighting causal  relations  in  which  an 
object stands.
I said that the recognition of a difference between objects results in establishing sub-
classes. If to classify the objects in a realm is also the aim of a contrastive procedure I will  
speak call the activity “classification.” Since the procedure sorts the objects in a realm in 
sub-classes, this form of classification can be called “sorting.” There is, however, also the 
case where objects previously recognized as belonging to different classes will be found to 
share a property, which establishes a super-class that all objects belong to. This will be 
referred  to  as  “grouping.”  Also  grouping depends  on  contrasts.  Not  only because  two 
objects have to be compared to find a similarity, but most importantly, because on this 
account,  properties  only  become  perceptible  in  contrasts,  where  different  determinates 
make the construal of a determinable possible. Thus if two objects are found to have the 
same determinate property,  this  requires  that  one of  them has  been contrasted with an 
object that has a different determinate property with respect to the same determinable. This 
also implies that the new class, which is the realm that is organized into the two classes we 
started with, is itself a range of extension of the label that captures the similarity and that 
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belongs  to  a  scheme  with  a  label  that  denotes  the  object  that  exhibits  the  alternative 
determinate property, such that the ranges of extension of the new scheme organize a larger 
realm. Also grouping requires introducing a whole system.
Sorting and grouping are about the difference and similarity relations between objects. 
Another  type  of  activity  aims  at  establishing  part-whole  relations,  I  will  speak  of 
“partitioning.” If a whole is divided into parts, the activity will be called “decomposing.” It 
is applied to a realm taken to consist of a class of wholes. One picks exemplary wholes and 
applies  some  method  of  observation  to  find  that  their  parts  have  different  properties. 
Decomposing  is  a  form  of  sorting  in  that  two  classes  of  parts  are  established.  The 
difference between detecting parts through analysis and decomposition is that in analysis, 
two objects are compared to see that they differ with respect to the presence/absence of a 
part or some property of the part. In decomposition, parts of one object are contrasted with 
other parts of the same object.
What about detecting that two objects can in some respect be seen as parts of the same 
object (what can be called “composition” in opposition to “decomposition”)? In principal, 
it has the same structure as grouping. With respect to classes there is no requirement that 
they should have any significance. Whereever common or distinct properties are found 
among objects classification happens. Subsequently, the classes, or as should be said the 
labels (or, even more precisely, the schemes) can become entrenched, or not, they can fit or 
be made fitting in a network of systems, or not. It seems that a whole is a certain kind of  
class,  the class of objects  as parts  that becomes interpreted in a certain way in certain 
circumstances.
If objects in a given realm are grouped or sorted on the basis of having the same or 
different  effects,  I  shall  speak  of  “grouping  intervention”  or  “sorting  intervention,” 
respectively, because the objects as causes are in focus. If objects in a given realm are 
grouped or sorted on the basis  of having the same or different  cause,  I  shall  speak of 
“grouping observation”  or  a  “sorting  intervention,”  respectively,  because  effects  are  in 
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focus.  Parts  having  different  effects  or  causes  can  also  motivate  a  decomposition 
(“decomposing  intervention”,  “decomposing  observation”).  Finally,  having  the  same 
causes  or  effects  can  in  some  circumstances  motivate  composition  (“composing 
intervention”,  “composing observation”).  The different  types  of  contrastive procedures, 
distinguished by their aim and the according focus are summarized in Table 3.1.
Object – 
Property 
Relation
Object – Object Relation
Classification Partitioning
Attribute Analysis Sorting Grouping Decomposing Composing
Causal 
relation
Causes Analysing 
Intervention
Sorting 
Intervention
Grouping 
Intervention
Decomposing 
Intervention
Composing 
Intervention
Effects Analysing 
Observation
Sorting 
Observation
Grouping 
Observation
Decomposing 
Observation
Composing 
Observation
Table 3.1. A typology of contrastive procedures
The Uses of Contrastive Procedures
The last section distinguished possible aims and foci of contrastive procedures. I already 
alluded to the fact that contrastive procedures,  additionally,  can have different uses. In 
particular they can be used to introduce, teach or create differences. Here these uses shall  
be distinguished again more clearly.
A) Concept formation is the discovery of causal relations and relations of similarity and 
difference among objects that lead to the introduction of properties, super-classes, sub-
classes, classes of wholes or classes of parts. It involves also the naming of the new classes 
with labels and probably the development of a set of behaviors that answer differentially to 
the objects in the new classes.
B)  Concept demonstration is the act of making other people recognize the classes of 
objects, the similarity, difference and causal relations that specify them and teach them the 
labels and afforded behaviors. Labels and the classes they take as their extension, when 
they are already entrenched, are taught,  just  like they are introduced in the first  place, 
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through ostensive definitions. If causal relations are involved it requires a demonstrational 
(or reported) experiment. Teaching behavior, what can be called “instruction,” works like 
ostensive definition, except that a behavior is performed instead of a label mentioned.34
C) Concept introduction by fiat is the act of applying labels or behaviors differentially 
to some members of a given class or regions of a given object, thereby creating subclasses 
or parts (or applying the labels or behaviors to objects that are not previously considered 
members of a class, thereby creating a super-class). The classes and parts are introduced by 
fiat,  because  their  differentiation  is  not  motivated  by  their  possession  of  the  same  or 
different properties. We can distinguish two cases:
First, if the objects in a realm vary gradually with respect to a variable, such that it takes 
values covering a certain range, we can stipulate that a label L1 denotes objects that take 
values in a certain sub-range, while L2 denotes objects that take values of another defined 
range and so on. 
Second, if no difference at all is recognized between the objects in a realm consisting of 
the objects A, B, C, D, E and F (although there will certainly be differences), it can still be 
stipulated that objects A, B and C are denoted by L1, while objects D, E, and F are denoted 
by L2. One can just as well lump together objects that were not considered members of the 
same class before by stipulation. 
The same goes for the stipulation of behaviors. One can start to treat the objects that 
take values in a certain range for a given variable differently from those that take values 
that fall in another range. And one can treat A, B and C differently, from D, E, and F. One 
can also treat a bunch of objects alike that have not been considered as belonging to a class 
before. It might be said that here we have properly artificial classes (even more so than in 
34 A special case is the situation of learning the way labels and behaviors are applied, that is, of learning 
which classes are recognized, by observing the use of labels and other behaviors, of people who do not 
perform definitions or  instructions,  just  by making the right  contrasts  through arranging the observed 
events such that they can be contrasted (this will most likely work only, if other labels and behaviors of the 
relevant community are already known; see the discussion of radical translation, Quine 1960).
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Dupré’s  example  of  creatures  that  are  gray and over  one  foot  long).  But  it  has  to  be 
emphasized that an accurate physical description of these classes can be given. And one 
effect of this stipulation of classes might be that some unrecognized similarities become 
salient. Finally, the fact of treating things differently or alike will almost certainly make 
them acquire similarities or differences, making the classes less artificial. These stipulated 
systems can become as entrenched as any other system, if they have a place in the network  
of systems and if they are used and accepted by a community.
Since  the  activities  A)  and B)  are  structurally  similar  it  is  possible  to  explain  one  by 
explaining the other, as I did when discussing ostensive definitions. Ostensively defining a 
scheme to document a new difference found among objects in a realm, and the teaching of 
the application of a scheme well entrenched in a community to a novice, both require the 
same  contrast,  just  as  making  an  experiment  to  produce  new  knowledge,  and 
demonstrating the experiment to make other people acquire the same knowledge have the 
same contrastive structure. 
Making people acquire the causal knowledge might work through the description of an 
experiment in an article. It has been pointed out by historians and sociologists of science 
that articles are narratives that present experimental procedures much more linearly than 
they were performed, as a direct comparison with lab notebooks shows (and even those 
might be the result of some filtering) (see e.g. Gooding 1990, 5). But the ordering and 
cleaning that takes place in the construction of the article is similar to the ordering and 
cleaning the scientist performs cognitively to filter, evaluate and connect the significant 
contrasts from all the manipulations and observations performed. 
C) is  different  from A) and B) because in the case of concept  introduction by fiat, 
objects  do  not  immediately function  as  exemplars.  The introduction  of  stipulated  sub-
classes, for instance, requires that for every object it is stated by which label it is denoted. 
But once the system is conventionalized the objects can very well function as exemplars.
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In the following,  I  will  discuss  in  which sense contrastive procedures  enable,  bring 
about and are themselves representations.
3.3. Representational Practice and the Distinction Between Thick and Thin Concepts
Reference in Systems
Once  the  relations  between  objects,  their  effects,  the  labels  that  denote  them and  the 
behaviors that answer to them have been established, it is possible to use the object to refer 
to the other items and vice versa. That the label refers to the object is obvious and that the 
object in turn can refer to the label if it exemplifies it has been discussed before. 
Effects can, if the causal connection is known, refer to their cause. This is usually called 
– with respect to Peirce’ typologies of signs (e.g. Peirce 1998) – “indexical signification.” 
What is less often mentioned is that the cause can also refer to the effect. If I see smoke I 
know there  is  a  fire,  but  if  I  see  a  fire  but  the  smoke  is  concealed,  because  it  goes 
immediately in a chimney, I still know that it is there. Since “index” is mainly used for 
effects, referring to their causes – although Peirce uses it more broadly –, one might call a 
cause  referring  to  its  effect  an  inverse  index.  Effects  that  refer  to  their  causes  play a 
particularly important  role  in  cases  of  experiments  or  sorting  or  grouping experiments 
when the cause is only perceptible via the effect. But it has to be emphasized that not just 
any object or event, or whatever can be an effect, refers to all its causes. It refers to a cause, 
if the causal relation has been previously highlighted and the effect is used or interpreted as 
referring to the cause.35
If the relation between an object and a behavior is known, the object represents the 
behavior. This is the whole point about affordances. A chair cannot only be sat on, but, if 
one is part of a chair using community and has learned the behavior, a chair refers to the 
behavior of sitting. This is comparable to the situation where we know of an object what 
35 Above (Chapter 2), I discussed the parallels between iconic and indexical representation in this respect. 
Objects do not refer to everything that is similar to them, but only when they are used to refer, and thereby,  
one similarity relation among many becomes relevant.
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label denotes it, that is, what it is. But there might be more specific cases where an object  
exemplifies  a  behavior  (just  like  an  object  exemplifies  a  label  only  when  used  as 
exemplar). For instance, in a situation of instruction, say, how to use an instrument. At least 
some behaviors (as opposed to labels) cannot be present when the object they answer to is 
not present. Therefore, one might ask if the notion that a behavior refers to the object it 
answers to makes sense. The situation can be interpreted in parallel to indexes, which also 
can not refer to their causes if the cause is absent (a cause might refer to its effect in the 
absence of the effect if the appropriate background conditions are not met to realize the 
effect). If a behavior is observed, but the object is concealed from the observer’s view, the 
observer will still  know about the object if she knows the affordance relation. But also 
some quasi-pantomimic gestures might represent an object.
Reference does not require contrast, but the introduction of the systems that enable it 
does. Once the relevant relations have been made available through contrastive procedures, 
reference can travel along these routes.
Thin vs. Thick Concepts
So far I used “object” in a very general sense (just as “entity,” “thing” or “phenomenon”). I 
will now use “phenomena” as the most general term for what becomes represented in a 
contrastive procedure. Objects will be characterized as a certain type of phenomenon. 
Above, I introduced Goodman’s distinction between articulated symbol systems that are 
syntactically  and  semantically  differentiated  and  dense  symbol  systems  that  are 
semantically and syntactically dense. I pointed out that a symbol in a dense system can be 
re-interpreted under an articulated scheme. Here, I want to distinguish the ways symbols of 
dense and articulated systems are used. This is a distinction not in terms of differentiating 
action, that is, contrastive procedures, that bring about representations of objects, but in 
terms of differential behaviors, that is, in terms of what the represented objects afford in a 
particular research context. 
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Contrastive  procedures  bring  about  representations.  First  of  all,  the  contrastive 
constellation of phenomena in itself is a representation (I will argue for this claim below). 
It is a dense representation, because the phenomena as symbols can be interpreted such that 
between every two of their fragments there lies a third. Verbal schemes that are applied are 
always syntactically differentiated,  but can be semantically differentiated or dense. The 
procedure  might  also  give  rise  to  various  kinds  of  secondary representations,  such as 
reactions,  instrument  readings,  or  photographic  images.  While  some measurements  are 
articulated,  photographs are  dense.  They might  be translated,  however,  into articulated 
systems. Such secondary representations can be seen as data  for phenomena.36 But the 
phenomena in question can be data for yet other phenomena. For example, some difference 
between phenomena might become visible through the application of a staining dye and a 
microscope and recorded on a micrograph. The micrograph is data for the objects. But the 
objects themselves might be effects of yet other objects, and thereby can function as data 
for the latter.
Concerning the activities, the primary and secondary representations afford, they are, of 
course, specific to the particular situations. But it seems likely that phenomena that are 
represented in a dense symbol system afford different actions from phenomena represented 
in  an articulated system.  When it  comes to  epistemic  practices,  there are  roughly two 
responses:  performing  internal  or  external  contrasts.  In  an  external  contrast  the 
phenomenon that became represented in a previous contrastive procedure is treated as a 
unit. I will speak of a thin phenomenon or a thin concept in this case. The realm of which it 
is  part  can  be  compared  to  other  realms.  If  an  internal  contrast  is  performed,  the 
phenomenon  appears  as  complex  in  itself.  It  relates  to  its  parts,  properties  and  their 
organization. The phenomenon figures as a realm to be organized itself. Here, I will speak 
of thick phenomena or thick concepts.  Representations in  an articulated system do not 
36 See e. g. Woodward (2000) for the discussion of the distinction between data and phenomena.
120
afford internal contrasts, but representations in a dense system afford both, internal and 
external contrasts.
The distinction is best  illustrated with an example.  A micrograph of a cell  is in 
principal a representation in a dense system. But if, for instance, an organelle is identified 
as  a  darker  region  in  contrast  to  its  lighter  surrounding  and  an  articulated  scheme  is 
introduced that organizes the realm of the cell, by naming the organelle and putting it in the 
context of other organelles, and the partitioning is further used to classify cells according to 
the possession of this organelle as a variable, then a thin concept has been formed. The 
organelle can be denoted by an arbitrary label in a diagram or by a description. Cells can 
be compared with respect to the possession of such an organelle. If instead, the micrograph 
is  interpreted  as  containing  information  about  the  particular  shape,  components  and 
organization of the organelle or its structural relation to other visible particles, an internal 
contrast can be performed that yields a thick concept of the organelle. The micrograph will 
not be translated in a notational language, but rather manipulated to gain more information, 
or replaced by more sensitive representations.
A contrastive procedure can produce a representation of a momentous state of affairs. If it 
is taken as a thin phenomenon, we can call it an “object.” If what becomes represented as 
existing atemporally is a thick phenomenon, it can be called a “structure.” But a contrastive 
procedure can also introduce difference between instances of changes over time. If the 
change is taken to pertain to thin phenomena it can be called an “event.” Causation in the 
sense of counterfactual dependence is a case in point. If one object as opposed to another 
object is represented as causing one effect rather than another effect, a difference between 
two events is made. If the phenomena of change involve structures, that is, thick concepts, 
we can speak of “processes.”
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state change
thin object event
thick structure process
Table 3.2. Types of phenomena
The distinction between thick and thin phenomena (temporal or atemporal) is a distinction 
not between different kinds of things in the world,  nor between representations. It is a 
distinction  between  what  is  afforded  by phenomena  as  they  appear  in  representations 
brought  about  in  contrastive  procedures,  but  that  is  constrained  by  the  syntactic  and 
semantic properties of the representation. The thickness or thinness will be revealed in the 
follow-up actions that answer to the representations, in what people do with the objects as 
represented to them in dense or articulated symbol systems. The distinction will thus be an 
important tool in the analysis of the disciplinary perspectives in which character concepts 
figure.
Representations, Models and Discourses
Contrastive procedures bring about material constellations that, in virtue of their particular 
arrangement, make particular differences, similarities and causal relations stand out from 
the manifold relations that can be detected. Thereby, they represent phenomena as standing 
in these relations. This can imply to put an already individuated phenomenon into a new 
context (classification), but often implies to discriminate the phenomenon itself from a four 
dimensional material continuity (partitioning). I use the verb “to represent” in this context 
for  the  following  reason.  If  a  phenomenon  appears  only  within  the  kind  of  material 
constellation that is brought about in contrastive procedures, but the constellation itself is 
always  more than  the phenomenon itself,  then  the constellation as  a  whole,  even if  it 
includes  the  phenomenon  in  question,  is  not  identical  with  and  thus  represents  the 
phenomenon. Representation is the relation between a representing entity, in this case the 
material  constellation  that  is  brought  about  in  the  contrastive  procedure,  and  the 
122
represented phenomenon, the object, event, structure or process in question. But this use of 
representation does not license to speak of the phenomenon as unrepresented in the sense 
of something unperceived or unobserved. In other words, it does not presuppose that there 
is something – in a way pre-individuated – that is represented. The phenomenon is part of 
the representation but has no meaning outside the constellation in which it is represented. 
Rheinberger writes:
Scientific activity notoriously consists in undercutting the opposition between 
representation and referent, between “model” and “nature.” Representation is 
not the condition of the possibility of getting knowledge about things. It is the 
condition  of  the  possibility  for  things  to  become  epistemic  things.  The 
scientific object is re-presented in being produced; and it is re-presented in the 
sense of a repetition, of an iterative act. (Rheinberger 1997, 112)
By “being produced,” we can understand the introduction of differences that characterizes 
a  contrastive  procedure  “Repetition”  here  seems  to  mean  what  Rheinberger  also  calls 
“reproduction.” It refers to the fact that “the generation of new phenomena is always and 
necessarily coupled to the co-production of already existing ones.” (Rheinberger 1997, 75) 
Restated  in  the  terminology  used  here,  the  introduction  of  a  system,  that  is,  a  realm 
organized by a scheme, always happens in the context of other systems. The phenomena 
that are used in the contrastive procedure to refer to, intervene on, or observe the new 
phenomena  have  themselves  been  individuated  or  manufactured  at  one  point  and  are 
specified in systems, that is they are themselves parts of one or more realms, organized by 
schemes.  In  particular  the  realm  that  becomes  organized  or  reorganized  through  a 
contrastive  procedure  is  a  phenomenon  that  is  taken  for  granted  when  a  contrastive 
procedure is  applied,  but has been represented itself  in  a material  constellation before. 
Sometimes,  the  physical  isolation  of  this  phenomenon  for  further  investigation  might 
require  repeated  application  of  a  differentiating  technique.  In  other  cases,  it  might  be 
available,  but  the  fact  that  it  is  salient  as  such  means  only that  the  category became 
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entrenched. The contrastive constellation in which it is individuated as a phenomenon is 
still  implicit if it  affords contrastive procedures itself.  When it becomes organized as a 
realm this might disrupt its status as a phenomenon and can lead to a reconsideration of the 
constellation in which it was isolated in the first place.
If the term “representation” implies that there is something outside the representation, 
that is represented, I suggest to understand the claim that the constellation of material and 
instruments in a contrastive procedure represents a phenomenon it includes, as saying that 
it  represents  the  phenomenon  as  it  appears  in  non  contrastive  denotation  and 
exemplification (i.e. reference). I said above that once the phenomenon is individuated as 
part of a system, the label can denote the phenomenon and the phenomenon can exemplify 
the  label,  without  there  being  a  contrastive  constellation.  This  use  of  symbols  usually 
works  in  an  unquestioned  manner,  fitting  in  with  the  use  of  other  symbols  and other 
behaviors. If the flow of symbolic practice breaks down, the system has to be reaffirmed or 
adjusted  in  a  contrastive  procedure.  The  constellation  of  the  contrastive  procedure 
represents the phenomenon as what is denoted or used to exemplify in other situations. 
When the label “gold” is used to refer distributively to all pieces of gold, or singularly to a 
particular piece of gold, or when a piece of gold exemplifies “gold,” then this usually goes 
without  contrast.  But  when  doubt  is  raised  and  an  expert  is  consulted,  gold  becomes 
represented contrastively; it becomes specified by showing what it is not. If some concept 
is newly formed, the contrastive constellation represents a phenomenon as it figures in the 
future uses of the phenomenon in explication or in its role as referent of a denoting label. It 
is in this sense that we can understand Rheinberger’s appropriation of Jacob’s claim that 
experiments are “machines for making the future.” (Rheinberger 1997, 28) He points to the 
openness of experiments to unpredicted phenomena that once they become entrenched will 
belong to the interior of the world a community of language and practice lives in. But the 
interior of the world are phenomena that can be referred to, that exemplify and that afford 
behaviors. Thus it is an interior of symbols. “Representation,” then, is a relation that holds 
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within symbolic practice (between material constellations that highlight a phenomenon and 
the phenomenon in non-contrastive reference relations) and not between symbols and the 
unrepresented world. This is what Rheinberger means when he says that representation is 
symmetrical, that “both terms of the relation are representations or models of each other.” 
(Rheinberger 1997, 112) The world is around, but only insofar as it is broken down into 
units that exemplify, contrastively or conventionally – if one of the possible differences it 
embodies is realized.
Also Rheinberger requires for representations that they are made “coherent and resonant,” 
which is  reminiscent  of  Goodman’s  criteria  for  fitting  (Rheinberger  1997,  112).  These 
properties do not pertain to single representations, but to networks of representations. Two 
important  ways  in  which  representations  can  contribute  to  coherence  and  produce 
resonance in a network of representations can be distinguished. If representations cannot 
be compared with what they represent, they can be compared with other representations. If 
differences are introduced in a particular realm by different means, the resulting schemes 
can be aligned. If, for instance, differences are introduced in the realm of a certain type of 
cells  by using  an  electron  microscope in  combination  with  a  certain  staining  dye  and 
another population from the same realm is subjected to homogenization and centrifugation, 
the two schemes can start  to  resonate if  ranges  of extensions isolated by the different 
methods are subsequently subjected to the same contrastive procedure such that similarity 
relations can become established between them. If this happens the labels from different 
schemes  that  organize  the  same  realm  become  linked  in  a  relation  of  co-extension, 
although they do not have the same meaning.
Another form of resonance can be described as the combination of constellations in 
which  phenomena  are  individuated  and  specified.  The  most  relevant  ways  in  which 
representations  of  phenomena  are  combined  are  the  formation  of  taxonomies  and  the 
formation of explanations. If contrastive procedures are applied to a realm and always the 
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same criteria are applied in each set of contrasts, a taxonomy might be constructed. The 
taxonomy will have a material correlate in collections that constitute the constellations in 
which the classes are represented. On the other hand it will be an ordered set of schemes.
Although there are many forms of explanations, the way representations of phenomena 
are combined to larger  explanatory representations can be illustrated out  by looking at 
mechanistic explanations. Machamer, Darden and Craver famously explicate a mechanism 
as follows:
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive 
of  regular  changes  from start  or  set-up  to  finish  or  termination  conditions. 
(Machamer et al. 2000, 3)
The entities and activities here are phenomena that become represented through contrastive 
procedures in material constellations that individuate and specify them. They can be thick 
or  thin,  that  is,  they  can  be  objects,  events,  structures  or  processes.  If  the  material 
constellations  that  represent  those  phenomena  are  combined,  a  representation  of  the 
mechanism  as  a  phenomenon  is  achieved.  But  why  is  the  resulting  representation 
explanatory? The point is probably simply that a link between phenomena always provides 
more  information  than  the  phenomena  separately.  The  whole  point  about  contrastive 
representations was that a phenomenon is never represented alone, but at least put in a 
relation to other phenomena that make up the realm in which differences are introduced. As 
a result, a causal event, even if it cannot explain a structure, still has some explanatory 
force with respect to a thin object. It can explain why the object occurred in a particular 
background. Also a represented structure can have some explanatory force. If, say, the cell 
wall  is  represented  as  different  from the  inside  and  the  outside  of  the  cell,  then  the 
continuity of  the inside of  the cell  is  explained partly through the containment  that  is 
provided  by  the  cell  wall,  without  there  being  any  events,  processes  or  mechanism 
invoked. Containment is a structural feature. Finally, if a process is traced, for instance, if a 
population  of  cells  is  marked  with  a  dye  in  an  early  embryo  and  traced  through 
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development,  the movement  of  a  population stands  out  at  least  against  the rest  of  the 
embryo, no matter how differentiated our perception of the rest  might be due to other 
contrasts. If the population migrates, then it migrates to a position relative to the whole 
embryo. This phenomenon alone should thus have some explanatory force concerning the 
state resulting from the process. 
Even if one is not willing to call such relatively simple representations of phenomena 
explanatory,  one  at  least  has  to  admit  that  the  boundary  between  descriptions  and 
explanations is not very sharp. The representation of a mechanism requires that one of the 
phenomena represented is taken as an outcome (explanandum). To “take it as an outcome” 
indicates  that  a  set  of alternative actions is  applied that  map on the distinctions made 
between objects. To set the focus on some phenomena as opposed to others is an act. Then 
phenomena  (the  entities  and  activities  in  the  explanans),  probably  from  a  range  of 
phenomena, are selected such that not only their manipulation, but also the manipulation of 
the  relations  among  them can  be  used  to  manipulate  the  outcome.  This  manipulation 
requires  to  make  the  explanans  phenomena  accessible  in  the  respective  procedures. 
Representing  a  mechanism is  representing  its  components.  In  a  way  a  mechanism is 
represented,  when all  its wheels and levers are represented and thus made available to 
operate the mechanism. 
The components of a mechanism can be thin or thick phenomena. A mechanism can be 
heterogeneous  in  this  respect.  And  there  is  no  preferred  direction  of  developing  a 
mechanism in the sense that all thick phenomena have to be replaced by thin ones or vice  
versa.  If  complex  systems  like  organisms  are  explained,  there  will  always  be  thin 
phenomena functioning as black boxes. The mechanism might be refined if they are turned 
into thick phenomena, but if a mechanism is represented outside the material constellation 
in the form of an discursive explanatory model, the thick phenomena have to be turned into 
thin phenomena in that they have to be made available to some notation.
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I  will  speak of the material  constellations brought about by a contrastive procedure as 
models. Models are distinct from the observational systems employed. Observational, and 
experimental systems in particular,  are constructed to model phenomena. A model of a 
phenomenon is a particular experimental setup within an experimental system. For biology, 
Rheinberger puts it as follows: 
The term ‘model’ is here taken in its generic meaning as an experimental setup 
that appears to be particularly apt for the analysis of a particular phenomenon 
and  that  usually  involves  a  corresponding  model  organism.  Every valuable 
experimental system is a model system in this sense. (Rheinberger 2007, 38) 
The phenomena are epistemic things, embedded and contained in an experimental system 
(Rheinberger 1997, Ch. 2). The important point is that epistemic things “embody what one 
does not yet know” (Rheinberger 1997, 28). Experimental systems are thus understood as 
generating knowledge, as opposed to only arrangements for testing hypotheses. That is, 
because they not only introduce previously unnoticed differences, but in doing so, make 
them afford further activity that can yield further differentiation or unexpected resonances 
in one of the ways mentioned above.
When I speak of models here, this form of model has to be distinguished from other 
models. What I call model is a more or less complex arrangement of samples, instruments 
and the imagery that they produce. It is a material model. What is peculiar about such 
models is that they include what they model. If molecular interactions are represented in a 
model organism, the organism contains these molecules and the interactions take place in 
the organism. But they are discriminated and highlighted – carved out from the complex 
net of causal interactions – only in this arrangement. This is why they are represented and 
why the arrangement is a model. The modelling of ecological interactions by means of 
collections of appropriately annotated specimen as it  is  described by Griesemer (1990) 
similarly includes the phenomenon modelled, even if only in form of “remnants.” because 
the model contains the phenomenon it represents which in the model is an exemplar, such 
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models might be called exemplificational models. They can be distinguished from other 
material models that do not contain the phenomenon in question. A balls and sticks model 
of a molecule does not contain the molecule it is a model of. It does not even have any 
indexical connection to the phenomenon in a way a photographic image does. It might be 
called an analogical material model (where no reference is made to semantic and syntactic 
properties, but to reasoning by analogy). It nevertheless has phenomenological qualities, 
which make it informative. With Gooding, one can probably speak of “phenomenological 
models” in both cases (Gooding 1990, 88). Phenomenological models can be distinguished 
from  theoretical  models  that  will  take  some  notational  form,  either  discursive  or 
mathematical.37
This chapter has introduced activities in an account of representation. On the one hand the 
activities that produce representations, which have been found to be characterized by a 
contrastive structure that follows from the systemic nature of knowledge, which is in turn 
derived from the  systemic  nature of  symbolization.  On the other  hand there are  those 
activities that answer to the represented phenomena. They come in alternatives, just as the 
signs, things, and thoughts. Furthermore, distinctions have been introduced concerning the 
aims,  focus  and  use  of  contrastive  procedures.  Thick  and thin,  as  well  as  simple  and 
complex representations, and different notions of model have been distinguished. These 
distinctions  should  be  helpful  to  analyze  why  and  how  characters  are  identified  and 
37 This classification is not elaborated enough to account fro all types of models in science. Is an anatomical  
wax model less connected to the phenomenon than a photographic image, just because the information  
goes through the modelers eyes and hands? Does not every analogical model or simulation start with at  
least some data derived from the phenomenon? Is a schematic diagram of a cell derived from a micrograph 
a material  model, or in its notational  character more akin to a theoretical  model? (For case studies in 
material  modeling,  see de Chadarevian and Hopwood,  eds.  (2004),  and for  a  more general  discussion 
Griesemer’s comment therein.) Are data models, which are statistically treated mathematical notations of  
data theoretical models? What is the difference then between them and mathematical models that fit the 
data? (Concerning models of data, see Suppes (1962).) My only aim here was to point out that contrastive 
constellations are models.
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individuated  in  biology.  Before  I  turn  to  the  historical  case  study,  let  me,  by way of 
conclusion of the foundational part, come back to pluralism as discussed in the beginning 
of Part I for a moment.
Part I Conclusion
It might appear as if I have made concept formation depend on given properties and causal 
relations. How is this picture reconciled with the anthropocentric pluralism suggested in 
Chapter 1? First of all, even Goodman, who criticized the idea of privileged properties for 
classification and rejects  the many roles that similarity had to play in philosophy, with 
respect to classification and representation, does not deny that there are properties and, 
accordingly, similarities. But there are indefinitely many properties. And what properties 
can be detected as same or different depends on which objects are individuated in the first 
place and this in turn depends on what properties are recognized. The point is to extract a 
coherent network of objects and properties from the many possibilities to individuate them. 
Some properties maybe salient for the contingent reasons that the human sensual system 
reacts to certain features more than to others, but that does not mean that those properties 
are the most relevant in any context. In general one cannot rely on the relevant properties 
to be obvious and guide us to the relevant concepts. They have to be made perceptible and 
many different properties can be made perceptible. This does not only imply that they have 
to  be  somehow  translated  into  perceptible  properties,  but  also  that  there  has  to  be  a 
contrast. This requires that properties are construed as determinates that belong to certain 
determinables.  A contrast  in the relevant sense is  the juxtaposition of phenomena with 
different  determinate  properties.  If  we  have  thus  defined  a  determinable  among  the 
indefinitely many there are and if we are able to discriminate some of the determinate 
properties, we can also say that things are similar with respect to that determinate property. 
This implies that we individuate similarities only as relations in systems of similarities and 
differences that are given in particular constellations of objects that have to be arranged in 
a certain contrastive way to represent the similarity relation. In this arrangement, which we 
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can call a model, the objects are exemplars. They can exemplify labels (or behaviors) in a 
scheme. Similarity appears thus appears in a semiotic system and does not motivate it.  
Once a scheme is established, the fact that the label denotes these objects might be the only 
indication that they are similar and makes us attentive to look for the similarity. In this 
sense similar is what is denoted by the same label. The same goes for causality. The point 
is not that there is no causality; there is a dense net of causal relations, but a particular 
causal relation appears in exemplificational models that makes particular contrasts. Thus 
also here, causality alone does not motivate concepts, but a concept forms if one of many 
causal relations is made accessible and intelligible in a semiotic system.
Furthermore,  human  action  brings  about  ever-new  objects  or  puts  objects  in  new 
contexts. Pure substances such as gold do not occur in nature. If they are produced, there 
will be new similarity relations. The same goes for more composed artifacts. And if an 
object is brought in a new environment, there will be new causal interactions. One can 
speak of  causal  dispositions,  of  course,  as  it  is  done when it  is  known that  an object 
belongs to a class of objects,  exemplars of which have been observed in actual causal 
relations. But to say that a fruit that grew before Homo sapiens evolved had the disposition 
to react in a certain way, if put on a Wall-Mart shelf sounds, albeit intelligible, grotesque.
Finally, I pointed out that classes can be formed by fiat if no difference in a property is 
observed and that labels and behaviors can become attached to these classes by stipulation. 
This can alter the causal properties of the objects in the classes in question. Examples are, 
if things are treated as “valuable” vs. “invaluable” or “mine” vs. “yours,” which, as we 
know all to well, has many causal effects in this world.
A stone  might  be  interactionally  simple.  But  since  it  can  be  contrasted  with  many 
things, put in many contexts and become the object of stipulated behaviors, it is certainly 
descriptively complex. It follows that descriptive complexity is not a function of whatever 
it is that makes us call things complex. It is a function though of the interactions between 
humans and things and among humans. The plurality we observe in the decompositions 
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and classifications, explanations and taxonomies, and the definitions of the boundaries of 
the discipline itself, that we observe in a science like biology is thus not a result of the 
complexity  of  nature  as  the  complexity  pluralists  have  it,  but  instead  stems  from the 
complexity and principal open endedness of human practice.
The parts and properties of organisms that become individuated, and the many roles 
they play, are unsurprisingly an instance of plurality. Different actors might cross-classify 
and cross-decompose the units that make up organisms and they will be interested in doing 
so for  different  reasons.  To investigate  how parts  and properties of  organisms become 
subjects of knowledge will provide a case study for pluralism. Furthermore, it will provide 
a case study for the systematic constitution of knowledge explicated above and for the 
contrastive structure of epistemic practices. At the same time, the analysis of knowledge 
and epistemic practice in this respect will help to address historical questions about the 
conceptual development of biology. In particular, it will help to understand why there are 
different disciplines, what separates them, and what the splitting or merging of research 
fields or strategies amounts to.
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PART II. CASE STUDY: CHARACTERS IN DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE
Part Introduction
The term “character” has been used for parts or properties of organisms in many different 
roles. Characters can be the parts or properties that serve to classify organisms. As parts, 
they can be the objects subjected to classification themselves. They can also be the parts or 
properties  of  parts  that  motivate  classification.  Sometimes  a  determinable  is  called 
“character” and sometimes the determinate property.  Characters can be contrasted with 
other characters within an organism or between organisms. Characters can be causes or 
effects.  They  can  be  the  phenomenon  of  interest  and  they  can  be  data  for  another 
phenomenon, which might itself be a character or not. Characters can be represented in 
dense and articulated symbol systems and they can be taken as thin or thick phenomena. 
They  can  be  objects,  structures,  events  or  processes.  Finally,  when  they  figure  in 
explanations, they can be part of the explanans or the explanandum.
Given  this  variety  of  roles  in  classification,  explanation  and  representation  of 
organisms,  it  is  no  surprise  that  the  realm  of  organisms  becomes  organized  in  many 
different  ways  in  different  research  contexts  or  that  same  character  according  to  a 
particular scheme, can figure in different complex representations.
In the following, I will look at a very limited range of the whole variety of biological 
research. Nevertheless, but even in this limited comparative study it will be possible to 
show  that  characters  are  individuated  and  represented  very  differently  and  play  very 
different  roles  in  contexts.  To  understand  this  will  also  help  to  clarify  some 
misunderstandings that result from not realizing that talking of characters is not always 
talking about the same concept. Furthermore, the case will illustrate the usefulness of the 
analytic vocabulary developed in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 4.  Characters:  Terminology and the Distinction Between Parts,  Variables 
and Values
Terminology
The most general term concerning the descriptions of organisms, which is frequently used 
by biologists, is “feature.” It is used in the most general sense to refer to parts (e.g. bones, 
muscles or legs), properties or qualities (e.g. leggedness, coat color, brown), processes (e.g. 
respiration,  metabolic  pathways)  and  activities  or  behaviors  (e.g.  swimming,  escape 
response) observed in organisms. The term is often employed in definitions of other terms 
such as “character.” The ornithologist Kurt Fristrup for instance writes: “An observable 
feature, a correlated set of features caused by a single developmental or ecological process, 
a historic event in the evolution of a feature: all of these are characters.” (Fristrup 1992, 
45) Apart from their more or less specific name or description (e.g. “bone”, “incus”, “coat 
color”, “brown coat color”), features of organisms are often referred to in a more abstract 
manner as “part”, “property”, “process”, etc., respectively. But there is also an important 
family of terms that is used in specialized ways, though differently in various contexts, 
namely “character”,  “trait”,  “(partial)  phenotype”,  “phene”,  “morph”,  and maybe some 
more. Sometimes features are also referred to with the term that indicates their theoretical, 
e.g. evolutionary, role (e.g. “adaptation” or “homology”). 
“Character” and “trait” are the terms most frequently used for features of organisms in 
specific contexts.38 According to the  Oxford English Dictionary39 both words originally 
38 The term “phenotype”, being a neologism, has a much shorter history. It is certainly more tied to the term 
“genotype” and the according conceptual  changes with respect  to the gene.  This  will  be the focus of 
Chapter 6.
39 "character,  n.".  OED  Online.  September  2011.  Oxford  University  Press. 
http://www.oed.com.pros.lib.unimi.it/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/30639  (accessed  September  23,  2011); 
"trait,  n.".  OED  Online.  September  2011.  Oxford  University  Press. 
http://www.oed.com.pros.lib.unimi.it/view/Entry/204450?redirectedFrom=trait  (accessed  September  23, 
2011).
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referred to artificially produced signs before they changed their meaning such that they 
could designate naturally occurring signs that allow to recognize an object as an individual 
or  as  belonging  to  a  class  of  things40.  The  meaning  of  “character”  changed  from “a 
distinctive  mark  impressed,  engraved,  or  otherwise  formed;  a  brand,  stamp,”  to  “a 
distinctive significant mark of any kind; a graphic sign or symbol” and from there on the 
one hand to “a graphic symbol standing for a sound, syllable, or notion, used in writing or 
in printing; one of the simple elements of a written language; e.g. a letter of the alphabet,” 
a meaning that persists, and on the other hand to “a distinctive mark, evidence, or token; a 
feature, trait, characteristic” in general and finally to the specialized meaning in Natural 
History: “One of the distinguishing features of a species or genus.” “Trait” changed its 
meaning from “a stroke made with pen or pencil; a short line; a touch (in a picture)” via “a  
40 Similar in its etymology, and, due to the language’s rank as a language of science and scholarship in the  
19th century, very important in the history of this family of concepts, is the German word “Merkmal”. It is a 
compound of the verb “merken” and the noun “Mal”. According to the  Duden, Herkunftswörterbuch the 
former has the same roots as the English “mark” in a Germanic word for “border”, which later acquired the 
meaning of “sign” (marking the border), that was artificially introduced. Today “merken” has the meaning 
of “to notice” or “to memorize.” “Mal” has the meaning of “stain,” in a sense that historically associates it  
with an event like a sin, which it indicates. In this sense it is a naturally occurring, or god-made sign. Today 
it  can  also  refer  to  a  mole  or  something  similar,  but  also  to  artefacts  that  remind  of  an  event,  like  
memorials. Within the compound it designates any naturally occurring aspect of a thing that allows to 
recognize it. So in a way both parts of the compound have the same meaning but the first part emphasizes  
the  cognitive  role,  while  the  latter  emphasizes  the  material  nature  of  the  sign.  (Duden,  
Herkunftswörterbuch. 2nd ed. s.v. “Mal”, 436; Duden, Herkunftswörterbuch. 2nd ed. s.v. “merken,” 454.)
The meaning and use of the term in natural history are very similar to that of “character” or “trait” and 
thus  the  latter  two are  often  used  in  translations from texts  originally written  in  German,  such  as  in 
Bateson’s translation of Mendel’s paper (Bateson 1902). “Merkmal” on the other hand is often used as  
translation for “trait” or the Latin or English form of “character”, as for instance in translations Darwin’s  
work, although in the case of the Origin of Species “character” is sometimes translated as “Merkmal” and 
sometimes as “Charakter”, which indicates that there are a number of concepts designated by these terms 
(Darwin 1967, translation by H.G. Bronn and J.V. Carus).
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line or lineament of the face; a feature,” to “a particular feature of mind or character; a 
distinguishing quality; a characteristic.” It seems that it  was the particular forms of the 
faces, or other body parts, or behaviors of people (or animals) that where recognized as 
shared, but more importantly,  as being different,  among people (or animals),  especially 
among parents and offspring, that let “trait” become a biological term.41 This happened 
when the knowledge of traits as shared or differing among individuals became increasingly 
organized under the metaphor of inheritance, which was taken from the legal sphere in the 
first half of the 19th century.42
Due  to  their  different  etymology  and  entry  point  in  the  language  of  the  emerging 
biological  sciences,  the  word  “character”  is  still  more  associated  with  systematics  and 
evolutionary  biology,  while  “trait”  is  more  frequently  used  in  genetics.  Accordingly, 
“character” pertains more to features of species, while “trait” is used more often to refer to 
variation  among  individuals.  Nevertheless,  both  terms  are  used  in  both  contexts  and 
sometimes even with the same meaning in one text (Allen 2002, 373-374). The words 
themselves are thus no guide to the conceptual distinctions that can be made in the areas 
where they are applied. Some of those distinctions are discussed in the following, using the 
word “character,” but it should be kept in mind that they might also be relevant when the 
word “trait” is used or another of the above mentioned terms.
Distinctions: Features vs. Characters and Parts vs. Variables
A first  notable  distinction  made by Fristrup is  that  between a feature  and a  character. 
“Feature,” being the most general term, “denotes a description or measurement of a part, 
quality, or action observed in an entity.” (Fristrup 1992, 47) Characters instead, according 
41 I have argued in Chapter 3, that similarity presupposes difference, in that properties only become salient in 
a contrast.
42 The book  Heredity Produced: At the Crossroads of Biology, Politics, and Culture, 1500–1870 (Müller-
Wille and Rheinberger, eds. 2007) provides a number of case studies that show how certain traits of people  
(but also features of animals) first became visible in a social and medical (or agricultural) context and then 
became conceptualized as “inherited”.
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to Fristrup, are relations among features. This means that characters are features that play a 
particular  role  in  classification  or  explanation,  where  they  related  to  other  features. 
According to  the typology of contrastive procedures provided above,  one can say that 
features  are  the  result  of  analysis,  while  characters  figure  in  classifications  and 
partitionings (though again,  the use of the words is not consistent,  what matters is  the 
conceptual distinction). The criteria used to define characters are a matter of conventions 
pertaining  to  different  fields  and  might  include  similarity  of  form,  correspondence  of 
internal  structure,  congruence  of  external  associations,  developmental  congruence  or 
functional relation to other features (Fristrup 1992, 47; Crovello 1970). Of course, a feature 
might be observed and subsequently be assigned a particular role, but in most situations, 
certain roles will be selected as interesting by the research program and this will influence 
the choice of observational means.
As the etymological history of the terms “character” and “trait” showed, both could and 
can be used to address individual peculiarities. But as biological categories, they usually 
refer to a type of thing. Fristrup writes (Fristrup 1992, 45):
Characters are always defined with reference to a sample of biological entities 
(organisms, populations, species). Characters are named to express a perceived 
or hypothetical likeness among entities in the sample. Characters provide the 
basis  for  relating  or  comparing  these  entities.  By recognizing  likeness,  we 
define  a  character,  but  its  importance  lies  in  emphasizing  variations: 
differences in the character values assigned to entities. In fact, characters are 
never defined unless an observed or probable variation exists.
This passage sounds contradictory. One the one hand Fristrup says that likeness defines 
characters and on the other hand variation is required to define them. The statement is best  
understood as saying – in accordance with the analysis given in Part I – that characters 
become defined in contrast, that is when differences point to the part or property, but that 
they are types  only in  that  there is  likeness  among the instances  of a  label.  What  the 
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passage also points out is that one has to pay attention to the realm that becomes organized 
by a  scheme of  character  labels.  Furthermore,  the  passage makes clear  that  characters 
pertain to individuals in a class and not to a class. Sometimes, a character is attributed to a 
species, for instance if it  is said that “Homo  sapiens has an upright stance” but such a 
formulation is to be understood as a metonymy (Colless 1985, 34).
The entomologist Donald Colless makes an important distinction between characters as 
parts  and  characters  as  variables  taking  values  (Colless  1985).  His  discussion,  like 
Fristrup’s is mainly concerned with the role of characters in taxonomy, but his results are 
important  for  all  character  concepts  as  used  in  various  contexts.  He  starts  from  the 
observation that the term “character” is used differently in different contexts even within 
taxonomy  and  distinguishes  three  semantic  categories  subsumed  under  the  term 
“character”: Parts, attributes, and variables.
Characters  as  parts  are  the  physical  building  blocks,  such as  body parts,  but  also 
segments of behaviors, or processes, of which an organism or its behaviors or activities are 
composed. In predicating statements about organism they appear as either subject or object 
(Colless 1985. 230).
Characters as attributes are the distinctive qualities or properties of a form, structure, 
material or function. They are possessed — in the logical sense — by an organism or part. 
They constitute a fact about an organism. A statement assigning an attribute to an organism 
is a description that can be true or false (Colless 1985, 230-231).
Characters as variables are a set of mutually exclusive values (Colless 1985, 231-232). 
Logically, the relation between a variable and its values is not to be thought of as a class 
and member relation, but rather as that of a determinable and a determinate (see Fn. 33 
above). A variable is not possessed by, present in, or true or false about an organism. It can 
be said to be applicable to a part or an organism. A character as variable corresponds to the 
Aristotelian  notion  of  a  fundamentum  divisionis with  the  values  as  differentia,  which 
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traditionally  underlies  taxonomic  reasoning  in  natural  history (see  also  Ghiselin  1984, 
105).  Another  common  distinction  that  maps  on  the  variable-value  scheme  is  that  of 
character  and  character  states.  (In  genetics  characters  are  also  construed  as  sets  of 
alternatives, see Chapter 6.) Characters as variables can be defined intensionally through a 
part name and a determinable (e.g. eye color, seed size), which is useful especially for 
metric characters, or extensionally through a list of the values (e.g. blue, brown, green for 
eye  color),  which  makes  explicit  the  actually  observed  character  states.  In  general 
characters that are values of the same variable are judged homologous.
To summarize Colless’ distinction with the help of an example, “eye” would designate a 
part,  “eye  color”  a  variable.  A variable  comprises  a  set  of  values  such as  “blue”  and 
“brown”. The description of an organism (or populations, or species) as “has blue eyes,” 
assigns an attribute to it.
Colless’ text sometimes gives the impression that he equates attribute and values, but 
this is not the case. He says that values must be given as “brown” or “blue” instead of 
“blue  eyes”,  whereas  attributes  have  the  form  “has  blue  eyes”  (Colless  1985,  232). 
Attributes  are  thus  not  the  determinates  of  determinables,  but  predicate  a  determined 
variable over an organism (or population, or species). But even if we have to be sensitive 
concerning  the  difference  between  a  character  and  the  attribution  of  a  character,  this 
distinction is not on the same level as that between characters as parts and characters as 
variables  that  take  different  values,  since  both,  characters  and  values  of  a  particular 
variable can be attributed. Here I will focus on the distinction between parts and values of 
variables and interpret it in terms of thick and thin concepts.
What  Colless  describes  as  parts  is  the  result  of  the  contrastive  procedure  of 
decomposition. Decomposition has been characterized above as a contrast between parts of 
the same structure. A character as part results from the decomposition of an organism taken 
as a structure, that is from contrasts between its parts. A part can be become a variable, if it  
is used in a contrast between organisms. Then it is treated as an object, that is, as a thin  
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phenomenon.  As  a  variable  it  can  take  as  values  either  “presence”  and  “absence,”  or 
different states. But as long as it is treated as a part, it is seen in relation to other parts of 
the same structure and it is itself a structure that is open to further decomposition. It is thus 
a thick phenomenon and affords manipulation.
The identification of a variable and the values it takes results from a contrast between 
organisms the  variable  is  applicable  to,  what  I  have  called  analysis.  Even if  a  part  is  
identified in contrast with other parts of the organism, when it plays the role of a value, it 
only becomes identified in contrast with another value of the same variable. If a part is not 
previously identified in a decomposing contrast, but identified as a thin value of a variable 
(as an object),  the attention can shift from the analysis of the object to the analysis or  
decomposition of the part. In this case the part will become treated as a structure. But as 
long as a part or property figures as values of variables, they are thin phenomena. They 
afford comparison and being recorded and can serve as data.
Variables  can  either  be  thick  or  thin.  If  the  scheme  that  organizes  the  realm  is 
semantically dense, there will for every two values a value that lies between them. An 
object under such a scheme affords ever more fine-grained determination of the value and 
furthermore cannot be an exemplar, but for itself. If the scheme is discontinuous, instead, a 
label will cover a range of variation and the objects in its extension can represent each 
other as exemplars.
In some contexts, characters might afford being treated as a part, in others they will 
afford being recorded as a value of a variable. Since the term “character” is used for both 
categories, confusion might arise either if the categories are not separated conceptually, or, 
even if used consistently, when the uses are not specified in the literature (Colless 1985, 
232). One situation where it would be problematic not to distinguish between parts and 
variables would be the following. The character “eye” can be described as having the being 
“blue” or “brown”. Since other determinable properties such as shape can be applied to the 
eye, the character that takes values is the variable “eye color,” not the part “eye.” A failure 
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to make that distinction also leads to the,  according to Colless mistaken view, that the 
character/character  state  distinction  is  just  a  matter  of  hierarchical  levels.  Of  course 
“brown” and “white” could be character states of the character “wing” while “winged” and 
“non-winged” are character states of the character “limb-form” etc., but it is important to 
notice that “brown” and “white” are states of the variable “wing-color,” which is applied to 
the part  “wing”,  whereas “winged” and “non-winged” are states of the variable “limb-
form” that is applied to the organism. That is, it is not a simple hierarchy where a character 
on one level is a character state in the other, but a character on one level switches it status  
from part to a value of a variable while ascending in the hierarchy. The distinction is also 
necessary to  understand the  concept  of  a  dependent  character:  the  variable  wing-color 
depends on the value “wing present.”
A failure to distinguish variables and values can be equally problematic. The difference 
between “eye color” and “blue eyes” is relatively easy to grasp and not much harm is done 
if the two uses of “character” are not made explicit. A more difficult case is the absence of 
a structure. If a variable such as “leggedness” is not applicable at all to a species this is a 
different case from that of a snake, where the variable is thought to be applicable due to 
snakes’ position in a phylogenetic classification, but the value of the variable “leggedness” 
is “absent”. To make this difference comprehensible requires to be explicit about characters 
as variables or values (Ghiselin 1984, 105).
Chapter 5. Parts: Pluralism, Function and Characters as Thick Phenomena
Pluralism Concerning Partitionings
Rasmus Winther (2006, 472ff.) distinguishes two styles of biological theorizing (in the 
sense  of  Hacking  2004,  Ch.  12):  formal  and  compositional  biology.  Whereas  formal 
biology  focuses  on  mathematical  models  that  express  quantitative  relations  between 
parameters  and  variables  that  represent  relations  between  the  entities  they  map  on, 
compositional  biology  looks  at  the  relation  of  parts  and  wholes  and  their  respective 
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functions  and  capacities  (the  notion  of  variable  here  is  more  narrowly  restricted  to 
mathematical representation than the notion of variable discussed above). This distinction 
crosscuts biological disciplines, however defined, in that all make use of both styles. But 
some disciplines might predominantly make use of one or the other style. For instance, 
theoretical  population  genetics  can  be  seen  as  a  science  relying  on  mathematical 
modelling, and developmental biology, according to Winther, is a science driven by the 
compositional style, even if there is elaborate mathematical modeling of developmental 
processes43. This distinction seems more appropriate than a distinction between theoretical 
and experimental biology, because theoretical biology makes use of experimental data and 
experimental biology is certainly connected to theorizing, and it is exactly the theoretical 
side of compositional biology that Winther intends to look at.
Relying on an institutional notion of discipline, Winther takes “theoretical perspectives” 
as his unit of analysis (Winther 2006, 475ff.). Accordingly, within an academic discipline 
such as  developmental  biology,  which  is  mainly pursued in  a  compositional  style,  but 
might  also  harbour  formal  approaches,  researchers  might  have  different  theoretical 
perspectives. What makes up a theoretical perspective is the “partitioning frame” and the 
“explanatory account,”  which  are  guided by a  certain  set  of  biases,  commitments  and 
norms. “Partitioning frame” describes which parts are identified and at what levels in part-
whole hierarchies they are located, where parts can be structures, processes, mechanisms, 
functions or time periods, everything that is delineated as a part of a whole. “Explanatory 
account” is supposed to capture the type of question that can be asked and the explanatory 
resources  that  can  be  exploited  to  answer  them  with  this  theoretical  perspective. 
“Explanatory resources” refers to the types of models that are constructed, the mapping of 
the explanatory roles of the parts recognized etc. If it is a compositional style theoretical 
perspective,  explanations  will  explain  properties  of  the  whole  through  parts,  their 
43 On the history of mathematical modelling in developmental biology and the conflicts or misunderstandings 
between the physical and the experimental cultures, as she calls it, resulting from differences in what is 
regarded as a satisfying explanation, see Keller (2003).
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properties and their organization. (“Organization” here implies that this style of reasoning 
can take emergent properties into account.)
Winther discusses three disciplines: Comparative Morphology, Functional Morphology 
and Developmental Biology. He shows that within these disciplines different theoretical 
perspectives are taken. Accordingly, the explanations given in these disciplines appear to 
be very different from each other concerning the type of question asked and the types of 
answers accepted, as one would expect. But furthermore, and maybe less obvious, different 
partitioning frames can be observed. For instance, Winther remarks that a leg is regarded as 
a part, an integrated whole, which is made up of bones, muscles and other sub-parts, from 
the perspective of functional  morphology,  where it  plays  a  causal  role  in  the systemic 
behavior of locomotion. In comparative morphology, on the other hand, muscles and bones 
are delineated as parts, and investigated concerning their status as homologies, but the leg 
does not appear as a part (at least in the account studied by Winther) (Winther 2006, 486). 
Winther’s notion of compositional style matches the idea of a context in which thick 
conceptions of phenomena prevail  and his  idea of  a  partitioning frame can be read as 
corroborating my view that characters can only be individuated in a system, that is as part  
of a realm that gets organized by a scheme. The point I want to emphasize here, however,  
is  that  his  analysis  supports  pluralism  concerning  characters  as  parts.  From  different 
perspectives, the organism will be divided into parts differently. And even parts that seem 
to be delineated in the same way they can still play different roles in explanations. It must  
be said, however, that Winther’s pluralism is motivated by the assumption of complexity.
Some critical notes on Winther’s account shall be mentioned here: First, Winther writes: 
“once a perspective has identified the parts pertinent to it, specific explanatory accounts 
can  be  adopted”  (Winther  2006,  476).  And  it  seems  that  he  is  not  only  heuristically 
separating these aspects, but thinks of them as discrete steps in reasoning and even sees 
them as appearing in chronological order. Instead I contend that what Winther calls the 
“partitioning frame” will in many cases be determined by his “explanatory account.” A 
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way of defining types of parts can become established because these types of parts are 
necessary for the type of explanation that is envisioned. Explanations should be seen as 
constructed in a delicate process involving material and theoretical practice, in which the 
explanandum and the explanans, the parts on both sides and their explanatory relations are 
determined together and in mutual adjustment. The explanation sought will most likely 
influence what contrast is made and by which means differences are introduced. This leads 
to the second critical point, the neglect of the practice of partitioning. 
The procedural character of part delineations is missed. Winther’s reliance on textbooks 
as sources clearly has drawbacks here. But even from the textbook quotations Winther is 
presenting it becomes clear that a part is determined by the  activity that is isolating it or 
making  it  visible.  In  a  passage  from  the  Comparative  Morphology  textbook  he  is 
analysing, muscles are separated conceptually by describing how the scalpel has to be used 
to  separate  them  physically.44 (This  is  reminiscent  of  the  importance  of  cutting  and 
touching  for  Aristotle’s  delineation  of  parts;  see  below.)  Also  comparing  animals  — 
necessary for the construction of parts as homologies — is an activity of holding objects 
(body parts or drawings) against each other. In other cases it is even more obvious that the 
delineation of characters depends on a procedure of detecting it, for instance when staining 
reveals differences among tissues. The account of contrastive procedures given above and 
their distinction by aim and focus should be helpful to further analyze the practices that 
result in a partitioning frame. 
In the following I will take a closer look at how explanatory aims, especially concerning 
functional explanations influence the delineation of parts.
44 “In studying the muscles it  is necessary to separate each muscle from its neighbours. This is done by 
searching carefully for the white lines of connective tissue, which mark the boundaries of muscles and 
slitting along these lines with the point of the scalpel. ... After freeing the margins of a muscle the fingers  
should be worked under the muscle until it is separated from its fellows.” (Hyman 1942, 222, cited from 
Winther 2006, 481)
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Biological Objects, Function and Models
In a  series  of  papers  Manfred  Laubichler  and Günther  Wagner  discuss  the  relation  of 
biological  objects,  including  characters  and  the  (functional)  models  that  refer  to  them 
(Laubichler 1999; Laubichler and Wagner 2000; Wagner and Laubichler 2000).
Laubichler (1999) emphasizes the distinction between an object identified by means of 
some  measurement  procedure  and  the  biological  object  individualized  through  its 
functional role. This is important, because often the functional terms are used to designate 
the object. Thus, even if “ß-galactosidase” is used to refer to the object in question, the 
object is a protein and the term refers to it in its functional role in a given context. The 
context  in  this  case  would be a  theory of  cellular  metabolism.  Generalized  theoretical 
models will have more general characterizations of the functional role such as “metabolic 
enzyme”.45 Nevertheless,  the  protein  as  an  object  can  be  measured  independently and 
function might only be ascribed to it subsequently. Analogously, a character as part (e.g. 
the vomeronasal organ), as detected by an anatomical procedure (histology), can have the 
function (olfactory sense organ) in one or more theoretical context (e.g. neuro-physiology 
or behavioral biology),  where it  has a generalized role (sense organ or signal receptor,  
respectively). It is useful to keep the measurement and the ascription of functional roles 
separate, because often functions are taken to individuate characters.46
When it comes to ascribing roles, it  seems, however, that Laubichler puts too much 
weight on functions. An object might figure in a theoretical model but not as having a 
function, e.g. when a protein or a morphological character is used in taxonomy. In this case 
45 Laubichler frames his distinctions in terminology from Peircian semiotics, with the object given in the 
measurement as the object sign, the functional role as the representamen and the generalized role in the 
theoretical  (interpretative)  context  the  interpretant.  But  also  a  non-functional  concept  would  be  a 
representamen and the functional interpretation is better understood as a further semiotic process.
46 Karen Neander writes: “… most biological categories are only definable in functional terms.” (Neander 
1991, 180, see also Neander (2002) and Griffiths (1994) and (2006), as well as Amundsen and Lauder 1994 
for further discussion of the role of function for character individuation).
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the protein, for instance, would be considered as sequence in relation to other sequences. 
Laubichler also uses the term “relational property” for functions. This could be adopted as 
the more general term and (causal)  functions should be treated as one type of relation 
among others (I prefer, however to speak of roles, functional and other).
Nevertheless,  Laubichler's  initial  distinction  between  the  object  and  its  relational 
properties is  important,  because one object can be relationally characterized in  various 
ways. The protein for instance can be seen as homology or as enzyme. So the object might 
be considered in theoretical contexts that assign different relational properties (roles) to it. 
It can be said that still the same object is considered, when the same method of identifying 
the object is used, what I have specified as a contrastive procedure (e.g., in the protein case 
the  same  chemical  way of  measuring,  isolating  or  sequencing  the  protein).  It  is  also 
important to see that a relational property (role) is interpreted in, but distinguished from a 
theoretical model in the sense that one relational property can be considered in different 
theoretical contexts (for instance neuro-physiology and behavioral biology in the above 
example  of  the  vomeronasal  organ  as  an  olfactory sense  organ).  Of  course,  since  the 
functional role is defined by, and thus not independent of the theoretical context, the latter 
point implies that there is a recognized connection between the two theoretical contexts 
that allows to regard them as being concerned with the same function of the object (e.g. 
that behavior coordinated through signals requires neuronal activity). In other theoretical 
contexts the object might not be regarded as having any biologically relevant relational 
properties at all.
The important point is that the role of an object, such as a character, in a functional, 
classificatory or other type of model will still influence the individuation. Laubichler and 
Wagner  (Laubichler  and Wagner  2000;  Wagner  and Laubichler  2000) propose that  the 
behavior of a character as a variable in a mathematical model of a process (again this use 
of  “variable”  is  more  narrow  than  the  one  discussed  above)  determine  whether  an 
individuating scheme is adequate in a given context.
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According to the authors, natural processes, interpreted as a mapping of an initial state 
to a subsequent state of a system, can be represented through mathematical models, which 
map one set of numbers to another (this is a different notion of process from the one I use  
in this thesis). The former mapping is determined by the physical properties of the process, 
while  the  latter  mapping  relation  consists  in  mathematical  operations  (Laubichler  and 
Wagner 2000, S291). The functionally relevant objects are those that are represented by 
variables in the equations that remain constant under certain important transformations. 
This holds for characters as much as for any other biological object that plays a role in a 
model  of  a  biological  process.  Accordingly,  there  might  be  different  character 
decompositions,  depending  on  which  biological  process  is  mathematically  modelled. 
Wagner  and Laubichler  give  an example for  the  modelling of  natural  selection,  where 
characters are construed as adaptations, but a model of the development of a characters 
might individuate them differently. 
What can be learned from this discussion is the following. While some authors seem to 
suggest  that  characters  are  individuated  according  to  their  function,  Laubichler  (1999) 
points out the relative independence of the measurement procedure that makes a character 
visible and thus amenable to functional reasoning. However, his and Wagner’s arguments 
concerning  modelling  emphasize  that  the  intended  model  might  still  suggest  the 
measurement  method  or  select  among  alternative  individuation  schemes  in  a  given 
situation. 
Thus even if alternative decompositions are achieved by different anatomical methods, a 
model might determine which one is to be used. However, not all research programs that 
involve characters aim at mathematical models. Furthermore, if the model not only selects 
among  different  ways  to  decompose  a  whole,  but  also  suggests  how  the  variables  it 
contains should be measured, the pathway leading from the theoretical modeling activity to 
the  measuring  activity  must  be  described  to  understand  how  models  determine  the 
individuation of objects. A last important critical point is that it might still be possible to 
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change the  model  if  there  is  reason to  cling  to  one  partitioning scheme.  Whether  the 
practice in a given research context is driven by theoretical models or rather by procedural 
interaction with the material is to be judged on a case-by-case basis. 
To see how methods of introducing differences are used in the individuation of characters 
as parts and what other factors play into the process, I shall look at the  locus classicus 
concerning the “Parts of Animals.”
Aristotle and the Parts of Animals: Dissection, Contrast, Function
Aristotle’s  writings  on  biology  are  among  the  earliest  systematic  descriptions  of 
organisms.47 It’s worth looking at the way he perceived parts of animals, because his work 
already contains most of the issues that are present in different forms every time when the 
parts and properties of organisms are under investigation and his ideas had a far reaching 
influence on later schools of natural history, anatomy and physiology. In particular, this 
short excursus in the early history of biology might serve to show that the delineation of 
parts  is  historically  conditioned,  dependent  on  the  observational  practice  (the  physical 
delineation  of  parts  as  well  as  the  choices  of  contrasts),  and  intermingled  with  the 
explanatory aims of an inquiry.
A first observation is that even Aristotle did not start from nothing, but practiced as 
someone  deeply embedded  in  a  tradition.  Many parts  and properties  he  discusses  had 
names in common language, be it because they are salient with respect to human senses 
and dimensions, be it because they were relevant with respect to some human practice, for 
example related to food production. Aristotle often uses the expression “what is called” 
when he refers to parts. What can be learned from this is that a partitioning or classification 
47 It is common practice among philologists to refer anachronistically to Aristotle’s writings on animals as his 
“Biology” (see e.g. Gotthelf and Lennox, eds. 1987). Aristotle’s Biology mainly consists of  History of  
Animals (HA), On the Parts of Animals (PA), and Generation of Animals (GA). In HA he limits himself to 
description of parts of animals as they appear in different animals. In PA he gives functional explanations 
of the forms and qualities of the parts. In GA he discusses the reproductive organs and the generation of the 
parts from the fertilized egg.
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usually  starts  from  a  situation  where  some  probably  competing  partitionings  and 
classifications are already in place. The entrenched systems often provide the realm that 
becomes organized (sorted or decomposed) by a new scheme.
Aristotle also refers to more specific knowledge concerning the anatomy of men and 
animals,  in  the  form  of  written  sources  from  preceding  scholars,  like  Diogenes,  for 
instance,  or oral reports from practitioners like fishermen. As a matter of fact it  is not 
always  clear  which  observations  Aristotle  made  by  himself  and  which  stem  from 
testimony.  But  not only is  the delineation and designation of parts  influenced by prior 
knowledge;  also  aspects  of  their  theoretical  explanation  are  taken  from  the  natural 
philosophy  of  his  predecessors,  Empedocles  for  example,  which  Aristotle,  of  course, 
developed further. A last role of the tradition lies in the fact that his methods of observation 
were partly taken over from preceding practice.
The  second  point  to  observe  is  his  observational  practice.  Even  if  he  included 
testimonial knowledge in his reasoning, his biology relied to a large extent on observations, 
which shall now be described in more detail. Aristotle mainly studied animals. However, 
he comments also on the parts of plants and many things he says about the parts of animals 
he seems to think of as being true also for plants. He obviously practiced dissections of 
dead animals. Probably he also dissected living animals. It is debated but unlikely that 
Aristotle  dissected  human  corpses,  but  he  might  have  used  evidence  from lesions  or 
diseases in humans as evidence for the individuation and functional characterization of 
organs.
Aristotle makes a distinction between the internal and the external organs. The most 
striking point about dissection is that it allows to observe the inner parts of organisms and 
even the inner structure of the inner organs. How important this material practice was for 
the development of conceptual distinctions can best be seen when Aristotle introduces a 
distinction between the homogeneous and the heterogeneous parts. The former might be 
seen as roughly coextensive with what in the 18th, and especially in the 19th century became 
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characterized as tissue types, whereas the latter corresponds to organs or complex body 
parts. However, the way that Aristotle defines homogeneous parts is as those parts of the 
body, a fraction of which falls under the same description as the original part. If a piece of 
flesh is cut away from a larger piece, it is still flesh. This is not true of the heterogeneous 
parts of the body, like the eye, nostril, the whole face, the fingers, the hand and the whole 
arm. If such an organ is cut apart, the fraction will not be of the same kind — a piece of a 
hand is not a hand. Some parts, especially the inner organs are both in that they are made 
of only one homogeneous material, but are structurally complex, like the heart with its 
various chambers and valves (Aristotle PA, Book II, Part 1, in  Lennox 2001). It can be 
seen here how the method of cutting determines the conceptual distinction.
Obviously  the  anatomical  procedure  also  implied  to  touch  the  organs.  Touch,  as 
Christopher Cosans points out, for Aristotle had a priority over visibility concerning the 
knowledge of things made of matter and thus informs more reliably about the qualities of 
parts than vision, which might yield different impressions for various students of animals 
or under different conditions (Cosans 1998, 312). But touching the parts of the body did 
not only determine the dryness/wetness, hardness/softness or hotness/coldness of the parts, 
but also its form. The delineation of elongate organs, for instance, like the oesophagus or 
sinews or vessels had to be traced out with the fingers in order to determine their way 
through the  body and the  organs  they connect  to.  Touching,  by Aristotle  is  used  as  a 
technique in contrastive procedures, in particular in decompositions.
Aristotle’s  practice  exemplifies  the  ubiquitous  role  of  contrast.  Aristotle  performs 
decomposing contrasts (between parts of the same animal) as well as classifying contrasts 
(between  different  animals).  Observations  require  contrast  and  establish  schemes  that 
organize a realm. Aristotle’s observations on different temperature in different sides of the 
body, for instance, invokes a planned simultaneous or subsequent touching of those areas 
(Aristotle PA, Book III, Part 7). 
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Sensations  like  temperature  and  degree  of  hardness  or  dryness,  resulting  from  the 
material composition of parts serve as a basis for decomposing contrasts. But “Aristotle 
also considers how parts are differentiated other than by their  composition; namely,  by 
their  presence or  absence,  by arrangement  or  position,  by ‘‘the more  or  less,’’ and by 
differences in their features or qualities (for example, coloration).” (Blits 1999, 61) This 
implies  that  Aristotle  delineates parts  by contrasting parts  in various  animals,  however 
without  necessarily intending a classification of animals.  Parts  in  different  animals  are 
contrasted on the basis of material and shape (by analytic rather than decomposing cutting 
and touching)  and than further determines them according to a variable  (fundamentum 
divisionis) such as length, width, texture, density, arrangement and number that can have 
discrete  values,  but  is  also often described in  a quantitative manner  as  “more or less” 
(Lennox 1987, 342).
Another  aspect of Aristotle’s biology is  the way it  fits  in his  general philosophy of 
nature and his view on how knowledge about nature is to be achieved. This is not the place 
to reconstruct Aristotle’s philosophy but the picture that emerges from Aristotle`s biology 
concerning parts and properties of organisms can be roughly summarized as follows: The 
constituents of animals and plants exhibit three degrees of composition. The homogeneous 
parts are composed of the elements, earth, air, water, fire, or of their forces as he specifies. 
These constituents of material are — although different from the actual stuff (earth, air, 
water,  fire as it  is found in experience),  which just  consists  of the respective elements 
almost  exclusively  —  not  thought  of  as  atoms,  but  rather  as  continuous  matter.  The 
homogeneous parts of animals (as other stuff, like stone) do consist of a combination of 
these elements, which Aristotle seems to think of as a compound or at least alloy, rather 
than a mere mixture in that it acquires new properties according to the proportions of their 
combination  (Lones  1912,  91).  The  heterogeneous  parts  are  composed  of  different 
homogeneous parts. The hand for instance is made of flesh and bones. This theoretical 
framework can be seen as influencing Aristotle’s choice of contrastive procedure. Touch 
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was though to be particularly apt to detect the properties determined by the elements (dry, 
wet, hot and cold) and thus allowed to determine which element was dominant in which 
homogeneous part.
Similar things can be said about the notion of function. Concerning the last step in the 
hierarchy of composition, that of the whole body from the parts, every part has its function 
as an instrument of the soul (this is the original meaning of the word organ), although this 
does not require that every organ is operated by the soul as Aristotle illustrates with the 
metaphor of a state in which, once an order is established there is no need for a monarch to 
permanently intervene in the actions of its members (Cosans 1998). The qualities of the 
parts that result from their specific composition are explained by the role the parts play in 
the  specific  life  the  animal  lives  (Lennox 1999).  Here  the  explanatory goals  will  also 
influence, but not fully determine the partitioning frame.
In the following, I want to cite some examples to show how disciplines such as anatomy 
and classical embryology worked with a thick concept of characters as parts. This take on 
characters is certainly influenced by the functional characterizations and other relational 
properties they the practitioners were interested in, but is best investigated in the ways that 
representational practices are linked.
Characters as Structures: Thick Phenomena in Anatomy
Anatomy in the broadest sense48, is concerned with characters as parts, even if the term 
character is rarely used in this context. In terms of representations and affordances, it is 
concerned with structures.  A contrastive procedure as a setting within an observational 
system can represent structures. In the discussion of Winther’s analysis of compositional 
biology and Aristotle’s practise of this style of investigation, the role of cutting, touching 
and seeing in contrastive procedures, in particular in decompositions was mentioned. If 
these  observational  techniques  are  applied  in  a  contrastive  procedure  that  aims  at 
48 The boundaries between Morphology, Anatomy, and Physiology are not always easy to draw (see Nyhart  
1987; Cunningham 2002, 2003).
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decomposition,  a  part  becomes  represented  as  a  structure.  The  structure  itself  in  its 
materiality is a representation, in that it exemplifies and it does so only in virtue of the 
contrastive  constellation,  even  if  it  is  isolated  from  the  whole  in  the  course  of  the 
procedure. Such an exemplar is always capable of exemplifying in a dense symbol system. 
For every sub-part such as a fragment of the isolated organ it is impossible to say that it  
belongs to one kind of sub-part rather than the other, because under a dense interpretation, 
the  kinds  are  so  ordered  that  between  every  two  there  is  a  third.  The  system is  thus 
syntactically dense.  It  is  also semantically dense in  that,  for  every sub-part  (for  every 
fragment of the organ) it is impossible to decide if it exemplifies one label or the other. The 
labels in a descriptive language are so ordered that between every two there is a third. 
The organ can of course also be interpreted in an articulated symbol system. In such a 
system the  organ as  a  whole would be one  object  belonging to  a  kind  of  objects  and 
exemplify one label. If such a scheme would be applied, the object affords to figure in a 
contrast between different organisms, where the mere presence or absence of the organ is 
recorded. In this case the organ is a thin phenomenon. But if the dense scheme is applied, 
the organ as a structure affords to be further investigated with respect to the details of its 
relation to other parts and its structural properties. It affords further decomposition.
If  anatomists  produce  secondary  representations,  descriptions  and  images,  their 
descriptions of the structure must be at the same time a description of how to isolate the 
structure. Thus they provide a way for other anatomists to avail themselves of the structure, 
which then, as I said, affords further decomposition. With respect to images, they might be 
dense such as photographs, which in principle, and this is the best prove for their thickness, 
enable someone to discover sub-structures that have gone unnoticed in the situation of their 
production. Other images, such as camera lucida drawings are more diagrammatic. But if 
we compare them to a mere name that denotes the object, which belongs to an articulated 
scheme and renders the object thin, in that it affords no further investigation, the structure 
represented in the drawing appears thick. The drawing might be schematic, but it offers the 
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possibility that someone relates e.g. the depicted shape to some function, that the producer 
of the drawing did not know of. This is not afforded if the part in question is represented in 
a sentence such as “There is an organ which I call xy.” The drawing as opposed to the name 
cannot  be  replaced  without  a  change  of  representation.  The  best  indicator  for  a 
representation of a thin object is that it can be replaced by another symbol.
As an example for a thick phenomenon in anatomy, I will sketch the history of the 
adrenal gland, an organ that is attached to the kidneys, and consists of two sub-structures, 
the adrenal cortex and the medulla, both of which release hormones.49 The adrenal gland 
was recognized in dissections at least since Galen (129-199), but he  described them as 
“loose flesh,” that was not seen as fully distinct from the kidney, but rather as some extra 
kidney  material.  maybe  the  situation  is  best  described  in  the  way that  he  detected  a 
difference between the adrenal gland material and the “other” kidney material in terms of 
integratedness, but he was not able to make the scheme resonate with other schemes that 
organize the same realm, thus the distinction did not gain significance. The adrenal glands 
were described as structures properly distinct from the kidneys by Eustachius (1520-1574), 
although he considered them as supporting the function of the kidneys and at his time the 
existence of this separate structure was still contested.
When by the early 17th century, the concept of the adrenal gland as a structure distinct in 
substance and function from the kidney was finally well entrenched, it afforded further 
investigation of the way it is attached to other parts such as the kidneys, blood vessels and 
nerve fibres, as well as further decomposition. Every aspect of the organ mattered for the 
anatomist  and  also  for  the  physiologist,  who  asked  for  the  function.  Morphological 
differences  between the sub-structures  were recognized e.g.  by Georges  Cuvier  (1769-
1832). In 1836 N. Nagel described the medulla as a substance distinct from the adrenal 
cortex. Mainly due to the use of compound microscopes, anatomists, who now became 
49 My historical sketch relies in large parts on a review by Stephen Carmichael (2005).
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histologists,  founded  their  decomposition  of  organs  on  the  different  ways  these  were 
composed of cells (see Coleman 1971, Ch. 2).
Albert  von  Kölliker  (1817-1905),  in  his  influential  Manual  of  Human  Histology 
describes  the  adrenal  glands  and  their  internal  structure  in  detail.  Concerning  the 
distinction between the adrenal cortex and the medulla, he writes: 
The  former,  substantia  corticalis,  is  more  compact,  1/3-1/2'''  thick,  tearing 
readily in the direction of its thickness, and, when torn, presenting a fibrous 
aspect. Its color is for the most part whitish-yellow or yellow, in the innermost 
third,  however,  usually passing into brownish-yellow or brown, so that in a 
transverse section, two layers maybe distinguished, an external, bright-colored 
layer  and  an  internal  narrow,  dark  border.  The  medullary  substance is, 
normally, of a brighter color than the cortical, being of a greyish-white with a 
tinge of red, although when its numerous veins are full of blood, it may assume 
a darker and more venous hue. Its consistence is softer than that of the cortical 
substance, though not so much so as is usually believed, and with respect to its 
thickness, it  is  very inconsiderable (1/6-1/3''')  at  the thin borders and at  the 
upper and outer extremity of the organ, whilst in the middle, and in the lower 
and inner half, it amounts to as much as 1''' or even 1 1/2'''. (Kölliker 1854, 
214-215)
He  also  describes  the  different  cell  forms  that  are  found  in  the  structures  and  the 
connections to the vessels and nerves. Kölliker manages here to introduce a number of 
differences by applying various contrastive procedures, looking at one region of the gland, 
looking at the other, tearing one piece of the material and tearing the other, applying a 
measuring tool to one and to the other. Once there is one difference, for instance in visual 
impression, others can be applied in a ways that more and more schemes organize the 
realm in a consistent way and resonate with each other. This will increase the fit of the  
category and lead to its entrenchment.
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Function does play a role. “As regards the functions of the suprarenal glands” he writes:
I consider the cortical and medullary substances as physiologically distinct. 
The former may, provisionally, be placed with the so-termed “blood-vascular 
glands,” and a relation to secretion assigned to it; whilst the latter, on account 
of its extremely abundant supply of nerves, must be regarded as an apparatus 
appertaining to the nervous system. (Kölliker 1854, 219)
But function can hardly be described here as defining or individuating the structures. What 
happens is that Kölliker detects similarity (between medulla and the vascular system and 
cortex  and  nervous  system,  respectively)  on  the  basis  of  the  properties  distinguished 
through  contrast.  Similarity  as  suggested  above  presupposes  difference.  The  similarity 
relation  here  motivates  a  composition  rather  than  a  grouping,  rendering  the  structures 
components of the vascular and nervous system.
The next step in the history of the adrenal glands was the application of contrastive 
procedures that relied on histochemical means. The preparation of sections and the use of 
the microscope made Kölliker’s observation already quite manipulative. Now another level 
of manipulation was introduced that relies on causal relations, which are not, however, 
themselves the subjects of investigation. I will now turn to processes as thick phenomena 
as  they  are  studied  in  classical  embryology  in  order  to  discuss  similar  kinds  of 
manipulations.
Characters as Outcomes of Processes: Thick Phenomena in Embryology
James  Griesemer  describes  the  epistemic  practice  of  “Tracking  Organic  Processes” 
(Griesemer 2007) by looking at several case studies in embryology and genetics in the late 
19th and early 20th century. In discussing his approach, I will first emphasize the contrastive 
nature of such practices, and then show that in the case of embryology, processes as well as 
the  characters  as  parts  that  are  the outcomes of  such processes  are  construed as  thick 
phenomena. Classical genetics will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Experimental  embryology  emerged  as  a  discipline  in  the  course  of  the  nineteenth 
century together with other specialized biological disciplines that were all driven in one 
way or the other by the notion of organismic parts being composed of cells (see Coleman 
1971, Ch. III). Thus, other than comparative embryology, which stood more in the tradition 
of natural history, experimental biology did not focus on the contrast between organisms, 
but on contrasts within organisms, in particular on contrasts between cell populations.
Griesemer characterizes the practice of tracking organic processes as follows:
Tracking work provides the basis for causal narrative accounts of prospective 
significance, which involves two shifts of attention: (1) from developmental 
outcome to some earlier stage of a central subject significant to the narrative 
from which to begin tracking, then (2) tracking the historical process forward 
in time, conceptually “back” to the future developmental outcome from which 
the narrative account began. (Griesemer 2007, 399)
The  developmental  outcome,  “the  development  of  organized  heterogeneity  out  of  the 
apparent homogeneity of the fertilized egg,” (Griesemer 2007, 397) is the explanandum of 
embryology.  The local  explanandum might  be a  certain stage of  the embryo,  which is 
explained  by  processes  leading  from  an  earlier  stage  to  the  stage  in  question,  but 
ultimately, these explanations aim at the form of the adult plant or animal (although the 
notion of adulthood is not very precise or rather arbitrary, given the continuity of the life 
history of  an  animal).  What  is  important  is  that  the  adult  form is  perceived  as  being 
composed  of  distinct  structures.  These  structures,  as  we  saw  above,  came  to  be 
conceptualized  as  being  composed  of  specialized,  in  the  language  of  embryology, 
differentiated cells. Cells in earlier stages of development came to be conceptualized as 
determined. Griesemer writes:
These  “cell  lineage  workers,”  already very familiar  with the  end results  of 
development, shifted attention to early cleavage stages of blastulation. They 
sought to identify the fate or prospective significance of cells that did not yet 
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manifest the differentiated states of the kind of tissue or organ to be explained, 
whether  epidermis  or  mesoderm, neural  plate  or  lens,  notochord or  somite. 
(Griesemer 2007, 399)
The adult organism afforded anatomical decomposition, but the structures were not only 
defined as being different from other structures, with respect to position, shape, color or 
reaction to some intervention, but they also differed with respect to what brought them 
about or was transformed into the structure in question, while the embryo in this context 
afforded to contrast structures in terms of what they,  in turn, give rise to or what they 
transform into.
Embryologists had to “track a process of cell division leading from a determined state to 
a visible embryonic differentiation.” (Griesemer 2007, 402) Processes are transformations 
of structures in time. What are contrasted in the contrastive procedures of embryology are 
such structures over time, or what is called a lineage. The contrastive procedures can be 
characterized  as  visualizing  differences  in  the  fate  of  cell  populations;  they  are 
decompositions,  in that  they decompose the whole process of development  into partial 
processes. Classical embryologists did so by “introducing and then following  ‘marks’ in 
order  to  establish  the  fate  or  prospective  significance  of  marked  parts of  a  dynamic 
process.” (Griesemer 2007, 378, my emphasis)
Marking interactions can be one of the following activities or a combination of them 
(Griesemer 2007, 399). The first activity is mental marking, which basically relies on the 
fact that some notable features in a process can be followed with the eye, e.g. under the 
microscope,  by focusing  one’s  attention  on  them as  opposed to  others  and track  their 
transformation by literally “keeping and eye on them.” The trajectories of structures will 
typically be captured by physical marks in a diagrammatic representation, e.g. a  camera 
lucida drawing. These drawings allow to make a second observer understand which was 
the notable feature followed, since it omits many other equally notable observable features. 
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Griesemer illustrates this practice with the work of C. O. Whitman and E. B. Wilson in the 
late 19th century.
Secondly, marking procedures can make use of artificial substances that highlight some 
structures as opposed to others, just as in the case of anatomical staining, but are observed 
over time. The intervention again does not only introduce a difference for an observer, but 
allows  her  to  share  the  observation.  This  strategy  is  illustrated  by  Walther  Vogt’s 
investigations in the 1920s.
A third  way  to  track  processes  consists  in  heterospecific  tissue  hybridization,  an 
approach most famously applied by Hans Spemann and Hilde Mangold in their work that 
led  to  the  organizer  concept.  The  strategy  they  followed  not  only  made  certain  cell 
populations visible when the implanted cells had a different pigmentation from the host 
embryo, but furthermore, allowed them to infer the state of the implanted cells at the time 
of extraction, by following their fate in the new embryo.
In one case discussed by Griesemer, Edwin G. Conklin’s (1863-1952) The Organization 
and  Cell-Lineage  of  the  Ascidian  Egg  (1905),  among  other  procedures  performed,  a 
strategy is followed that lies between the first and the third way of tracking processes.  
Conklin “relied specifically on pigment markings of cells, which behaved as though the 
observer had introduced a persistent physical mark directly on the embryo.” (Griesemer 
2007, 404) Conklin describes his discovery as follows:
The very first lot of the living eggs of  Cynthia which I examined showed a 
most remarkable phenomenon and one which modified the whole course and 
purpose of my work; for there on many of the unsegmented eggs, which were 
of a slate-gray color, was a brilliant orange-yellow spot, which in other eggs 
appeared in the form of a crescent or band. Further observation showed that 
this crescent became divided into two equal parts at the first cleavage and that 
it could be followed through the later cleavages and even into the tadpole stage. 
(Conklin 1905, 7)
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Apart  from  being  an  example  for  the  open  character  of  experimental  systems  and 
procedures for new phenomena and unplanned changes in strategy, that was emphasized by 
Rheinberger and Gooding, Conklin’s approach shows how a contrast (gray/yellow) defines 
a phenomenon against what it is not, in this case makes a lineage stand out against the 
manifold process of development, made up of countless interdependent cell divisions. It 
allows to interpret characters as parts, at least in the tadpole, such as the tail muscles, as 
originating from certain regions in the embryo, and structures in the embryo as having a “ 
prospective  significance  for  future  states.”  (Griesemer  2007,  399)  Griesemer  writes: 
“Presence of yellow pigment in a cell at a later time meant membership in the cell lineage 
tracing back to the original mark.” (Griesemer 2007, 404)
While,  as  argued  above,  the  parts  of  embryos,  larvae  and  adult  organisms,  if  they 
become represented through decompositional contrastive procedures, exemplify in a dense 
system and afford further decomposition, in short,  are thick phenomena, also processes 
have  been  classified  as  thick  phenomena  in  Chapter  3.  The  following  passage  from 
Conklin’s  work  illustrates  how  the  processes  that  bring  about  the  parts,  that  is,  the 
structures transforming in time, themselves exemplify in a dense system when individuated 
by a contrastive procedure, and afford further distinguishing of sub-processes.
While  the  divisions  of  the  endoderm  and  chorda-neural-plate  cells  are 
occurring,  the  most  anterior  mesoderm  cell  [...]  forming  the  point  of  the 
crescent  on  each  side,  divides,  the  spindle  lying  in  a  nearly  dorso-ventral 
direction [...]. The products of this division are nearly equal in size but are 
qualitatively dissimilar,  the dorsal  one [...]  containing less of  the yellow 
protoplasm  and  more  yolk  than  the  ventral  one  [...]. This  difference 
between these daughter cells is plainly visible in the living condition, the dorsal 
cell being a fainter yellow than the ventral one (figs. 43-48, et seg.). [...] This 
difference in the constitution of these cells corresponds to a difference in their 
fate; the dorsal cells give rise to mesenchyme, while the ventral ones produce 
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some of the muscle cells of the tail of the tadpole. (Conklin 1905, 53-54, bold 
emphasis is mine)
The sentence in bold font shows that the process of cell division is resolved to a level  
below the cell, describing the distribution of cellular components in terms of more or less. 
For every sub-process such as cells dividing to give rise to daughter cells it is impossible to 
say that it belongs to one kind of sub-process rather than the other, because under a dense 
interpretation, the kinds are so ordered that between every two kinds there is a third with  
respect to the distribution of components. The system is thus syntactically dense. It is also 
semantically  dense  in  that,  for  every  sub-process,  every  manner  of  distribution  of 
components, it is impossible to decide if it exemplifies one label or the other. The labels 
that describe the objects are so ordered that between every two there is a third. This is not 
to say that Conklin does actually resolve the process to an extent that every sub-process or 
resulting  structure  is  different  from  every  other.  He  obviously  observes  a  pattern  of 
distribution, and establishes a semantically differentiated scheme, where two distinct types 
of cells arise, the precursors of muscle cells and of mesenchymal cells. The point is that the 
system, the experimental as well as the symbolic, which after all is no difference, is in 
general open to further distinction.
Conklin’s  figures  (see  Figure  5.1.),  that  illustrate  the  structures  in  the  embryo  at 
different stages and in their spatial succession in the plates as snapshots also the process, in 
their reporting function must be seen as diagrammatic, but the system of representation is 
in principle open to differentiation. They operate with shades of yellow and indicate the 
presence of cellular constituents.
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Figure 5.1. Drawings from Conklin 
1905, 119 ff., Plate II, Fig. 14 (top,  
left)  Plate  IV (top,  right),  Fig.  48  
and  Plate  V,  Fig.  59  (bottom),  
showing the distribution of yellow 
pigment in the embryo that Conklin  
exploits to track cell fates.
To conclude,  classical  embryology was a  science that  operated with  thick  phenomena, 
concerning the developmental processes as well as the explananda, the resulting parts of 
organisms. This conception of characters as parts, with its dense systems of representations 
and its characteristic affordances of further decomposition is still present in developmental 
biology today, as I will argue below. 
Chapter Conclusion
There are indefinitely many ways to decompose and an organism into parts, or to ascribe 
properties  to  it  or  its  parts,  in  short  to  describe  features  of  organisms.  Some of  them 
become recognized and important in some context of human practice and especially in 
scientific  practices.  Those  might  be  called  characters.  In  order  to  become  recognized, 
characters must be represented by some kind of method, that delineates them from the 
whole organism, and which always includes some form of contrast and sometimes also 
physical manipulation. The delineated features will usually be put into some theoretical 
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context by emphasizing some of their relational properties, such as their functional roles or 
similarity relations to other features. The methods and theoretical contexts are always at 
the  end  point  of  some historical  tradition  and their  particular  interaction  constitutes  a 
disciplinary perspective. I argued for pluralism concerning the way parts are delineated and 
suggested a symmetrical view of observation and theoretical goals in the sense that neither 
the contrastive procedures that represent characters, not the theoretical roles they play can 
be said to have epistemic priority. The ways to make things visible have a life of their own, 
but  nevertheless  their  choice  or  a  choice  among the  representations  produced,  will  be 
guided by the theoretical goals, such as the construction of certain explanatory models or 
taxonomies.
Furthermore, I have shown that in those disciplinary contexts in which characters are 
investigated as parts (though the term “character” is not always used in these contexts), 
they  exemplify  analogously  and  afford  further  decomposition  and  are  thus  thick 
phenomena.  One  might  ask  now,  whether,  if  characters  in  their  materiality  always 
exemplify in dense symbol systems, there are situations at all, in which they nevertheless 
are thin phenomena. What can exemplify in a dense system and can also exemplify in an 
articulated system, and the interests need not always aim at further decomposition. Thus 
there are contexts in which characters are thin phenomena. Systematics might be one of 
them,  but  I  cannot  investigate  this  part  of  Biology  here.  Another  context  in  which 
characters are thin is classical genetics, although, the development of the discipline has to 
be described as a negotiation of thick and thin character concepts by different practitioners 
(see below). The illustration of this movement that results in a thin character concept, will 
centre around Wilhelm Johannsen’s writings on heredity. The juxtaposition of the thick 
notion of characters as parts in embryology and the thin notion of characters as values of 
variables in genetics will  allow me to address some controversial  points about modern 
developmental genetics by way of conclusion.
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Chapter 6. Variables and Values: The Phenotype Concept — Negotiating Thick and 
Thin Characters in Genetics
6.1. From Darwinian to Mendelian Variation
Variation
One  of  the  roles  that  characters  can  play  in  biology  is  that  of  being  the  bearers  of 
differences among members of the same or closely related species. In this case they mostly 
appear not as parts, but as variables that can take different values. Whether the differences 
are thought of as being between varieties, races or species depends on how these notions 
are applied. In any case, differences among closely related groups can also be expressed in 
terms of parts  as we will  see, and the variable/value scheme is  also applied on higher 
taxonomic levels. But the thesis of this chapter is that in genetics, which deals with closely 
related groups, the variable/value scheme became dominant.  This is  because characters 
became mere data for genotypes. Also in systematics it seems that in those cases where 
functional  considerations  are  put  aside  and  characters  are  treated  as  pure  data  for 
phylogenetic relations the character concept moves from thick parts to thin variable/values, 
but this discipline and its history will not be covered in this thesis.
Apart from “character-state,” which is more related to systematics, another term often 
used  for  these  different  values  in  characters  as  variables  is  “phenotype.”  It  is  used  in 
genetics in a similar way to the term “trait.” Being a neologism, it has a much shorter and 
specific  history than  “character”  and  “trait.”  It  was  introduced by Wilhelm Johannsen 
(1857-1927) in 1909 in the context of the disciplinary formation of genetics as the science 
of  heredity.  However,  the  more  specific  context  of  the  introduction  of  the  term is  a 
clarification of the concept of variation as relevant for evolutionary theory. It is important, 
therefore, to understand what was at stake in debates on variation at Johannsen’s time.
Peter  Bowler,  in  tracking  the  concept  of  “Variation  from  Darwin  to  the  Modern  
Synthesis” (2005) remarks that Darwin held the view of his predecessors that heredity and 
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variation are two antagonistic processes. Whereas heredity guaranteed similarity between 
parents  and  offspring,  variation  was  thought  of  as  disturbance  of  the  fidelity  of  the 
hereditary  process  caused  by  environmental  influences.  Nevertheless,  variation  was 
persistent.  From this perspective,  he did not distinguish between somatic  and germinal 
variation,  that  is  he  allowed  for  acquired  characters  to  be  submitted  to  the  offspring, 
although he thought, informed by breeders experience, that most variation was random, 
that is, the characters were acquired, but not as directed adaptations (Bowler 2005, 15). He 
also  did  not  distinguish  sharply  between  trivial,  individual  variation  and  large-scale 
monstrosities, or “sports of nature,” but he thought that the latter are rarely beneficial and 
thus held a mainly gradualist view of evolution (Bowler 2005, 10). 
August Weismann famously separated Darwinism from the possibility of the inheritance 
of acquired characters. The determinants of characters were passed on through the germ-
plasm, which gave rise to the soma, but was not effected by it. A variety of determinants 
for one character were thought to exist in a population that were passed on to the offspring. 
Selection affected the proportion of determinants in a population. In this way variation and 
heredity were no longer antagonistic,  but heredity maintained variation in a population 
(Bowler  2005,  21).  However,  Weismann  followed  Darwin  in  considering  large-scale 
variations as unimportant for evolution. Francis Galton shared the new concept of variation 
as being passed on through heredity, and emphasized that there is a range of values present  
in a population for a given varying character, following a normal distribution. 
Variation thus became a property of populations, instead of referring to independent 
deviations of individuals. Galton, as opposed to Weismann, thought, however, that even in 
the case of continuously varying characters, variation could only be evolutionarily relevant 
as long as it involved saltation, that is a major shift of the statistically normal type around 
which  variation  is  distributed.  Selection  on  individual  variation  would  only  skew  the 
distribution temporarily, but the population would move back to its normal type when the 
environmental pressure disappears (Bowler 2005, 20-21). Early Mendelians like William 
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Bateson and Hugo De Vries also emphasized the role of saltations or mutations, but built 
their view of evolution on the role of discontinuous characters. Their view contrasted with 
that of biometricians like Pearson and Weldon, who appropriated the Galtonian notion of 
ranges of variation in normal distribution,  but thought of selection as operating on the 
individual variations, gradually changing the distribution of values for a given character 
(Bowler 2005, 21). This was the position that Johannsen attacked when he introduced the 
term “phenotype,” thus lining up with the Mendelians. The purpose of the concept was to 
assimilate  continuous  characters,  the  realm  of  the  biometricians,  to  the  discontinuous 
characters  of  the  Mendelians.  At  the  same time,  as  we  will  see,  Johannsen  distanced 
himself from the Mendelian character concept.
Following De Vries, in a chapter on genetics in the textbook on  General Botany co-
authored  with  Eugenius  Warming,  Johannsen  distinguishes  five  forms  of  variation 
(Warming and Johannsen 1909, 632-633, the classification was already in place in the 
fourth Danish edition from 1900, on which the translation is based):
1) The varieties or polymorphisms within Linnaean, “large,” or “good” species, that is, 
the sub-species or races.
2) The diversity typical for the progeny of hybrids.
3)  Individual  or  fluctuating  variability,  that  is,  the  (often  quantitative)  differences 
between offspring and parents or among siblings.
4) The differences that are (obviously) caused by different environments.
5) The differences that are (obviously) caused by mutations.
The fourth type of variation had not been distinguished by De Vries, who subsumed it 
under individual variation, which he sharply distinguished from variation due to mutation. 
Johannsen praised De Vries for separating statistical variation from mutation, but wanted to 
emphasize that from mere observation it is not always possible to distinguish fluctuation 
from mutation,  especially  concerning  quantitative  traits.  Therefore,  he  classified  those 
cases where differences are  obviously caused by the environment (such as, for instance, 
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when two plants grow under different light conditions) separately, just as the obvious cases 
of  mutation  were  listed  separately.  He  then  focused  on  the  analysis  of  individual, 
fluctuating variation. In this category the cause was not obvious, but it had to be either 
environmental factors, or mutations. Thus category 3) had to be dissolved into categories 
4) and 5). His strategy of pure line breeding that consisted in producing offspring from 
individual  plants  by  self-fertilization,  allowed  him  to  analyze  individual  variation 
accordingly (Roll-Hansen 2009, 477-479).  Mendelian hybridization experiments instead 
were designed to account for variations in category 2). Those were the core problems and 
strategies of heredity50.
Do Phenotypes Apply to Individuals?
There is dispute among historians concerning the meaning Johannsen gave to the terms 
“phenotype” and “genotype.” Frederick Churchill (1974, 13) claims that Johannsen first 
uses  the  terms  predominantly  in  a  statistical  sense  and  claims  that  this  implies  that 
populations have phenotypes, but not individuals. He then observes that Johannsen later in 
his life, in the light of the success of the chromosomal theory of heredity as advanced by 
the Morgan school, came to an understanding of individual phenotypes and genotypes. Nils 
Roll-Hansen  (2009,  489)  instead  maintains  that  Johannsen  from  the  beginning  was 
interested in the hereditary types of individuals. This follows, according to Roll-Hansen, 
from Johannsen’s application of the pedigree method (pure line breeding as Johannsen 
calls it), developed by the French breeder Louis de Vilmorin in the mid-nineteenth century, 
which  focused  on  the  selection  of  individuals  in  breeding  instead  of  selecting  large 
numbers of individuals exhibiting the desired traits, a strategy that Johannsen also knew 
from Microbiology (see also Gayon and Zallen 1998; Müller-Wille 2007a).
It seems inappropriate to dismiss those instances in the first edition of  Elemente der 
Exakten  Erblichkeitslehre (Johannsen  1909)  where  Johannsen  uses  “phenotype”  as 
applying to individuals, just because these instances are “not common and they do not fit in 
50 Variation in the sense of Category 1) instead were the data of systematics.
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with the general thrust of Johannsen's text” (Churchill 1974, 13). Instead one should ask 
under what interpretation the apparently different uses go together. I will show that the 
different occurrences of the term in the Elemente stand in a systematic relation that mirrors 
Johannsen’s view on heredity.
While  it  is  misleading  to  say  that  for  Johannsen  populations  have  a  (or  are  of  a) 
phenotype, but not individuals, it is true that phenotype is a statistical concept. It is defined 
as the mean value concerning a given variable in a studied population,  the centre in a 
binomial distribution, around which variation occurs:
Such Phenotypes are in and for themselves measurable realities: exactly what 
can be observed as typical;  thus in  variation distributions the centers  about 
which the variants group themselves (Johannsen 1909, 123).51
Of course, one has to observe at least two organisms — and should observe much more — 
to arrive at  a mean value concerning a quantity.  In this  sense only populations have a 
phenotype in that they possess a mean value. But this concerns just the way to construct 
the particular phenotype category. Once it is available it is possible to say of one individual 
in the population that it falls under the category, or that it has (or is of) that phenotype. 52 
One might also say that every individual in this population has the phenotype and in this 
sense  the  population  has  the  phenotype.  Both  formulations  —  the  population  has  a 
phenotype in that it has a mean value for a quantity, and the population has a phenotype in 
that all of its members have the phenotype — are distinct. But both are not at odds with the 
statement that an individual has a phenotype in that it falls under the phenotype category, 
51 The  translation  follows  Churchill’s,  except  that  he  uses  “characteristic”  where  I  chose  “typical.”  The 
original  reads:  “Solche  Phaenotypen  sind  an  und  für  sich  meßbare  Realitäten:  eben  was  als  typisch 
beobachtet werden kann; also bei Variationsreihen die Zentren, um welche die Varianten sich gruppieren.”
52 Usually, one would say that a token is of a certain type or belongs to a certain type. Here the question is  
whether the population or the individual is the token that is of a certain type. But since the type is defined 
by a property, I will say that the population or the individual has the phenotype, in the sense that one can  
say that if a token is of the red type, it has the property red.
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which  means  that  it  is  part  of  the  population  with  that  particular  mean  value  for  the 
quantity in question. The criteria for delineating the population of which the mean value is 
determined, and for counting the individuals in, can be different in different situations. 
Johannsen often starts from a population defined by all individuals on a field or from one 
package of seed and moves on to populations defined as generations of offspring of one 
(self-fertilised) individual or parental pair of organisms.
Mendel’s Character Categories
The notion of phenotype as a constructed category can best be illustrated with qualitative 
characters of the type that Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) used in his experiments, and that 
were the model for Johannsen’s approach to quantitative traits. Phenotype is a concept that 
allows to treat quantitative characters just as qualitative ones. Johannsen explicitly says 
that there are also qualitative phenotypes:
[Phenotypes of qualitative nature] are almost always obvious, and it  can be 
seen in any given individual without problems whether it belongs to one or the 
other qualitatively different phenotype. There are, for instance, brown, blue, 
yellow,  violet  etc.,  and  furthermore  differently  marbled  beans;  and  from a 
mixture one can easily sort the individuals according to such color- or pattern-
types. Here the phenotypes are qualitatively different and easily recognizable 
(Johannsen 1909, 129, all  translations of Johannsen’s texts are mine,  unless 
stated otherwise).
Here a phenotype such as brown color of beans obviously applies to individuals. A given 
individual is brown. One might also say of a population of brown beans that the phenotype 
applies to this population, without there being a conflict.  But what about the statistical 
nature of the phenotype concept in this case? Note that brown is a “color-type.” The point 
is that labels such as “brown” have individuals in their extension that show much variation 
in color. Thus the difference between qualitative and quantitative variation is not so sharp 
after all, but rather a matter of the scheme that is applied to organize a realm.
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When Mendel first introduces the characters (Merkmale) he uses in his experiments the 
descriptions are quite rich. Here is the second and third of seven characters he investigates:
2. The difference in the color of the seed albumen (endosperm). The albumen 
of the ripe seeds is either pale yellow, bright yellow and orange colored, or it 
possesses a more or less intense green tint. 
3. The difference in the color of the seed-coat. This is either white, with which 
character  white  flowers are  constantly correlated;  or it  is  grey,  grey-brown, 
leather-brown, with or without violet spotting, in which case the color of the 
standards is violet, that of the wings purple, and the stem in the axils of the 
leaves is of a reddish tint. The grey seed-coats become dark brown in boiling 
water. (Mendel 1902, 45-46)
A character, for Mendel, is the differential value of a variable, which is a property of a part 
(the expression in italics). The part (e.g. seed albumen) is a category from plant anatomy. 
The property (color) is perceptually salient. I treat those categories (seed albumen, color) 
as given for the present purpose, but it should be kept in mind that not only their choice, 
but their individuation or definition might be effected by the context. Here I am concerned 
with the delimitation of the values. The actual appearance of the albumen of individual 
plants obviously showed some variation (from pale yellow to orange). But Mendel knew 
from his pre-experiments, which consisted in pure-line breeding, that offspring from plants 
with  yellow  albumen  showed  the  same  variability  in  albumen  color  (from yellow  to 
orange)  as  did  offspring  from orange  plants.  These  characters  bred  true,  or,  to  put  it 
differently, they did not segregate. And none of the plants exhibiting them ever produced 
offspring with green albumen (or any other  color).  Plants with green albumen showed 
variation as well (“more or less intense green tint”) in their offspring, but never produced 
plants with yellow or orange albumen. Yellow-to-orange and more-or-less-intense-green 
where thus “constant differentiating characters” as Mendel calls them (Mendel 1902, 42). 
Realizing the importance of focusing on plants differing in singular characters (as opposed 
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to overall appearance) has often been emphasized as a major achievement of Mendel (e.g. 
Müller-Wille and Orel 2007, 194). But an often-overlooked step in Mendel’s approach is to 
define the two characters that are contrasted, such that they are constant. The characters 
qua values are delimited according to the criterion of true breeding. This criterion justifies 
to lump together a great variety of colors under one category. 
Robert  Scott  Root-Bernstein  (1983)  shows  that  Mendel  put  considerable  effort  in 
constructing discrete character categories, which have to be seen as idealizations in the 
sense that scientific models always operate with idealizations. He diagnoses a difference 
between a biological and a statistical approach to characters, where Darwin’s work is an 
example of the former, emphasizing the continuous differences between individuals with 
respect  to  single  characters,  while  Mendel,  the  statistician,  was  looking  for  kinds of 
characters. This terminology is misleading, though, because Mendel also applied biological 
criteria  (breeding  true)  and  his  approach  must  not  be  confused  with  that  of  the 
biometricians, who where gradualists. According to the analytic tools recruited in Part I of 
this thesis, it is possible to interpret the situation as follows. While gradualists applied a 
semantically dense scheme to variations in a given property (variable), Mendel applied a 
differentiated  scheme.  Individuals,  accordingly,  fall  in  groups  that  share  an  idealized 
character, or, in terms of symbol systems, they fall in one range of extension or appliance  
class. Mendel can be said to have introduced this approach in the study of variation among 
closely related organisms.53 To be more precise,  with respect to characters as variables 
(albumen  color,  seed  size),  individuals  share  characters  on  both  accounts.  Schemes  of 
labels  for  variables  are  differentiated.54 But  according  to  the  Darwinian  or  biometric 
account characters as values (yellow, 12,3mm) are not shared, the scheme is dense. They 
are individual appearances (this particular shade of yellow, this particular shade of orange), 
53 It must be said, though, that this notion of characters certainly existed with respect to higher taxonomic  
relations.
54 But again, also variables have to be delimited. E.g., where does color end and brightness begin in the  
perception of a surface?
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only constraint in the researchers ability to measure differences. For Mendel the values 
come in discrete categories (a category called “yellow” covers all shades from yellow to 
orange). 
If we look at the description of characters in the above quotation, it seems that language 
is  used  as  a  dense  symbol  system  and  the  organism  affords  ever  more  fine-grained 
descriptions. Characters are thick phenomena. But then Mendel applies his two factorial 
model,  which  requires  the  application  of  a  differentiated  scheme.  Under  this  system, 
characters  afford different  sorting and grouping.  But  such a  transformation of  a  dense 
system to an articulated one requires decisions and a process of adjustment to make the 
categories fit with the model.
With reference to J. Heimans’ (1971) analysis of a preserved note of Mendel, Root-
Bernstein shows how Mendel  carefully constructed these character  value  categories.  It 
appears as if Mendel, with respect to the third character (color of the seed coat), has started 
with the assumption that there are six categories: white, violet, light violet, dark brown, 
light brown and violet brown, and, with an intermediary step supposing five categories, 
finally came up with a scheme that had three labels, “white,” “violet” and “brown,” that 
subsumed  the  different  shades  of  violet  and  brown.  He  thus  delimited  the  character 
categories  from a (though already partly fragmented)  continuum such that  they fit  the 
predictions of his two-factorial model. In this sense it is true that Mendel did not arrive at 
his  model by induction,  but  that  his  observation was driven by theory (Root-Bernstein 
1983,  288),  but  only  in  the  sense  that  the  theory  suggested  an  interpretation  of  the 
observations, it suggested a scheme. On the other hand this does not exclude that he was 
led to his model by observation. Even if here function plays no role, the situation fits the 
analysis of Laubichler and Wagner discussed above. Observation as material practice has a 
life of its own, but the model drives the determination of character categories. We do not 
have  enough  information  on  Mendel’s  reasoning  to  finally  answer  these  questions  of 
priority, but this seems to be an occasion where the model and the entities that figure in it  
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are fixed by mutual adjustment.55 The important point is that Mendel thought of characters 
as categories that partition individual variation in discrete chunks. Accordingly, when he 
proceeded he omitted the rich description and spoke, for instance, of the second set of 
characters as “yellow” and “green,” but these were only names he gave to the category, 
which still subsumes different shades of yellow and orange, or green, respectively. 
Mendel chose only those character variables for his experiments where the constant 
differentiating characters were easily distinguishable:
The various forms of Peas selected for crossing showed differences in length 
and color of the stem; in the size and form of the leaves; in the position, color,  
size of the flowers; in the length of the flower stalk; in the color, form, and size 
of the pods; in the form and size of the seeds; and in the color of the seed-coats 
and of the albumen [cotyledons]. Some of the characters noted do not permit of 
a sharp and certain separation, since the difference is of a "more or less" nature, 
which is often difficult to define. Such characters could not be utilized for the 
separate experiments; these could only be applied to characters, which stand 
out clearly and definitely in the plants. Lastly, the result must show whether 
they, in their entirety, observe a regular behavior in their hybrid unions, and 
whether  from  these  facts  any  conclusion  can  be  reached  regarding  those 
characters which possess a subordinate significance in the type (Mendel 1902, 
45).
Here Mendel makes clear that also the delineation of the easily separable characters is 
evaluated by their behavior in crosses. If they do not conform to the laws then they are not 
the right categories in this context. If they do, then they are typical for that kind of plant. 
But  also  the  less  clearly  separated  and  thus  less  typical  characters  can  be  evaluated 
according to their behavior in crosses.
55 Sara  Schwartz  (2002)  gives  a  similar  example  from Bateson’s  work,  which  she  describes  as  “mutual 
adjustment” of the model and the entities that figure in it.
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Even in the case of characters that allow for a sharp and certain separation, there are 
individual plants that do not fit easily in one of the categories. 
In counting the seeds, also, especially in Expt. 2, some care is requisite, since 
in some of the seeds of many plants the green color of the albumen is less  
developed,  and  at  first  maybe  easily  overlooked.  The  cause  of  this  partial 
disappearance  of  the  green  coloring  has  no  connection  with  the  hybrid-
character  of  the  plants,  as  it  likewise  occurs  in  the  parental  variety.  This 
peculiarity  is  also  confined  to  the  individual  and  is  not  inherited  by  the 
offspring.  In  luxuriant  plants  this  appearance  was  frequently  noted.  Seeds, 
which are damaged by insects during their development, often vary in color 
and form, but with a little practice in sorting, errors are easily avoided (Mendel 
1902, 53).
Root-Bernstein, answering to the long standing debate on whether Mendel’s results were 
“too good” from a statistical point of view, argues that Mendel sorted these indefinable 
items according to the expectation. This does not qualify as fraud, because it is part of the 
very common process of fitting the data to the model. Characters are discrete values of 
variables in the model and as such idealizations (Root-Bernstein 1983, 289).
Johannsen’s Phenotype: Mendelizing Continuous Variation
Whereas the existence of Mendelian characters, that is qualitative characters that are easily 
separated  and  that  segregate,  were  a  threat  to  the  Darwinian-biometricians’ view  of 
selection operating on individual variation, it seemed that those qualitative characters were 
still rare phenomena, and as we saw, they were not so discontinuous after all. Most of the 
characters  still  seemed  to  be  continuous.  Johannsen’s  point  in  the  first  edition  of  the 
Elemente (1909) was to treat quantitative (continuous) traits just as qualitative traits as they 
are studied in Mendelism. His pure line research (1903) was the experimental basis of this 
strategy. We can now see how the phenotype definition is tailored for this purpose.
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The discussion of Mendel’s characters showed that there is no sharp distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative properties. Colors appear as qualitative characters when the 
constant differentiated characters (character categories) are clearly separated by gaps in the 
continuum, but otherwise are continuous. If they are differentiated, a differentiated scheme 
is applied and characters fall in the mutually exclusive ranges of extension of one of the 
labels in the scheme. Even height, which is almost the standard example for quantitative 
characters, can be treated as qualitative if long and short forms are easily separated like in 
the case of Mendel’s seventh trait:
The difference in the length of the stem. The length of the stem is very various 
in  some forms;  it  is,  however,  a  constant  character  for  each,  in  so far  that 
healthy  plants,  grown  in  the  same  soil,  are  only  subject  to  unimportant 
variations in this character. In experiments with this character, in order to be 
able  to  discriminate  with  certainty,  the  long  axis  of  6  to  7  ft.  was  always 
crossed with the short one of 3/4 ft. to 1 and 1/2 ft. (Mendel 1902, 46-47)
“Long” and “short” are categories of character values that subsume variations (6 to 7 ft.) 
that are in this context “unimportant.” The delimitation of characters is determined by the 
context, that is the interest and method. Here, the criterion for characterhood is to breed 
true under similar conditions.
The difference between qualitative and quantitative characters is thus just an epistemic 
matter. If there are two forms, say long and short, but they overlap — the longest of the 
short form are as long as the shortest of the long form — the researcher cannot distinguish 
them. Thus the case is treated as quantitative or continuous variation.  If the forms are 
clearly separated through a gap in the continuum as in Mendel’s seventh character, they 
appear as qualitative or discontinuous characters. But even if a gap in the continuum was 
necessary for  Mendel  in order  to  recognize qualitative traits,  it  is  the treatment  of the 
separated ranges as categories that makes them qualitative traits. Otherwise they would be 
continuous fragments of a range of values. On the other hand, once the notion of character 
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categories  is  accepted,  even  uninterrupted  continua  can  be  broken  down  into  discrete 
character categories. That is exactly Johannsen’s goal when he introduces the phenotype 
concept. The pure line analysis is a way to find out if an individual, which has a certain 
value for a variable that is covered by both categories, falls under one or the other category.
If Johannsen approaches a population (Bestand) of beans (which are self-fertilizing), 
with an interest in a quantitative property such as seed length, he starts with an assumption 
of  unity of type.  And just  as in  the case of  qualitative properties,  he glosses  over  the 
individual  differences,  and defines the phenotype as the most  typical,  that is  the mean 
value (“what can be observed as typical; thus in variation distributions the centres about 
which the variants group themselves”). If the mean value of the seed length is 14,1mm, the 
population has the phenotype 14,1mm56. It sounds odd however, to say that the population 
has this phenotype in that all its members have that phenotype, or to say of a particular 
individual plant, which has an actual seed length of 12,2mm that it has the phenotype “seed 
length 14,1mm.” But in fact the case is not different from that of Mendel’s characters, 
where he called the orange albumen “yellow,” or seeds with light depressions “round.” 
And the oddness goes away when we give a different name to the category. We can call the 
phenotype  —  defined  as  14,1mm  —  simply  “M,”  and  say  that  all  members  of  the 
population have the phenotype “M”. The individual that has a seed length of 12,2mm still 
has the phenotype “M,” just as the plant with orange albumen has the phenotype “yellow.” 
It becomes even less odd when the name is contrastive. If the population is subjected to 
a pure line analysis, and it is found that some plants give rise to offspring generations that  
has a mean seed length (that is phenotype) of 12,8mm and some give rise to a generation 
with a mean seed length (that is phenotype) of 15,1mm, then there will be two phenotypes. 
56 The example is taken from Johannsen (1909, 122). In Johannsen’s example the measurement procedure 
divides continuum segments of 1mm, so that every individual has a class value such as 12-13mm. I will  
pretend the seeds were measured to a tenth of a millimetre and I will round up the mean values. It has also  
to be noted that seed length is a property of the individual plant that grows from the seed, not of the plant  
that brings the seeds about, because the seed is the embryo.
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Even if  they are  defined by the mean value,  they might  be  designated  as  “short”  and 
“long.” To say that all individuals of the population consisting of the offspring of one bean 
have the phenotype “short,” or to say of one individual that has an actual seed length of  
10,7mm that it has the phenotype “short,” does not sound odd at all.57 And this is exactly 
the way Johannsen uses the term. The following passage, where Johannsen discusses some 
data from Bateson’s Materials for the Study of Variation (1894) illustrates Johannsen’s use 
of  the  term “phenotype.”  The distribution  of  the  length  of  forceps  in  a  population  of 
earwigs shows two clearly separated peaks:
As the distribution shows itself, divided in two almost independent parts, two 
phenotypes become obvious: Males with short — about 3,5mm on average — 
forceps and males with long forceps, about 7mm in the mean. Around both of 
the phenotypes variation of a very common nature can be observed (Johannsen 
1909, 208).
Churchill is right; the phenotype “forceps length with a mean value of 3,5” is derived from 
a population. Its formulation depends on the observation of a population. But this does not 
keep the phenotype thus defined from being applied to individuals. Johannsen speaks of 
individuals here. There are male earwigs with “short forceps,” where short is specified as 
on average  3,5mm long.  To define  the  phenotype as  the  mean value  is  just  a  way to 
produce a robust and exact category.58
57 Not speaking of properties, but of types, one can also say, more correctly, that the individual is a token of  
the short type, and accordingly,  that  it  is  a token of the 12,8mm type, even if it  has a seed length of  
10,7mm.
58 If one would define the phenotype as the range such that short would be specified as “between 3mm and  
4,5mm,” it would be less odd to apply the phenotype to an individual: “A has a forceps length between x 
and y,” sounds unproblematic. But in this case a single individual would have too much influence on the 
construction  of  the  phenotype  category.  An  outlier  of  2mm  length,  for  instance,  would  change  the 
definition of the phenotype, while it would not have much influence on the mean value if the sample size is  
big enough.
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From the above said, it follows that even if every population has a phenotype in the 
sense of a typical value, Johannsen seems to imply that there are tentative phenotypes and 
phenotypes proper. The tentative phenotype would be the mean value concerning a given 
property in any population that happens to come under investigation (say, a package of 
seeds). The phenotype proper is the constant phenotype that is determined in a pure line 
breeding experiment; they are phenotypes of very specific populations, that is, generations. 
These  are  quantitative  characters  treated  as  Mendelian  characters  and  they  apply  to 
individuals.
If we look again at the section chosen by Churchill (1974, 13, fn. 23) to show that 
Johannsen sometimes speaks of the phenotype of individuals, and of which he claims that 
these passages “do not fit with the general thrust” of the text, we can now see that it fits 
very well into the picture developed above:
Especially  here  [in  the  context  of  quantitative  properties]  where  it  is  not 
possible to recognise directly in every individual its phenotype, the difficulties 
for  research  were  the  largest  and  the  sources  of  mistake  were  the  most 
abundant (Johannsen 1909, 130-131).
One cannot read the mean value of the population the individual belongs to (or gives rise 
to) off the individual, but once we know the phenotype, the individual can be said to have 
the phenotype.
Phenotypes, Personal Characters and the Environment
We saw that it is wrong that the phenotype does not apply to individuals, as Churchill  
claims, if that means that it cannot be predicated about individuals. It can. Another thing is 
to observe that the non-idealized value of a character variable, that is, a value in a dense 
scheme, as exhibited by an individual is not called a phenotype. Johannsen indeed does not 
use the term in this sense in the first edition of the Elemente. Instead he speaks of “personal 
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properties.”59 If an individual plant of a pure line has a seed length of 13,5mm and is part 
of a population of siblings that has a mean value for seed length of 12,8mm (and also the 
population consisting of its offspring will have roughly the same mean value), then it has 
the phenotype “short,”  specified  by the mean value 12,8mm, but  it  does  not  have the 
phenotype  “seed  length  13,5mm.”  This  particular  value  is  a  personal  property  of  the 
individual.
It is not the case that the phenotype has to be separated from the genotype, because the 
phenotype is influenced by the environment, while the genotype is not. As a matter of fact 
the phenotype as typical (in the sense of the mean value of a property such as seed length 
or  in  the  sense  of  the  “yellow albumen”)  is  construed  in  a  way that  it  subsumes  all  
environmentally induced variation under one type. The phenotype is exactly the property 
defined  broadly  enough  to  be  robust  against  environmental  influences.  “Therefore,  a 
statistical treatment of the observed groups becomes necessary, such that the more random 
influences  of  the local  fluctuations  in  the environment  can be eliminated.”  (Johannsen 
1909, 101) The personal character, as opposed to the phenotype, is the result of genetic and 
environmental influences:
The personal character of an individual is not only determined by its genes, 
which  the  gametes  bring  together  in  the  zygote.  Also  the  whole  living 
conditions, the environment (the sum of all states that have an influence on 
development,  all  “factors  of  the  surrounding”),  plays  a  significant  role 
(Johannsen 1909, 131).
The  phenotype  instead  is  only  differentially  influenced  by  the  environment,  if  two 
populations of the same genotype are influenced by different environments, e.g. different 
fields,  or  different  climatic  factors  in  subsequent  years,  and  thus  have  different  mean 
values for a property (Johannsen sometimes speaks of “year-phenotypes,”1909, 216). 
59 “Persönliche Beschaffenheit,” (Johannsen 1909, 131) “persönliche Abweichung,” (p. 113) “persönlicher 
Charakter,” (p. 167) or “persönliche Einzeleigenschaften” (p. 243).
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The concept of a phenotype,  as determined in pure line breeding, was not meant to 
account for the fact that the environment had an influence on the individual appearance and 
that therefore individuals with the same genotype had different phenotypes. It showed that 
the differences caused by the environment did not change the phenotype and therefore only 
changes in genotype could change the phenotype in an evolutionary relevant way.
The genotype-phenotype distinction was devised to cut off the characters of the parents 
and  ancestors  from  the  constitution  of  the  zygote.  Johannsen  wanted  to  cut  off  the 
Darwinian-biometrician tradition that saw individual variation as the source of evolution, 
the material on which selection acted. He expressed this by cutting off a syllable from a 
word used by De Vries with reference to Darwin’s pangenesis conception of heredity, to 
indicate the influence of the whole body on the formation of the gametes: Johannsen’s 
critique culminated in cutting away the “pan” from “pangenes” and left us with the gene as 
an element of the zygote that comes from the gametes of the parents not from their body. 
The characters of the parents do not influence the gametes and the resulting zygote, and 
thus are not transmitted to the offspring. Instead the same genes influence the characters of 
the parents and offspring.
Accordingly,  the  purpose  of  the  genotype-phenotype  distinction  was  not  to  criticise 
preformationism as Lenny Moss claims:
Johannsen  coined  the  terms  genotype  and  phenotype  and  distinguished 
between  them in  order  to  depart  from this  morphological  (preformationist) 
legacy and establish, he felt, the grounds for a proper science of the inheritance 
of the genotype. It is precisely the conflation of the phenotype — a product of 
environmental-developmental interaction — with the inheritance of Mendelian 
units, which constituted a new brand of preformationism. (Moss 2003, 29)
As we saw, Johannsen did not think of the phenotype (the mean value of a variable) as 
being  “a  product  of  environmental-developmental  interaction,”  but  as  being  robust  to 
environmental influences. Only personal characters were the result of such an interaction.
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Johannsen’s contemporaries were in a way right when they thought that his distinction 
served the same purpose as Weismann’s germ-plasm/soma distinction. Johannsen explicitly 
credits Weismann for attacking the idea of the transmission of characters. Then, as Moss 
rightly says, Johannsen distanced himself from Weismann and his terminology because of 
Weismann’s preformationism that Johannsen disagreed with. But this difference in their 
views is  logically independent from the difference between their  shared views and the 
biometricians’ view. And making change in continuous characters dependent on saltation 
was actually very welcome for preformationism.
Accordingly,  the  genotype-phenotype  distinction  was  not  a  device  to  overcome 
preformationism. As will be shown in the next section, Johannsen did that by employing 
several conceptual means: He made another distinction, namely that between characters as 
parts and characters as properties (values of variables), he stated a many-many relation 
between genes and characters, and a form of the difference principle (the latter two points 
are usually attributed to Morgan), and he made a further distinction between superficial 
characters  and  more  fundamental  features  of  organisms.  Finally,  he  developed  an 
epigenetic concept of development, which he formulated in the chemical idiom of reaction. 
The role of the environment was not important for the critique of preformationism. Even if 
the  influence  of  the  environment  is  acknowledged  by  preformationists  (that  the 
environment modifies the unfolding of the preformed character,  a view that Johannsen 
grants Weismann, 1909, 320), the problem for Johannsen is the one to one relationship 
between  genes  and  characters.  Expressions  such  as  “new  preformationism,”  but  also 
“genetic determinism” often do not distinguish between cases where genes are thought of 
as being related to particular characters and cases where the influence of the environment 
is neglected. Johannsen was clearly more concerned with the former case.
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6.2. From Morphological Unit-Characters to Characters as Values
Johannsen’s Critique of the Morphological Unit-Character Concept
Already  in  the  first  edition  of  the  Elemente,  Johannsen  formulates  his  critique  of 
morphological unit-characters. He cites Weismann and Bateson as allies in the rejection of 
the notion that characters are passed on from parents to offspring,  that was implied in 
Darwin’s  “pangenes”  and  the  biometricians’ view  that  selection  acted  on  individual 
variation. He acknowledges the value of the germ-plasm/soma distinction in this respect, 
but  he  strongly  disagrees  with  Weismann’s  speculations  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
components  of  the  germ-plasm as  small  independent  units  that  determine  whole  body 
parts:
That  Weismann's  doctrine  of  the  “determinants”  is  also  wrong  in  that  the 
“determinants” affect organs or tissue regions, becomes clear from the behavior 
of hybrid offspring; accordingly in this lectures we spoke of properties, with 
which  genetics  has  to  operate  —  whether  these  properties  are  local  or 
distributed in the organism (Johannsen 1909, 323).
Apart from the fact that Johannsen tries to avoid any speculation on the nature of, what he 
would call genotype, — he introduces the term “gene” to have a term that is free of any 
previous speculations, — he relates genes to properties not parts. This is the way Mendel 
and Bateson perceive characters as determined by factors, and what the latter called “unit-
characters”. Johannsen endorses this view. He himself makes use of a quasi preformationist 
language of the unit-character when he says:
The single gamete contains special, separable “genes” for different properties. 
The gametes of Lychnis diurna e.g. contain genes for hair generation, genes for 
red coloring, genes for chlorophyll generation etc. Every property that has a 
special  gene (a gene of a special  type) at  its basis can be called a singular 
property. It is a matter of research to determine in every case, what is a singular 
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character in this sense. Crossing experiments are an important procedure here. 
(Johannsen 1909, 125)
The term “phenotype” was introduced to apply this Mendelian notion of character that can 
be delineated through pure line and hybridization analysis to quantitative characters (and 
thus make changes in quantitative characters require changes in genes). 
But at the same time he expresses doubts about the unit-character concept. Johannsen 
speaks  of  “single  properties”  (Einzeleigenschaften)  as  opposed to  the  whole  organism. 
Bateson’s unit-character he interprets as a “simple” (einfach) property (Johannsen 1909, 
389). While characters, observed as segregating in hybridization experiments are single 
characters (what is different when the rest of the whole organism is similar), Johannsen has 
doubts about the simplicity of characters, if this is to mean that they are influenced by only 
one gene. 
When  Johannsen  discusses  Bateson’s  research  on  the  combs  of  fowl  hybrids,  he 
emphasizes the relativity of genetic analysis. Bateson describes a certain form of comb 
(walnut) as a compound character, because it appears only if two factors are present, which 
in the absence of the respective other produce different characters (pea and rose). If both 
factors are absent, the property of the comb is described as single. If characters in the sense 
of Mendelian genetics are represented by one factor, walnut is not a proper character, but 
composed of two characters. Johannsen observes that this depends on the depth of analysis. 
If  walnut would be crossed with only  pea or  rose, it would appear as a dominant unit-
character. Only if crossed with single, the compound nature becomes apparent. But in the 
same way also pea and rose can be regarded as compound characters if it is assumed that 
there is a factor corresponding to single. If pea and rose appear as unit-characters, the only 
reason is that no mutation is known that allows for further analysis. The unit-character is 
an illusion that stems from the relativity of observation: “What appears in one cross as 
“single [read: simple] property” (here  walnut — e.g. versus  rose or versus  pea) can turn 
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out to be a complex matter. The relativity of hybrid crosses thereby becomes obvious.” 
(Johannsen 1909, 390)
Thus Johannsen comes to the conclusion that every character is in the end influenced by 
many genes. The fact that one gene affects many characters was already mentioned by 
Mendel himself, when he stated that the difference in seed coat color is correlated with 
differences in many properties such as flower or stem color. Johannsen accordingly clearly 
states the many-many relation between genes and traits.
What appears in segregation phenomena as one unit, can affect a whole series 
of properties; and conversely, a seemingly simple property, e.g. red color of sap 
in  Matthiola  require two different genes under given circumstances, or, as in 
the case of felted character of the mentioned plants, the simultaneous presence 
of three genes (Johannsen 1909, 483).
Bateson’s  version  of  the  unit-character  is  closely  linked  to  his  presence-absence 
hypothesis,  according  to  which  in  any  pair  of  alternative  segregating  characters  the 
dominant form is regarded a property present in the organism, whereas the recessive form 
is simply interpreted as the absence of the same property, and accordingly, the factor is 
present or absent in the zygote. Johannsen instead, sees any character, part or property, as 
the result of the (interdependent) activity of many genes. The whole organism, with all its 
parts that one might anatomically dissect, is a result of a reaction of the whole genotype 
with the whole environment. The alternative characters of genetics, which should be seen 
as properties of parts, indicate specific differences in the reaction, they can be singled out, 
but they are not simple. They are different outcomes of the reaction that reproduce under 
similar  environmental  conditions  and that  indicate  different  starting conditions,  that  is, 
differences  in  the  composition  of  the  zygotes.  Johannsen  calls  the  characters  of  the 
geneticists “differing points.” He thereby comes very close to formulating the difference 
principle that is worked out in a much clearer from by Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866-1945) 
and co-workers in The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity (1915). There are several places 
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in the Elemente, where Johannsen makes the point, but his formulation in his first English 
language publication from 1911 is probably most telling in this respect:
It may be quite impossible to indicate whether a particular reaction (character) 
is  due  to  something  positive  or  to  the  lack  of  a  factor  in  the  genotypic 
constitution.  All  that  can as yet  be determined in this  regard by Mendelian 
analysis is the number of differing points between the two gametes forming a 
heterozygote.  Such differences  maybe  termed “geno-differences.”  The well-
known facts, that a “character” maybe dominant in some hybrids but recessive 
in others, and that segregation in different cases maybe very different, indicate 
that “characters” are complicated reactions. (Johannsen 1911, 148-149)
While the elements that compose the zygote can be independently recombined, characters 
as parts, are (genetically and developmentally speaking) not such independent bits,  but 
outcomes  of  the  reaction  as  a  whole.  Differences  in  the  outcome,  that  is,  differential 
properties of parts allow to track zygotic constituents.
Bateson instead interprets the notion of composition of characters quite literally and 
describes the morphology of the walnut comb in terms of the morphology of the rose and 
pea combs  (that  is,  as  combining  papillosity  and  ridgedness  which  morphologically 
characterize rose and  pea, respectively, where  single is characterized as a comb showing 
none of these features). Therefore, Johannsen, later in his life, comes to include Bateson in 
the morphological tradition that first included the Darwininan scholars that saw selection 
operating on individual variation, then Weismann for thinking of germ-plasm constituents 
as  determining whole  body parts  (tissue  regions),  and now Bateson for  conceiving  of 
characters  as morphological  properties,  a view that  still  had single factors  determining 
parts.  One  can  also  say  that  Johannsen  constantly  rejected  a  thick  interpretation  of 
characters when it comes to heredity, while he promotes a thick character concept as the 
proper explanandum of development.
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By the time of the Johannsen’s second English language publication in 1923 and the 
third  edition  of  the  Elemente (1926),  Mendelism  had  succeeded  and  the  Darwinian-
biometric notion of individual variation that is transmitted to the offspring, was generally 
regarded  as  defeated,  at  least  within  genetics  (though,  of  course,  not  biometrics  as  a 
method).  Now  Johannsen  put  much  more  emphasis  on  criticising  character-
preformationism (the view that one factor determined one character, where the character is 
understood as  a  part).  He sees  himself  strongly supported,  among other  things,  by the 
multifactorial hypothesis of Nilsson-Ehle60, which states that many genes have the same 
effect on certain properties (as opposed to the compound case where many genes affected 
the same property differently). The one to one relation between genes and characters could 
not  be  maintained  and  it  generally  was  not  supported  any  more  at  this  time.  Again 
Johannsen cut off a tradition. The tradition of the morphological unit-character, comprising 
among others Weismann, Mendel, Bateson and De Vries.61 While earlier he had cut off 
genes from characters in the production of the gametes, he now cut off the genes from 
characters on the side of the development of the zygote. He again signaled the intellectual 
step by cutting of a syllable: he suggests — successfully — to eliminate the “morph” from 
Bateson’s term “allelomorph,” leaving us with the alleles as the alternative forms of a gene, 
that  do  not  determine  morphological  properties,  but  are  indicated  by  differences in 
properties of organismic parts.
Johannsen  introduced  the  term “phenotype”,  in  an  attempt  to  construct  quantitative 
characters  as  Mendelian  unit-characters,  that  is,  as  idealized  property  categories.  The 
phenotype was therefore sharply separated from the individual expression of the character, 
the exact value measured, or “personal property.” At the same time he had doubts about the 
one to one relation between genes (factors) and characters implied in the unit-character 
60 These results did not enter into the first edition of the Elemente, because they were published in the years 
from 1909 to 1913.
61 I described Mendel’s characters as abstract values as opposed to morphological properties, but at least in  
the influential Batesonian interpretation they appeared as morphological properties.
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concept. Later, when his focus was more on the critique of the unit-character, in this sense, 
especially the morphological understanding of characters that was attached to it, he also 
used the term “phenotype” for personal properties:
The word phenotype, however, is not only applied to statistically ascertained 
'typical'  averages  but  can  simply  be  used  as  a  designation  of  personal 
characters  of any individual  whatever.  The phenotype of an individual  thus 
comprises all of his expressed characters. The single organism, the individual 
plant, an animal, a man, — “What it is and what it does” — has its phenotype, 
i.e., it appears as a sum of traits which are determined by the interplay between 
“inherited  Anlagen” and elements of the environment (Johannsen 1926, 163, 
modified translation from Churchill).
Churchill argued that Johannsen did not apply “phenotype” to individuals in 1909, but did 
so in 1926, citing this passage. But we have to distinguish between applying the term to 
individuals by sorting them into idealized character categories (e.g. Mendel’s yellow) and 
applying it to personal properties of individuals (e.g. the particular shade of orange a plant 
might exhibit). I showed that Johannsen did apply the term in the idealized category sense 
to individuals in 1909 and here we see that he used it for personal properties in 1926. But 
this cannot be the change that Churchill diagnoses, because he says Johannsen adjusts his 
use to the Morgan school’s use of individual characters. But these are idealized characters 
of individuals, as I will show below. If a fly has the phenotype vestigal, then it has short 
wings. There will certainly be differences in wing length among vestigal individuals. But 
no individual has a phenotype given by the exact length of its wings, but only vestigal or 
normal,  which covers  a  whole range of  possible  lengths.  (Though at  first  the Morgan 
school  does  not  make much use of  the  actual  term “phenotype,”  at  all,  but  speaks  of 
characters  or  mutations.)  When  Johannsen  in  the  passage  above  includes  “personal 
properties” in the phenotype definition, this is because he speaks about the phenotype as 
the outcome of the reaction of the genotype with the environment, that is, as the outcome 
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of development. This becomes obvious from the holistic perspective, because what is the 
more  striking  change  in  this  amended  phenotype  definition  is  that  Johannsen  uses 
“phenotype” for the whole of the organism, comprising all characters, instead of single 
properties.
What we can observe is that Johannsen who criticized “simple properties before,” now 
even has reservations about “single properties.” This becomes apparent in the fact that 
when Johannsen — himself never shy to introduce new terms — rejects the possibility of 
using the term “phene” with a “sit venia verbo.” (Johannsen 1926, 165) He does not deny 
that the organism can be dissected descriptively in many ways, into single morphologically 
or physiologically characterized parts or properties, but at the same time he emphasizes 
that in its development, as well as in its physiological function, the organism acts as a 
whole.  The  development  of  the  parts  in  the  context  of  the  whole  is  a  matter  for 
developmental  physiology  (Entwicklungsphysiologe).  As  his  discussion  of  Valentin 
Haecker’s  (1918)  Entwicklungsgeschichtliche  Eigenschaftsanalyse (Phänogenetik) 
(Haecker’s term for developmental studies) makes clear he sees developmental physiology, 
studying the development of the organism with all its parts and properties from the zygote, 
as  a  separated  field  of  research  from  genetics,  which  moved  from  pheno-analysis 
(Mendelism) to geno-analysis (what we might call Morganism). But the latter still relies on 
single  phenotypic  differences,  the  heuristic  value  of  which  Johannsen  never  denies 
(Johannsen  1926,  519-520).  Only  if  the  phenotype  is  thought  of  as  the  result  of 
development,  the  individuation  of  individual  units  (characters  as  parts)  becomes 
problematic. If “phenotype” is used for difference points as the data for geneticists, the 
difference  between  “phenotype”  designating  the  whole  organism  or  a  single  property 
becomes irrelevant,  because the difference point is  ideally the one point  in  which two 
organisms as a whole differ and to speak of “phenes” would give the property identified 
through the difference too much independence. We can see here already that there are two 
notions of phenotype, the value of a variable (the difference point against the background 
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of  otherwise,  at  least  ideally,  identical  organisms)  as  data  for  the  geneticist,  and  the 
organism as a whole, that can be dissected into morphological parts for many purposes, but 
whose parts do not develop independently from each other. 
Johannsen’s Chemical Metaphors
The impact of Johannsen’s training as a pharmacist and the chemical knowledge he gained 
from this education on his thinking have often been mentioned (Churchill 1974; Müller-
Wille 2007a; Roll-Hansen 2009). Two notions are central to his thinking, which we can 
understand as being imported to biology from chemistry: Analysis and reaction. Johannsen 
often  speaks  of  the  type  of  investigation  the  geneticist  performs  as  analysis:  “The 
variations can only be analysed through the hereditary ratios!” (Johannsen 1909, 440) This 
is the credo of the Elemente. Organisms are compounds that result from the reaction of the 
genotype with the environment. If a chemical compound is analysed, it is usually subjected 
to a test where it is brought in contact with another chemical element or compound or 
physical environments like heat to see what reactions take place. A particular reaction, for 
instance,  a color in a flame test,  can be ambiguous, because more than one metal can 
produce the same flame color. But several tests can narrow down the possibilities, so that 
as a result of a series of tests the elements that reacted to form the original compound are  
known. Similarly, an organism is subjected to tests in the form of self-fertilization or cross-
fertilization and the result of the reaction is observed in form of the phenotypic make up of 
the offspring generation. A single test might be inconclusive, but if the appropriate series of 
tests is performed, the genotypic elements that reacted with the environment to form the 
organism are known. “Analysis” is an epistemic term; it is a procedure, a series of tests that 
result  in  a  certain  type  of  knowledge.  “Reaction”  instead  is  an  ontological  term;  it 
designates  an  occurring  process.  But  in  the  chemical  example  there  are  two kinds  of 
reactions, which are ontologically the same, but epistemologically different: The reaction 
that gave rise to the compound of interest and the reaction that is part of a test to determine 
the elements that took part in the first reaction. In the case of biology the compound of  
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interest is the organism. The reaction of the genotype with the environment that gave rise 
to  the  organism is  development.  The  results  of  the  test  reactions  are  the  phenotypes 
observed in the breeding experiments. Thus the phenotype of the organism resulting from 
the reaction of the genotype with the environment, we can call it phenotype-D(evelopment) 
(the whole organism, that has morphological parts, which do not develop independently), is 
epistemologically  different  from  the  phenotype  as  observed  in  breeding  experiments 
(difference point), the phenotype-G(ene), that indicates a genotypic difference. They are of 
course both the result of development, just as the test reaction and the original reaction are 
both  obeying the  same chemical  laws.  But  the  phenotype-D is  in  a  way the  naturally 
occurring phenomenon that is analysed. The phenotype-G is the controlled reaction that, 
according to the contrast and the known background conditions, allows the geneticist to 
draw certain conclusions about the original constituents. Analysis aims at identifying the 
elements (in the case of genetics only the genotypic elements) that took part in the reaction 
that brought about the compound (organism). Chemical analysis in itself does not provide 
an explanation of  the reaction.  The reaction can be explained with the help of certain 
properties of the elements but this is another project. In the case of the organism this is the 
task  of  developmental  biology  (Entwicklungsphysiologie).  The  phenotype-G  is  an 
experimental phenomenon that is indicative with respect to the genotypic elements that 
entered into the production of the phenotype-D because it is a result of reactions that are 
planned, controlled and put in the context of other reactions.
In emphasizing the analytic value of single properties (Einzeleigenschaften), while at 
the  same  time  battling  the  morphological  unit-characters,  Johannsen  expresses  the 
epistemic  difference  between  phenotypes  in  breeding  experiments  and  phenotypes  as 
products  of  a  developmental  process.  But  in  his  writings  the  heuristic  value  and  the 
ontological criticism of unit-characters still remain in a tension that is not fully resolved by 
Johannsen. 
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The clear difference Johannsen makes between the units of analysis and the analyzed 
whole is obvious in the following quotation. It also shows again that he draws analogies 
between  chemistry  and  biology,  but  is  at  the  same  time  conscious  about  their  limits. 
Furthermore,  it  expresses  the epistemic point  that  analysis  of complex entities  such as 
organisms does not automatically lead to an understanding of the functioning of the whole 
(as it would manifest itself in the ability to synthesize an organism). 
The Mendelian analysis of an organism through hybridization is in its restricted 
relativity of a rather primitive nature; the analytical reagents are other complex 
organisms,  not  simple  pure  bodies  like  in  chemical  analyses.  Genes  or 
hereditary  units  as  elements  of  life  are  probably  impossible  to  isolate  — 
because  “life”  can  manifest  itself  apparently  only  as  complex  appearance. 
Analysis leads to death — and we will as it seems not succeed in the synthesis 
of life (Johannsen 1909, 439).
Saying that Johannsen developed several notions that are usually attributed to Morgan, 
such as the many-many relation between genes and characters and the difference principle, 
is not meant to redirect credits or blame, but to show that influential geneticists at the time 
pushed  in  the  same  direction.  The  genotype  was  the  subject  of  research  and  it  was 
investigated through phenotypes(-G), which implied a construction of the phenotype as a 
idealized  differential  value  of  a  variable,  a  measurement  datum  that  informed  the 
researcher  about  the  genotype.  This  view was essentially there  already in  Johannsen’s 
reasoning in 1909:
The  genes  are  not  to  be  seen  as  “bearers”  of  hereditary  properties.  These 
properties should only be regarded as symptoms or reactions, which however 
are real and measurable — and they must be measured if one wants to proceed 
in exact research (Johannsen 1909, 482).
This is what Sara Schwartz called the minimizing of the trait concept (Schwartz 1998) and 
it  can  also  be  expressed  by saying  that  characters  were  made  thin  in  genetics.  I  will 
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describe Morgan’s versions of thin characters, in order to go one step further and argue that 
this implied to cut characters construed in this way completely from genes, with respect to 
the  explanatory  projects  pursued,  and  treat  characters,  instead,  purely  as  data.  The 
causation expressed in the difference principle is part of an observational theory. It was 
acknowledged that genes do play a role in the explanation of characters as parts, but this 
was out of the scope of the experimental systems the Morgan group had at hand. So if we 
first saw a movement from thick characters to thin characters, we now see the completion 
of this movement in the change of the status of characters from explananda to data.
6.3.The Morgan Group and Mutations as Markers
Laboratory Phenomena: Mutations and Organisms as Instruments
Johannsen was never fully able to relegate phenotypes (even in the sense of difference 
points) to mere data (as I will show Morgan did), most likely, because he, coming from 
research on industrially and agriculturally important organisms himself, was well aware of 
the  implications  of  genetics  for  practical  fields.  In  practical  contexts,  characters 
(alternatives in the difference points) were always the focal point of interest and therefore 
not regarded as indicators for genes, but instead had to be seen as something that could be 
controlled through genetic knowledge. I will briefly come back to this point in the next 
section.
In  the  work  of  the  Morgan  school,  the  distinction  between  phenotypes-D  and 
phenotypes-G becomes much clearer. The mutations observed in the lab are, as Kohler 
(1994) showed, a result of the laboratory culture, of the sheer mass of flies bred. And the 
frequency of mutations would soon be pushed even further by artificial means (especially 
X-ray  mutagenesis).  The  phenotypes  studied  in  Drosophila are  clearly  laboratory 
phenomena.  They  do  not  constitute  elementary  species  that  are  sorted  by  natural  or 
artificial selection, like Mendel’s peas that represent two varieties, not a normal and an 
abnormal form (even if they can be interpreted as pairs of normal and abnormal forms). 
192
Even if Morgan started to work with Drosophila in the context of artificial evolution and 
thus regarded mutations as possible points of origin for new species (Kohler 1994, Ch. 2), 
the mutants that were finally employed for genetic research are described as aberrations 
from the wild type, which is in itself an artificial product in the sense of an inbred strain. 
The mutants often would not survive outside the lab. The term “mutation” thus changed its  
meaning. In natural history “transmutation” meant the change in the form typical for a 
species that resulted in a new species. De Vries used “mutation” in this way, but applied it  
in  a  Mendelian  vein  to  singular  characters,  which  mark  the  difference  between  two 
varieties. In Drosophila genetics it designated deformations of an individual that was part 
of a strain that was carefully maintained for its value as a research tool. “Mutation” here 
designated  the  kind  of  phenomena  that  were  called  “monstrosity”  in  teratology  and 
embryology. But since they were studied in the context of Mendelism they were called 
mutations. And we will see that this difference in terminology marked a difference in the 
disciplinary  perspective  on  characters,  monstrosity,  one  can  say,  is  a  thick  concept, 
mutation a  thin one.  The important  point  is  that  Drosophila mutations,  being artificial 
phenomena in an economically uninteresting organism, made Morgan’s research free from 
the focus on characters that makes every gene look like the cause in the explanation or at 
least  a  handle  in  the  manipulation  of  this  character  and  thus  a  handle  to  manipulate 
agricultural or medical situations. Characters were artificial and uninteresting mutations 
and the corresponding normal form they defined by contrast.
This made it easier to conceive of characters as conveying information about genes and 
nothing else. It is in this particular sense that the model organism became an instrument, as 
Kohler has put it. Johannsen described organisms as the “analytical reagents” that are used 
to investigate other organisms. Whether one describes organisms in genetics as instruments 
or reagents, both are laboratory tools, applied for the purpose of analysis (Kohler actually 
gives  analytical  reagents  as  an  example  for  instruments,  Kohler  1994,  53).  As Staffan 
Müller-Wille writes: 
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Mendel’s achievement was not so much that he discovered some empirical law, 
nor that he found out something about the evolution of hybrids. What Mendel 
achieved  was  nothing  less  than  the  invention  of  a  powerful  experimental 
system,  in  which  plants  not  only served as  ideal  devices  for  recording the 
effects  of  manipulations,  but  also  as  the  precision  tools  with  which 
manipulations were carried out. (Müller-Wille, 2009, unpublished manuscript, 
6)
If  this  tool-like  character  of  organisms,  with  characters  as  the  measured  effects  of 
manipulations was there from the beginning in Mendelism, the members of the Morgan 
school brought this approach to perfection, on the one hand by freeing genetic research 
from economically important characters and on the other hand by purifying the reagents 
through rigid standardization and control of strains and experimental conditions.
Of course, also the Morgan group, apart from the fact that there were different opinions 
among  its  members,  changed  its  attitude  towards  things  over  time.  Morgan  himself, 
coming from embryology, at first had a developmental understanding of genetics. He had 
criticized  the  morphological  unit-character  concept,  but  he  continued  to  see  genes  as 
causes of characters. Under the premise of a many-many relationship between genes and 
characters, he classified genes as affecting the same morphological characters in so-called 
“organ series.” If single genes did not determine characters, multiple genes, in interaction 
with the environment could be causally responsible for the growth of form. Morgan clearly 
had a  vision  of  a  genetically informed embryology,  but  apart  from constructing  organ 
series, which actually led to some quite elaborate developmental hypotheses (Schwartz and 
Falk, 1993), he did not have an experimental approach to address the interaction of genes 
in bringing about characters. Instead another experimental approach emerged in his lab 
(Allen 1985, 112-113), an approach that used characters, to study structural and spatial 
relations among genes (an approach that according to Kohler was much more pushed by 
his students than by Morgan himself, Kohler 1994, 62-63). Genes were now no longer 
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classified according to the organs they affected, but into linkage groups. Kohler interprets 
this  change  in  focus  and  method  as  a  break  away  of  the  Morgan  group  from  Neo-
Mendelism, “in which the boundaries between heredity, development and evolution were 
not yet well defined.” (Kohler 1994, 57) How strongly one wants to emphasize this break 
depends, of course, on who of the Neo-Mendelian researchers is chosen as contrast and 
how this researcher’s or group’s work is interpreted, but on the basis of the reading of 
Johannsen that was provided here, the move away from developmental or evolutionary 
explanations of characters towards using characters to study the genotype was inherent in 
Mendelism, because it was the only type of conclusions its experimental system warranted. 
The Morgan group, as opposed to Bateson, for instance, came to fully accept this limitation 
and by focussing solely on the informational  content  of  characters  with respect  to  the 
genotype, thereby abandoning any attempt to explain characters, they hugely expanded the 
range  of  types  of  information  that  could  be  gained  from  patterns  of  “inheritance  of 
characters” (it would be more correct to speak of occurrences of characters) and combined 
it with cytological information about chromosomes. But the information gathered allowed 
inferences only about the inventory and structure of the genotype and finally established a 
material  understanding  of  the  genotype  as  being  embodied  in  the  chromosomes.  The 
chromosomal theory of inheritance was a theory about the inheritance of chromosomes, 
not the inheritance of characters.
The Separation of Heredity and Development
It is usually said that Morgan separated heredity from development (Allen 1985; Gilbert 
1978; Amundsen 2005, Ch. 7). Before, this implies, they were seen as two aspects of the 
same process, which we might call reproduction (see also Griesemer 2007). That Morgan 
himself held this unitary view of heredity is often illustrated by the following quotation 
(which is given in varying length by Gilbert 1978, 349, Allen 1985, 108, Amundsen 2005, 
148):
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We have come to look upon the  problem of  heredity as  identical  with  the 
problem of development. The word heredity stands for those properties of the 
germ-cells  that  find  their  expression  in  the  developing  and  developed 
organism. When we speak of the transmission of  characters  from parent  to 
offspring,  we are speaking metaphorically;  for we now realize that it  is not 
characters that are transmitted to the child from the body of the parent, but that 
the  parent  carries  over  the  material  common  to  both  parent  and  offspring. 
(Morgan 1910, 449)
But if we read carefully and place the quotation in the right context, it actually looks as if  
Morgan already makes  a  distinction  here.  The expression  “We have come to look” is 
contrasting  his  view with  a  different  view.  This  rejected  view is  the  “transmission  of 
characters from parents to offspring,” a formulation, which, as he says, can now only be 
used metaphorically, but which was used literally before. It is the view that the body of the 
parents influence the germ cells, be it in form of the radical view of acquired characters, or 
in the mild version of the biometricians that allow for transmission of personal variation. 
This view was rejected so forcefully by Weismann and Johannsen that Morgan “hesitates” 
to  state  the new view, which is  expressed in the quotation above,  again.  Heredity and 
development are the same on the new account as opposed to the old view where characters 
are  transmitted  and characters  develop.  There  are  not  two  processes  that  involve 
characters, but only one: development. Transmission instead concerns only the constituents 
of germ cells. This observation clearly does introduce a distinction: The transmission of 
hereditary material and its expression. And Morgan already reserves the term “heredity” 
for the “properties of the germ-cells,” because they are the result of a transmission and this 
is what the metaphor taken from the legal context originally alludes to.62 His distinction is 
62 Johannsen preferred to get rid of the term “transmission” altogether, but from his point of view Morgan’s 
use of the term was harmless. He battled the “transmission of characters;” the transmission of germ cell 
constituents might be a metaphor as well, because it was not known if the hereditary material was passed  
on or copied, but as long as the body did not have an influence this did not matter. And as Roll-Hansen  
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a separation of one process in two linear steps (transmission and development). This is 
certainly  different  from the  distinction  made  in  the  rejected  view,  of  two  parallel,  or 
overlapping processes,  the  transmission  of  characters  from parent  to  offspring  and the 
development of the characters in the individual. If heredity and development are identical, 
it  is  because  they are  two steps  in  the  same process  (reproduction),  but  they are  still  
distinct. Later, Morgan will emphasize the difference between the sub-processes, stating 
that they are processes of a very different kind:
For  purposes,  then,  of  closer  analysis,  it  seems  desirable  in  the  present 
condition  of  genetics  and  embryology to  recognize  that  the  mechanism of 
distribution of the hereditary units or genes is a process of an entirely different 
kind  from  the  effects  that  the  genes  produce  through  the  agency  of  the 
cytoplasm of the embryo. (Morgan 1917, 25)
Thus  my interpretation  of  the  original  unity  of  heredity  and  development  (at  least  in 
Morgan’s reasoning) is quite different from that of Ron Amundsen who argues that, before 
the separation also for Morgan, “Heredity is the passing on of developmental processes.” 
(Amundsen 2005, 148) But as said above, it is true that Morgan first invested the genetic 
analysis  with the hope of achieving developmental explanations.  What is  suggested by 
most authors who discuss the separation of heredity and development is that Morgan and 
his co-workers came to abandon attempts for developmental explanations, but maintained a 
view where the presence of characters are explained through the presence of genes (where 
only genes and not characters are inherited), even if the intermediary steps of development 
are unknown. Sometimes this view is stated more carefully, acknowledging that what was 
explained was not the presence of single characters, but only patterns in the distribution of 
characters in the offspring, or at least differences in characters.
(2009, 470) pointed out, Johannsen used a Weismannist diagram throughout his career that showed the 
persistence of genotypic units (the transmission of the stirp, the genotypic unit in the Galton-Weismann 
view, which he shared to that extent). 
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I will argue instead that the Morgan group completed the separation of heredity from 
characters  and  left  the  explanation  of  characters  solely  to  development.  Scott  Gilbert 
writes: “The study of inheritance became genetics, which Morgan defined as the discipline 
concerned with the transmission of nuclear genes.” (Gilbert 1996, 104) One might add that 
it  was concerned also with the distribution of genes, but not with the transmission and 
distribution of characters. In Morgan’s words: 
The modern theory of heredity is  derived from numerical  data  obtained by 
crossing two individuals that differ in one or more characters. The theory is 
primarily  concerned  with  the  distribution  of  units  between  successive 
generations of individuals. (Morgan 1926, 1)
The units  here are  genes.  Characters only play a  role  as  data.  This  minimizing of  the 
character concept shows itself in the term “marker” as Schwartz rightly points out (1998, 
2000), although the term was introduced relatively late and at first did not exactly have the 
meaning of one character indicating one gene.  Muller and Altenburg use it  in 1930 to 
replace  the  more  complicated  expression “identifying  character”  or  “identifying  gene.” 
(Muller and Altenburg 1930) This terminology was first used in 1920 for characters that 
indicate genes the hereditary behavior of which was well  known, and that are used as 
evidence for other genes that are not related to these characters, but that did not have an 
easily identifiable phenotypic effect themselves. Through linkage relation inferences could 
be made about the gene in question (Altenburg and Muller 1920).63 
It is true that Morgan and his co-workers separated heredity from development, but they 
did  not  separate  heredity  from  development  in  explaining  characters.  By  defining 
63 Morgan et al. in the 1922 edition of their textbook discuss the case and use the term “identifying marks”:  
“An analysis of the factorial composition of the truncate flies was then made by crossing them to flies  
containing in each of their chromosomes other mutant factors whose hereditary behavior was known. In the 
second generation of the cross (back-cross) these other factors served as identifying marks which disclosed 
just which chromosomes of the P1 truncate fly each F2 individual had or had not received.” (Morgan et al. 
1922, 242)
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inheritance as the inheritance of genes, they excluded characters from the things that are 
explained by the theory of inheritance. Accordingly, they excluded development from the 
study of inheritance.  Later  development  was tackled again from within the  Drosophila 
community, most notably in form of the work of Beadle and Ephrussi, but this work, even 
if it utilized genetic analysis, consisted in an expanded experimental system that integrated 
strategies from classical embryology as well as biochemistry, and thereby facilitated a re-
morphologizing, or thickening of characters.
The Difference Principle and Characters as Data
The reason that some authors argue that heredity and development were separated, but that 
heredity still served as an explanation of characters, is that Morgan and other Drosophilists 
kept on talking about the causation of characters. The way in which genes are thought to 
cause phenotypes is given by Morgan et al. in a section “On the Relation Between Factors 
and Characters” as follows:
In  this  sense  we  may say  that  a  particular  factor  (p)  is  the  cause  of  [the 
character] pink [eye color], for we use cause here in the sense in which science 
always uses this expression, namely, to mean that a particular system differs 
from another system only in one special factor. (Morgan et al. 1915, 209)64
Ken Waters describes this type of reasoning more formally as a difference principle:
Differences  in  a  gene  cause  uniform  phenotypic  differences  in  particular 
genetic and environmental contexts. (Waters 2007, 558)
64 What this means is that causation is usually thought of as a relation between two states of a system as  
opposed to a relation among individual entities (a notion that many philosophers seem to have lost). The 
latter understanding is only warranted through the difference principle. A textbook on statistical method of  
the time that is also quoted by Johannsen illustrates the way that “science always uses the expression”: “We 
start with the assumption that everything that exists, and everything that happens, exists or happens as a 
necessary consequence of a previous state of things. If a state of things is repeated in every detail, it must  
lead to exactly the same consequences. Any difference between the results of causes that are in part the 
same must be explainable by some difference in the other part of the causes.” (Thiele 1903, 1)
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 It is usually acknowledged that this is a very modest form of claiming causal explanation. 
Nevertheless it is taken to indicate that the Morgan group was interested in explaining 
characters. Ron Amundsen for instance writes: “If a single allele can be regarded as the 
cause of pink eye color, then it is possible to causally explain characteristics without any 
reference  to  the  embryological  process  that  actually  brought  them about.”  (Amundsen 
2005, 150) For Amundsen it seems obvious that if genes are thought to cause characters, 
then this causal relation must be explanatory and therefore the explanations of characters 
must be on the agenda of the Morgan group. This shows in another reading of Morgan et 
al. by Amundsen that seems to me to be mistaken. Morgan and his co-authors write:
The characters of the organism are far removed, in all likelihood, from these 
materials  [factors=genes  as  chemical  materials].  Between  the  two  lies  the 
whole world of embryonic development in which many and varied reactions 
take place before the end result, the character, emerges. [...] Although Mendel's 
law does not explain the phenomena of development, and does not pretend to 
explain them, it stands as a scientific explanation of heredity, because it fulfils 
all the requirements of any causal explanation. (Morgan et al. 1915, 226-227)
Amundsen seems to read “causal explanation” in the end of the paragraph as referring to 
the difference principle, that is, to the relation between factors and characters. But it is 
clearly stated that explaining characters is a matter of development and that Mendelian 
genetics does not explain development and thus does not explain characters. There is no 
justification to  think that  here  it  is  said  that  Mendelian  genetics  does  causally explain 
characters, just not in a developmental way, but in a different way rationalized through the 
difference principle.  In which sense then is  Mendel’s law a causal explanation? In the 
formulation  that  it  has  been  given  by  the  Morgan  group,  it  causally  explains  the 
constitution  of  the  hereditary  material  of  the  offspring  from  the  constitution  of  the 
hereditary material of the parents. It provides an “explanation of heredity” and heredity is 
only about chromosomes as Morgan has clearly stated. 
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In Morgan’s later formulation of the  Theory of  the Gene,  characters  do not play an 
important  role  at  all.  What  is  said is  that  they “are referable” to  genes,  an expression 
Morgan uses several times and that can be read as “characters indicating genes.” In any 
case, characters are not mentioned as explananda here:
We are now in a position to formulate the theory of the gene. The theory states 
that the characters of the individual are referable to paired elements (genes) in 
the germinal material that are held together in a definite number of linkage 
groups; it  states that  the members of each pair  of genes separate  when the 
germ-cells mature in accordance with Mendel's first law, and in consequence 
each  germ-cell  comes  to  contain  one  set  only;  it  states  that  the  members 
belonging to different linkage groups assort independently in accordance with 
Mendel's second law; it states that an orderly interchange — crossing-over — 
also  takes  place,  at  times,  between  the  elements  in  corresponding  linkage 
groups; and it states that the frequency of crossing-over furnishes evidence of 
the  linear  order  of  the  elements  in  each  linkage  group  and  of  the  relative 
position of the elements with respect to each other. (Morgan 1926, 25)
Most authors would, nevertheless, agree with Amundsen that characters are somehow the 
explananda of Morgan’s theory of the gene, even if some are more careful in stating that 
only patterns in the distribution of traits are explained (Amundsen offers this  as a less 
problematic  reading  of  Morgan,  Amundsen  2005,  150-151),  or  that  only  differences 
between traits are explained (Waters 1994).
Therefore, I provide further argument that characters do not figure as explananda on the 
Morgan  school’s  agenda.  I  will  proceed  in  two  steps,  first  I  will  show  that  even  if 
characters are described as caused by genes in the sense of the difference principle, there is 
no sign that they are regarded as the explanandum of the “Theory of the Gene.” Then I will 
sketch an alternative role for the difference principle, namely as an observational theory.
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It  already  became  clear  from the  above  statement  of  the  Theory  of  the  Gene  that 
characters  do  not  figure  as  explananda,  but,  instead,  other  phenomena  concerning  the 
behavior of and relations between genes in the transmission of genetic material. But it can 
also be argued that characters cannot be thought of as explananda, because explanations of, 
say, eye color through the difference principle would not be very interesting. The reason is 
not, of course, that no one would be interested in explaining something as unimportant as 
eye color in a fruit fly, because in model organism based research the hope always is that 
some generalizable  principles  are  found,  such  that  an  explanation  of  the  eye  color  in 
Drosophila could  serve  as  a  model  to  explain  important  characters  in  humans  or 
economically relevant organisms, that is, it could help to explain characters in general. But 
what kind of generalization does the explanation of eye color through genes in the sense of 
the  difference  principle  allow  for?  Probably  the  only  generalization  is  the  difference 
principle itself, or some general statement that genes do play some role in development or 
that more than one gene is involved in the production of a particular organ. But then the 
power  of  the  system  to  generate  generalizable  explanations  would  soon  have  been 
exhausted. 
Furthermore,  it  seems  that  the  patterns  in  the  inheritance  of  characters  cannot  be 
explained through patterns in the inheritance of genes, because genes are only identified 
through characters. If, for instance, it is observed that a character is inherited together with 
sex and it is concluded (justified by the difference principle) that the gene modifying this 
character is located on the sex chromosome, a subsequent explanation of the co-occurrence 
of the character and sex would be rather redundant, because we only know that the gene is 
on the sex chromosome through the co-occurrence. In terms of explanation, independence 
matters. We cannot explain a phenomenon through something of which the only evidence 
is the explained phenomenon. Genetics’ explanatory structure has been accused of being 
circular. But this is not true of the work of the Morgan school. Not because they have 
independent evidence in form of microscopic cytology (this does not have the capacity to 
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identify genes), but because the phenomenon that is used as evidence for the genes is not 
what is explained. 
Another  point  that  shows  that  the  role  assigned  to  characters  cannot  be  that  of  an 
explanandum is that the characters used to identify genes can be switched in a way that an 
explanandum cannot be exchanged. Morgan keeps emphasizing that mutations in genes 
have many unrelated phenotypic effects. All of them are caused by genes (or rather alleles)  
in  the  restricted  sense  of  the  difference  principle.  In  Morgan  et  al.  (1915)  a  case  is 
described of a mutant that was first identified through the phenotype of not-unfolded wings 
(it was called club because of the shape of the wings in that state). Since only 20% of the 
carriers of the mutation actually showed the phenotype, it was exchanged by another effect 
of the mutated gene that was discovered later: the absence of a pair of spines on the side of 
the thorax. Of course, sometimes the explanandum is exchanged in scientific explanations, 
if an explanation has been elaborated but it turns out that a phenomenon different from that 
which triggered the investigation in the first place is explained better by this explanations. 
But here it is obvious that it simply does not matter which phenotypic effect is looked at,  
because the goal of the investigation was to find the mode of inheritance of the gene and 
the result was that it was sex linked. If unfolding of the wing would be an explanandum in 
any sense, it could not just be replaced by something else. That it does not matter which 
effect  of  an  allele  was  chosen becomes  obvious  in  the  following  quotation  from  The 
Physical Basis of Heredity:
Clearly then the character that we choose to follow in any case is only the most 
conspicuous or (for purposes of identification) the most striking or convenient 
modification that is produced. Since, however, these effects always go together, 
and can be explained by the assumption of a single unit difference in the germ-
plasm, the particular difference in the germ-plasm is more significant than the 
character chosen as its index. (Morgan 1919, 240) 
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Even if Morgan uses the verb “to explain” here, this passage also clearly states that the 
interest focuses in the constitution of the hereditary material and that the role of characters 
is  that  of  an “index.”  Causation accordingly matters only to  justify the indexicality of 
character, not to explain them. This term, similar to the term “marker,” gives a hint to the 
appropriate  understanding  of  the  difference  principle  as  an  observational  theory.  A 
character is explained only in the sense that an instrument’s readout is explained.
An index represents due to its causal relation to the object it represents. But pragmatically, 
an index is  used to measure the object;  its  explanation is  not necessarily a purpose of 
stating the causal relationship, but rather the justification of its use for measurement. A 
weather vane is an index for the direction of the wind. Its position is caused by and thus 
somehow explained by the wind direction.  But if “explanation” is taken to express the 
epistemic interest of the observer, it is hard to imagine a situation where someone was 
interested in explaining the position of the vane. Nevertheless, the causal relation can be 
spelled out in terms of classical kinetics. Such a theoretical explanation would justify the 
use  of  the  index,  but  this  would  usually  not  be  the  purpose  of  its  use.  The  kinetic 
explanation would be an observation theory here: a theory that explains the connection 
between the measured object and the measurement instrument. In this context it has no 
epistemic value in itself, though it might have in other circumstances.
Are Characters Explained in Genetics?
It might appear as if I am preaching to the converted here. For sure, I am not claiming that  
anyone  accuses  Morgan  and  his  followers  of  entertaining  any  naïve  form  of  genetic 
determinism.  Morgan  rejected  the  unit-character  concept  as  preformationist  and 
emphasized  the  many-many  relation  between  genes  and  characters.  If  genes  explain 
characters,  they do so only in the sense of the difference principle. It is also generally 
agreed upon that the Morgan school had various explanatory agendas and maybe some 
goals that are not well described as explanations at all, such as the mapping of genes, and 
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that many of the goals were related only to genes, not characters. Waters, for instance, 
writes:  “Laws  of  segregation  and  independent  assortment  and  principles  of  genetic 
recombination and replication are used to explain and predict gene transmission.” (Waters 
1994, 165, see also his 2004) It is further acknowledged by most authors that in pursuing 
these goals characters were used as indicators for genes. But still the idea that one of the 
goals  was  to  explain  the  inheritance  of  characters,  or  patterns  in  the  inheritance  of 
characters, or at least patterns in the inheritance of differences in characters dies hard.
Waters cites the passage where Morgan uses the term “index” (see above) and states that 
“the differences in phenotypic form identified by classical geneticists were not viewed as 
fundamental units of development; they were understood to be phenotypic quirks caused 
by differences in the real units of heredity, the genes” (Waters 1994, 174), thus making a 
distinction  similar  to  the  phenotype-G  and  phenotype-D  distinction.  He  puts  much 
emphasis on the difference principle and contests other philosopher’s reading of classical 
genetics as identifying genes for characters. But still, he writes that in classical genetics the 
“inheritance of phenotypic characteristics can be explained by charting the transmission of 
genes and relating genotypes  to  phenotypes.”  (Waters 1994, 169) His critique of other 
accounts  is  that  they  seem to  “relate  genotypes  to  phenotypes”  through  development, 
ending up wrongly accusing classical geneticists of a naïve genetic determinism, while he 
maintains  that  classical  geneticists  related  genotypes  to  phenotypes  only  through  the 
difference  principle,  that  is,  strictly  speaking,  they  explain  differences  in  characters 
through  differences  in  genes:  “What  were  studied  were  character  differences,  not 
characters, and what explained them were differences in genes, not the genes themselves.” 
(Waters 1994, 172)
It sounds, however, ontologically dubious, to say that differences cause differences. It 
was remarked above that earlier states of systems cause later states, and that differences in 
the resulting state indicate differences in the original state. If we move on this basis to 
individual causes, then it is still the individual alternative forms that “cause” the individual 
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alternative “effect.” Objects cause objects or values of variables cause values of variables, 
whatever  the  descriptive  decisions  taken,  but  differences  do  not  cause  differences, 
otherwise, the difference between smoking and non-smoking causes the difference between 
getting cancer and not getting cancer and smokers have nothing to fear. That is, it is still 
the allele that causes mutant phenotype. And another allele that causes the normal form 
(which is delineated from the whole organism in contrast to the mutation). It is the contrast 
(informed by counterfactual reasoning), that is, the difference that allows one to speak of 
the  alleles  as  causes,  but  it  is  not  differences  that  cause  differences.  The  difference 
principle is more aptly expressed by Sara Schwartz: 
Thus, the differential concept of the gene can coexist with both one-to-one and 
many-to-many relationships between genes and traits because the former deals 
with the relations on a different ontological level than the two latter concepts of 
relations.  The one-variate  and multivariate  functions  deal  with  the relations 
between genes and traits, while the differential concept of the gene deals with 
the  relations  between  their  attributes,  which  are  expressed  in  terms  of 
alternative  states  of  both  genes  (alleles)  and  traits  (AATs  [alternative 
appearances of a trait]). (Schwartz 2000, 31-32)
The relation is between alleles and alternative appearances of traits, not between 
differences. In a way already the one to one relation of the unit-character involved 
allelomorphs,  but they could be thought of as singular  entities.  The difference 
principle requires that one sees them as pairs (or x-tuples). This is implied in the 
fact that characters are viewed as values of variables as opposed to morphological 
units. Like Colless, Schwartz remarks that the relation of traits (variables) and 
alternative  appearances  of  traits  (values)  can  be  spelled  out  in  terms  of 
determinables  and determinates.  This  is  not  possible  for  traits  as  parts,  which 
follow a part-whole logic. Now it seems that a determinable cannot have only one 
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single determinate. (If there would be only red things, there would be no color.) 
As Schwartz writes elsewhere: 
Variability guides  the observer to the unifying element,  which indicates the 
boundary of the character.  In this way, for example,  the color variability of 
mouse guides the observer to the character ‘the color of mouse fur.’ (Schwartz 
1998, 4)
Schwartz also seems to share the view defended here that if classical genetics refers only to 
the work of the Morgan group, character differences were not the explananda in the sense 
of the object of interest of the investigation. They were pure data and as such they were the 
explanandum only of an observation theory, that was, however, in the absence of a 
developmental theory only a weak one. There are several reasons why the idea of 
characters (patterns of, differences in) are part of the explanandum of classical genetics 
persists in other authors’ writings.
First,  apart  from  statements  about  genes  causing  characters  that  have  now  been 
identified as statements specifying the observation theory, there is a particular feature of 
the observation theory that makes it difficult to identify it as such, and that is its relative 
lack of independence. Peter Kosso in analyzing “Dimensions of Observability,” emphasizes 
the role of the independence of observation: 
Given that there is a theory T of the object x (a theory which the observation of 
<x,P> is likely intended to test), one can ask whether the physical laws, which 
account for the delivery of information in observation are independent of T. 
(Kosso 1988, 456)
The question is if the observation theory, the theory that accounts for the causal connection 
between the measured object and the measurement instrument and the theory of interest 
about the measured object are independent. In this case we would have to ask if the theory 
connecting genes and phenotypes (the observation theory), which is used to observe genes, 
is independent of the theory of the transmission of genes (the theory of interest). However, 
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we have seen that there is no proper theory connecting genes to characters. This would be a 
developmental  theory.  Instead,  there  is  the  difference  principle,  describing  a  regular 
behavior that can be used to justify the observation. But this is done on the assumption that 
there could be a developmental theory assigning a, however remote, role to genes in the 
development of characters.  Would such a theory be independent  of the theory of gene 
transmission or not? From Kosso’s analysis, I cannot see sufficient criteria to distinguish 
dependent  from  independent  theories,  but  the  intuition  is  clear.  The  observation  of 
chromosomes under a microscope is, for instance, a case of relative independence. The 
optical theory accounting for the relation between the chromosomes and the microscopic 
image is not affected if the theory concerning the chromosomes that is investigated with 
the  help  of  the  microscope  is  modified.65 Instead  Morgan  and  his  co-workers  clearly 
thought that a complete theory of the gene would cover its behavior in transmission as well 
as its role in development. Thus even if the theory of development as part of a complete 
theory of  the  gene  did  not  yet  exist,  a  change in  the  theory of  the  gene  as  a  unit  of  
transmission must be seen as affecting the theory of development. The difference principle 
does not explain traits in the sense that optical theory explains the microscopic image. It is 
a proxy for a developmental theory that, apart from being of interest in itself (as optics is 
for physicists), would fully justify the evidence gathered about the transmission of genes 
through  phenotypes,  just  as  optical  theory  justifies  the  evidence  gathered  with  the 
microscope. 
Being a proxy for a developmental theory, being connected to it through the phenotype, 
which is after all explained only through development, the difference principle  has to be 
regarded as dependent as well. Kosso regards independence of observation theories as a 
criterion for evaluating observations. Dependent observations are compromised; they are 
65 One could argue that it is the same physical properties that are responsible for the reflection of light that are 
responsible for  the genetic  properties of the chromosomes,  but this would mean to break down every 
phenomenon to physics. But this is not done in the situations we are talking about, where theories of the  
domain of interest are employed. Here the theory of the gene and the optical theory are clearly separated.
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laden by the same theory they help to test. Independent observations are also theory laden, 
but since the theory in question is not the one tested, this is less threatening. Kosso writes 
in  the  vein  of  philosophical  debates  on  theory  justification.  In  the  actual  practice  of 
science, however, where phenomena of interest and theories are developed in parallel (as 
opposed to ready made theories that are tested and justified), dependent observations play a 
particular role in identifying and operationalizing the objects of interest in the first place. 
Also independent observations can operationally define objects, for instance, if an object is 
defined as the particle visible under this and that condition under the microscope. But it is  
theoretically dependent observations that identify objects as important functional players. 
Genes are not only indicated by phenotypes,  but they are also operationally defined as 
those bits of the chromosomes that have an effect on the phenotype, because this shows 
that they must have some distinct functional role (even if not directly in bringing about the 
phenotype).  I  claimed  that  the  Morgan  school  was  only  interested  in  explaining  the 
transmission of genes and not in the explanation of characters, but still they were interested 
in the transmission of these units because they had an influence on the phenotype. This is 
what made them interesting units to study, because, no doubt, the whole organism is what 
biologists are interested in. The fact that characters identified genes as interesting units 
seems to be one of the reasons that people think the investigation of the transmission of 
genes by Morgan and other Drosophilists must have had the immediate goal to explain 
characters.
Another  reason is  the role  that  the genotype-phenotype relation played in  other 
fields of investigation, contemporary to classical genetics, or later. For instance, genes will 
be successfully implemented in developmental explanations of characters some decades 
later, as discussed in the conclusion, and this strategy makes use of the difference principle. 
This  might  give the impression that  genes have been referred to  in  the explanation of 
characters also before. But here I want to focus briefly on the above-mentioned role of 
characters in practical contexts. The main reason that one might think that the Morgan 
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school provided an explanation for the “inheritance of characters” is probably that in most 
contexts people are interested in the characters, and not in the genes and chromosomes. I 
said  before  that  in  practical  contexts  characters  were  the  focus  of  interest  and  every 
application of transmission genetic knowledge depicted them as what is controlled through 
genes  rather  than  as  mere  data  for  genes.  Transmission  genetics  was  seen  as  being 
instrumental for controlling characters in agricultural breeding, and actually funded for this 
purpose (Allen 1985, 113-115), instead of characters being instrumental in investigating 
the transmission of genes. But the immediate goals of Drosophila genetics and agricultural 
genetics were, nevertheless, different and I emphasized the role of the emancipation of the 
Morgan school from practical contexts for the direction their work took. I am not intending 
to reinforce a sharp distinction between applied and basic research.66 But attempting to 
create an organism with particular features and giving an explanation of the principles that 
underlie successful breeding, are still logically separable activities and while the latter is 
not concerned with the explanation of characters, the former is interested in characters but 
not  concerned with explanation at  all.  People might  be interested in  the inheritance of 
characters  and  not  only  the  inheritance  of  genes.  But  in  a  practical  context  causal 
explanation is not what is looked for,67 but rather a recipe of how to set up a breeding 
regime  to  achieve  a  certain  result.  This  is  based  on  prediction,  but  prediction  and 
explanation are not symmetrical (Hanson 1959).
66 Research and the application of genetic knowledge, are certainly not separable as agricultural research 
stations such as Svalöf illustrate. And often it was particularly the challenges that arose from manipulating 
a certain desired traits that did not easily fit the known principles, which triggered new knowledge, where 
laboratory scientists would just have dropped the trait and worked with a more tractable feature instead. 
Nillson-Ehle’s multiple factor hypothesis might be a case in point (Müller-Wille 2005).
67 Although, a specific notion of causation becomes important in these fields, where the environment is not 
controlled as in laboratory genetics, when the degree of genetic and environmental influence has to be 
separated. This is not the notion of causation expressed in the difference principle, because the latter relies 
on constant environmental conditions.
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Morgan  acknowledges  the  predictive  power  of  the  results  his  version  of  genetics 
produces, but he leaves no doubts where his interest lies, namely in the structure of the  
chromosomes:
Today we arrange the genes in a chart or map. The numbers attached express 
the  distance  of  each  gene  from some  arbitrary  point  taken  as  zero.  These 
numbers make it possible to foretell how any new character that may appear 
will be inherited with respect to all other characters, as soon as its crossing-
over value with respect to any other two characters is determined. This ability 
to predict would in itself justify the construction of such maps, even if there 
were no other facts concerning the location of the genes; but there is today 
direct evidence in support of the view that the genes lie in a serial order in the 
chromosomes. (Morgan 1933, 315) 
The interests of the kind of genetics Morgan and his followers pursued where different 
from the interests of agricultural geneticists. And as has been argued before, they were also 
different from that of embryologists. Embryologists at the time, were equally aware of the 
difference between parts and variables, explananda and data, and, commenting on genetics, 
left no doubt they in turn were interested “more in the back than in the bristles on the back 
and more in the eyes than in eye color,” thus in thick parts (E.E. Just quoted in Harrison 
1937).
Chapter Conclusion
Today, Johannsen is taken to have rejected the connection between characters of parents 
and the  genes  they pass  on and between the  genes  received and the  characters  of  the 
offspring at the same time, through the introduction of the genotype-phenotype distinction. 
But these were two separable intellectual steps. To realize these steps and thus to see how 
the notion of character in genetics was sharpened and at the same time diversified in the 
different  sub-branches  of  genetics  that  developed  from  Mendelism,  it  is  important  to 
understand the specificity of the different character notions. I argued that Johannsen first 
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attacked a naturalist notion of heredity that for him goes from Hippocrates to Darwin and 
the biometricians. He saw Galton and Weismann as allies in his battle against this notion. 
This was a battle against the view that the body of parents or more distant ancestors had 
any influence  on  the  structure  of  the  gametes,  an  idea  that  was  clearly  dismissed  by 
Weismann’s germ-plasm/soma distinction. The introduction of the phenotype was meant to 
bring even continuously varying characters in line with the Mendelian characters concept, 
which implied that only mutation can facilitate evolutionary change. 
Nevertheless,  Johannsen  strongly disagreed  with  the  particular  conception  of  germ-
plasm  as  containing  determinants  for  body  parts.  Weismann  helped  to  establish  that 
“Heredity is the presence of the same genes in offspring and ancestors,” (Johannsen 1909, 
488) but he still felt the need to explain why there are the same body parts in parents and 
offspring, through the inherited units. This is after all the same notion of body parts that the 
naturalists  equipped  with  an  influence  on  the  gametes.  Even  if  Weismann  cut  this 
connection he kept the notion of body parts and he did not cut the connection between 
genes  and  body  parts  in  development.  Therefore,  Johannsen  later  came  to  think  of 
Weismann (and also Bateson) as being part of the naturalist tradition, which Johannsen 
characterized  as  a  morphological  tradition.  Johannsen  interestingly  connected  the 
morphological view to specific observational practices: collections, anatomical dissection 
and histology.68 It would be absurd to think that Johannsen dismissed any notion of body 
68 Already when he criticized the notion of  inheritance of the ancestor’s body parts,  which was for  him 
implied in the notion that selection operates on individual (non genetic) variation, he mentioned that this  
view  was  influenced  by  the  apparent  “continuity  of  museums.”  This  is  a  quite  modern  sounding 
observation about the epistemic role of collections (see e.g. Griesemer 1990; Müller-Wille 2007b; Strasser 
2010), that goes back to a metaphor of Galton (Johannsen 1909, 328, 1911, 134, 158; Galton 1889, 33),  
and  which  at  least  with respect  to  the concept  of  variation as  relevant  to  heredity and evolution,  for  
Johannsen was something that we could today describe with Bachelard (2002) as an epistemic obstacle, 
although not in the first place a conceptual, but rather an obstacle that is embodied in the institutional and 
material practice. Weismann overcame the obstacle of apparent continuity, but he still thought in terms of  
parts. This why in 1923, Johannsen added anatomy and histology next to collections as the practices that 
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parts  composing  the  organism.  As  a  botanist  he  could  clearly  see  the  usefulness  of 
anatomic and physiological partitionings that were described in detail in the textbook co-
authored with Warming (Warming and Johannsen 1909). But with respect to the relation of 
genotype  and  phenotype,  even  if  the  genotype  consisted  of  units  that  segregated 
independently, which could be observed in differences in characters as values of variables, 
the genotype as a whole (in the actual composition that happens to make up one zygote) in 
reaction  with  the  environment  brought  about  the  individual  organism  as  a  whole 
(Johannsen 1911, 133). Weismann’s mistake was not that he maintained a morphological 
character notion, in principal, but to describe heredity in terms of this character concept. 
Mendelian genetics had developed a new observational  system that implied a different 
character concept (characters as changes in values of a variable that indicated changes in 
genes)69. As long as there was no observational system that allowed researchers to address 
the  connection  between  genes  and  morphological  characters  every  statement  of  a 
connection was pure speculation. A practice with which Johannsen just as Morgan strongly 
disagreed; it was against their scientific ethos. But as opposed to Johannsen, Morgan was 
much more optimistic that such an observational system could be constructed. 
However, Morgan and his students did not have a system to address the development of 
characters as parts that would allow them to include the action of genes in the picture. 
Therefore,  they  had  to  follow  Johannsen  in  treating  characters  as  indicators  for  the 
constitution of the genotype and they did so very successfully. Including also cytological 
information about chromosomes, they managed to describe many new structural features of 
the  genotype  that  explained  how  the  constitution  of  the  offspring’s  genotype  was 
influenced by the parent’s genotypic constitution.
defined  characters  as  parts  (Johannsen  1923,  133),  and are  thus inadequate  for  defining characters  in  
genetics,  although  they  can  be  instrumental,  of  course,  because  after  all,  thin  character  concepts  are 
abstracted from thick observations. 
69 Even if they looked at properties not parts, Johannsen also thought of Mendel and Bateson as having a 
morphological property concept.
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If we return for a moment to the historical narrative of a separation between genetic and 
developmental explanations of characters, we can now see what went wrong. Amundsen 
illustrates this view with the help of two diagrams (see my Figure 6.1. after Amundsen 
2005, Ch. 7, Figures. 5 and 6, 156-157). One shows the older, broad view of heredity. We 
see  an  arrow,  which  symbolizes  the  flow  of  hereditary  units  and  the  structure  of 
explanation, accordingly. It connects the phylogenetic ancestors and the remote conspecific 
ancestors with the parents of an individual. The parents are connected with the “heredity 
passed to the offspring,” that is whatever goes from the parents in the zygote, and this is 
connected to the ontogeny of the offspring (the individual in question), which finally is 
connected  to  the  “phenotype  of  the  offspring”.  This  is  contrasted  with  an  image 
(representing the new, narrow view of  heredity)  in  which the arrow connects  only the 
parents with what is inherited, which here is characterized more specifically as “material” 
and this is connected with the “phenotype of the offspring”, bypassing “the black box of 
development.” The connection of the hereditary material with the remote ancestors has 
indeed been cut off by Johannsen. The hereditary material of the offspring is the result of 
the  merging  of  hereditary  material  from  the  parents,  whatever  is  the  reason  for  the 
constitution of the parental material. It is also true that what is passed on from parents to 
offspring  has  been  conceptualized  more  clearly  as  “material”  that  is  organized  in 
chromosomes. 
What concerns me here is the bypassing of development by the explanatory arrow from 
“heritable material” to the “phenotype of the offspring.” The point is that the expression 
“phenotype of the offspring” in the two diagrams actually should be taken to designate 
very different things. In the broad view diagram, it stands for thick characters as parts in 
the  sense  of  embryology,  that  is,  for  morphological  structures  that  are  conceived  as 
products  of  a  growth  process  (phenotypes-D).  In  the  narrow view diagram instead,  it 
represents characters as values of variables (phenotypes-G).
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Figure 6.1. The broad and the narrow conception of heredity. (After  
Amundsen 2005, Ch. 7, Figs. 5 and 6, 156-157.)
Characters as values are indeed caused by genes in the sense of the difference principle. 
But first, this does not imply that they are explained, because causation in this sense is not 
sufficient for proper explanation (even if “explanation” is sometimes used in this weak 
sense),  and their  explanation is  also not  a  goal  of the investigations  performed by the 
Morgan  group.  And  secondly,  development  does  not  explain  characters  as  values 
(phenotypes-G), but characters as parts as products (phenotypes-D). Therefore the arrow is 
neither an arrow of explanation, nor can it bypass development, because development does 
not lie on the way from genes to phenotypes-G. 
Instead,  it  would  be  appropriate,  to  draw  a  reverse  arrow,  connecting  the 
phenotype-G  with  the  “heritable  material,”  an  arrow  of  inference70.  Together  with 
70 It is an inference from data to phenomena, where genes are phenomena, that is, “stable, repeatable effects 
or processes that are potential objects of prediction and systematic explanation by general theories and 
which can serve as evidence for such theories,” while phenotypes are data, that is, “public records [...]  
produced by measurement and experiment, that serve as evidence for the existence of phenomena or for  
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phenotypic information about the parents, the constitution of the “heritable material” of the 
offspring can then be explained from the constitution of the “heritable material” of the 
parents.  To  come  back  to  the  cutting  away  of  the  remote  ancestors:  of  course,  the 
constitution of the genotype of the parents is somehow a result of the genotype of the 
ancestors. The reason for Johannsen to cut it off was exactly that there was no arrow of 
inference going from the observed organisms to the ancestors. This inference is possible in 
phylogenetic  analysis,  but  this  is  a  practice  with  a  different  data  set  and  inferential 
structure.  It  starts  from the  phenotype or  genotype  of  closer  or  more  distantly related 
varieties or species to infer the phenotype or genotype of remote ancestors.
So  much  for  the  historical  narrative,  but  it  should  at  this  point  be  clarified  again 
conceptually what a character as value or phenotype-G is as opposed to morphological 
parts or properties. This can probably best be achieved through a small thought experiment. 
If we get back to Bateson’s research on the combs of fowls, we can say that he gave the 
morphological interpretation of the walnut comb as showing the morphological features of 
rose and  pea combs  after  he  found  that  it  was  genetically  a  compound  character  by 
segregation analysis. His perception of form was biased by what he already knew to be a 
compound. Segregation analysis of course also requires careful morphological inspection, 
but only in order to find differences. We can now imagine a strict division of labour. One 
person  does  the  morphological  inspection,  but  does  not  give  any  morphological 
information to the second person, but only letters that indicate the differences (a notation 
that was actually used). The other person sets up the breeding regime and does all the 
their possession of certain features.” (The definitions, though exemplified with other examples are from 
Woodward 2000, S163) Woodward continues: “When data play this role they reflect the causal influence of 
the phenomena for which they are evidence but they also reflect the operation of local and idiosyncratic 
features of the measurement devices and experimental designs that produce them.” One can say that in this 
case  they reflect  environmental  influences,  but  in  virtue  of  the  way they are  represented  through the  
contrastive procedure, they refer to genes.
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genetic inference. It will be perfectly possible in this arrangement to come to the same 
conclusion, namely that walnut occurs in the presence of two factors that alone give rose 
and  pea, respectively. Inference to the constitution of the genotype does not require any 
morphological interpretation, just differences in values. This shows that in genetic analysis, 
a thin character concept is employed.
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Conclusion: Thick and Thin Characters in Developmental Genetics
What has been achieved?
The starting point for this thesis was the observation that some concept of character, trait or 
phenotype, or, even if these terms are not used, at least some form of recognition of parts 
and properties of organisms, plays a role in every branch of the life sciences and in many 
other contexts of human practice as well. A superficial look at different disciplines and 
different times in the history of biology makes clear that there are very different character 
concepts in use that play different roles and warrant different ways of decomposition of 
organisms into parts or discrimination of organismic properties. This diagnosis of plurality 
required taking a position on scientific pluralism. In Chapter 1 I have, therefore, analyzed 
philosophical accounts of the issue and found that, although pluralism became something 
like a consensus in  the philosophy of the life  sciences,  the prevailing view is  that  the 
plurality of decompositions, classifications and explanations that is found in these sciences 
is  due  to  the  complexity  of  the  living  world.  Complexity  is  construed  here  as  some 
fundamental  property  of  the  domain  that  is  studied  by  these  sciences.  I  have  argued, 
instead, that the plurality stems from the principal openness of human practice, in terms of 
how to represent, what to contrast, how to manipulate the world, and furthermore in terms 
of the ever new creation of cultural concepts that interact with empirical ones.
To describe which role characters play and how they become individuated in specific 
situations,  accordingly,  requires  some tools  to  describe  human practice  in  general  and 
scientific practice in particular. Scientific achievements, whether they are theories, models, 
explanations or taxonomies come in some semiotic form, be it linguistic text, mathematical 
formulas, images, e.g. diagrams, drawings, photographs or films, or material models of 
various kinds. Accordingly,  an account of representation was needed that is compatible 
with pluralism, can explain in which way representations are about the world and is open 
to all  kinds of semiotic forms. Furthermore,  an account of action was needed that can 
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describe representation as an activity,  that is,  describe how representations are  brought 
about and at the same time can show how action is informed by representations.
In Chapter 2 I have employed Saussure, in order to show that signs, verbal or other, 
have a systemic nature. Signifiers, the material sign-vehicles (or the impressions thereof) 
can fulfill their function in that they are different from other signifiers and the signified, 
which for Saussure is a concept, is delimited in its scope by the other concepts in a system.  
Such a view supports pluralism, because various systems can segment a conceptual space 
differently.  I  discussed  Putnam,  to  argue  for  the  necessity of  an  extensional  theory of 
meaning that construes sign-vehicles as denoting not only concepts, but also things in the 
world.  But  given  the  systemic  nature  of  signification,  these  things  should  not  be 
understood as pre-delineated. Things become individuated within the symbol system, just 
as  Saussure’s  concepts,  hence  the  systemic  interpretation  of  extensionalism  supports 
pluralism. I found in Goodman’s theory of symbols a theory that combines the systemic 
thinking  of  structuralism  (even  if  he  does  not  count  Saussure  among  his  ancestors, 
probably because of Saussure’s mentalism, or because of some socio-cultural boundaries) 
with an extensional approach. Furthermore, Goodman (like most structuralists but unlike 
Putnam)  does  not  restrict  himself  to  verbal  language,  but  develops  analytic  tools  to 
investigate all  kinds of symbol systems that include sounds,  images, diagrammatic and 
pictorial,  models,  and all  kinds  of  artifacts.  His  main  contributions  are  the  distinction 
between denotation and exemplification that allows for a description of things as symbols 
that are not sign-vehicles in the narrow sense, as well as the distinction between dense and 
articulated symbol systems.
I sketched an account of practice that fits with this view on symbol systems in Chapter  
3. That is, an account of how actions bring about symbol systems, and an account of how 
symbol systems regulate actions. Since symbol systems qua systems are coordinated sets 
of  alternatives  of  things  and labels  that  generate  the value  of  their  members  from the 
differences  between them, actions  that  act  on,  or react  to  things  must  come in sets  of 
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alternatives  as  well,  just  like the labels  that  denote things.  I  used Gibson’s  concept  of 
affordance to describe the relation between things and actions or behaviors, analogously to 
exemplification, but gave it a systemic interpretation in accord with the promoted view of 
symbol  systems.  Actions  answer  to  things  as  individuated  in  symbol  systems  and are 
themselves part of these systems.
If things appear in symbol systems, then actions that result in the recognition of things, 
as many scientific actions, must be understood to create such systems, that is, they must be 
described as introducing differences between things relative to a given realm, which is 
delimited in another system. To introduce differences, such an action, or procedure as I 
called it in order to acknowledge its complexity, must be contrastive. I showed that such 
contrastive procedures can be distinguished according to their aim and focus, according to 
whether they aim at attributing parts or properties, classify individuals or partition them as 
well as according to their interest in causal relations. They can be further distinguished 
according to their use, which is either concept forming or concept demonstrating. A special 
case that is important for the pluralism defended here is the introduction of systems by fiat.  
Once systems are established, effects, labels and behaviors can refer to things and  vice 
versa.
Finally, I argued that phenomena as represented in the material constellation brought 
about by the contrastive procedure can be interpreted as exemplifying in an articulated or 
dense symbol system, and accordingly afford different things in different situations. Most 
notably,  phenomena  exemplifying  in  a  dense  system (structures  and  processes)  afford 
further decomposition, that is internal contrast, while in an articulated exemplificational 
scheme phenomena (objects  and events)  are  taken as  units  that  can  figure  in  external 
contrasts. I spoke of thick and thin phenomena to subsume their syntactic, semantic and 
affording aspects.
Applying these analytic concepts to the case of the plurality of character concepts in 
biology,  I  was  able  to  show that,  at  least  in  the  few fields  and  periods  I  looked  at,  
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differences can be seen concerning what is contrasted (e.g. parts of organisms with other 
parts,  organisms  of  one  species  with  organisms  of  another,  organisms  with  mutated 
conspecifics). I was further able to show that in some contexts characters figure as thick 
phenomena, while in others a thin character concept is used. This observation maps on the 
distinction  provided by Colless  (discussed  in  Chapter  4),  who,  mainly speaking  about 
systematics and evolutionary biology, finds that characters are sometimes taken as parts 
and sometimes as variables that can take different values. Parts can be interpreted as thick 
concepts and the values of variables as thin concepts and these two conceptualizations are 
found  also  outside  of  systematics  and  evolutionary  biology.  In  particular,  I  found  in 
Chapter 5 that the anatomical and physiological disciplines, including embryology, a thick 
character concept is predominant, while in Chapter 6 I interpreted the history of genetics as 
a move from a thick to a thin character concept, as well as a move from characters as 
explananda to characters as data.
Mendel on my account introduced a thin character concept, but characters were still 
what was explained by his model. In the appropriation of his model by his re-discoverers  
confusion arose, because they interpreted the model in terms of thick parts. The confusion 
can  be  described  with  Goodman  as  a  lack  of  fit  of  the  character  concepts,  such  as 
Bateson’s, which therefore did not become entrenched. Johannsen analyzed the misfit and 
resolved the issue by proposing thin values of variables as the proper subject of a science 
of heredity that stand in a thin causal relation to genes that is expressed in the difference 
principle,  while  thick  parts  result  from thick  epigenetic  processes,  that  are  studied  by 
developmental  physiologists.  Johannsen  never  fully  rejected  thin  characters  as  the 
explananda of genetics, which I take to be a result of his intimate connection with practical  
contexts such as agriculture and the brewing trade, but after all, even in these contexts 
characters are not explained, but only predicted and manipulated through genes. Morgan 
and  his  followers  completed  the  move  to  a  thin  character  concept  and  relegated  thin 
characters to mere data in the investigation of gene transmission processes. They agreed 
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with Johannsen in  thinking that  thick characters were neither  caused nor explained by 
genes and were the subject of developmental biology.
Integration, Reductionism and Cellular Phenotypes in Developmental Genetics
The analytic  concepts  developed in  Part  I  should  be  useful  to  investigate  the  relevant 
contrasts and the resulting character concepts predominant in other branches of biology, 
such as phylogenetics and evolutionary ecology, as well as those in applied contexts, such 
as medicine or agriculture. Here, however, I restrict myself to pointing out that the analytic 
tools  and the  historical  results  achieved  through their  application  in  Part  II  should  be 
helpful  in  addressing  some  important  questions  about  contemporary  biology  and  its 
interpretation. The questions I have in mind concern the issues of disciplinary integration 
and reductionist strategies in modern developmental genetics in the context of functional 
genomics. 
Even though Morgan has separated genes from the explanation of thick characters, he 
did so in lack of an experimental system that allowed him to address the role of genes in 
development.  But very soon attempts were made to create an appropriate experimental 
approach and developmental  genetics  took shape.  With  the  rise  of  molecular  genetics, 
“regulation”  became  the  leading  metaphor  for  the  role  of  genes  in  development  and 
physiological processes in general, and recombinant DNA technology provided new means 
for manipulating and detecting components of molecular regulatory mechanisms. While 
regulatory pathways were successfully dissected by forward genetic screens, the study of 
gene function through the alteration of gene expression gained new significance in the light 
of the data provided by the human genome project and the accompanying sequencing of 
model organism genomes. Novel genes detected in the sequence by computational means 
could now be targeted in the organism. Whether genome sequencing is considered a tool 
for the study of development and other physiological processes, or whether developmental 
and physiological genetics are seen as serving genomics in investigating gene function is a 
matter of taste (and funding opportunities).
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In  any  case,  if  the  explananda  of  developmental  biology  are  thick  characters,  and 
genetics links genes to thin characters, how can developmental genetics bridge this gap that 
Morgan as well as contemporary embryologists expressed from either side of it? This is the 
problem of integration. How is the thin character concept of genetics integrated with the 
thick character concept of embryology? Integration in science has often been characterized 
as theoretical integration. Instead, if thick and thin concepts are characterized by different 
representational practices and afforded actions, then one shall ask how the practices that 
give rise to the different concepts are integrated.
The second issue I want to address is that of genetic reductionism71. If genes play an 
explanatory role in developmental biology and the explanandum of developmental biology 
is  still  the  outcome  of  developmental  processes,  that  is,  thick  characters,  do  genes 
ultimately explain thick characters? There are some philosophical commentators of biology 
that generate the impression that biologists give genes undue weight in the explanation of 
characters. I will argue that these authors usually do not distinguish between thick and thin 
characters and their different roles as explananda and data, respectively. Above I have also 
addressed  thick  and  thin  characters  in  the  context  of  development  and  genetics  as 
phenotypes-D and phenotypes-G, where the former refers to phenotypes as the outcome of 
a  developmental  process  (a  thick  concept),  while  the  latter  describes  phenotypes  as 
71 I use the term in a very broad way here to designate debates on the nature of the relation between genes and 
characters. Two main strands can be distinguished. There are those debates in which it  is discussed in 
which sense genes determine characters (genetic determinism). Everyone agrees that characters are the 
result of internal  and external  factors,  but  the question is if genes somehow play a special  role in the 
determination of characters. Another strand discusses the value of centring on genes on the expense of 
other factors (gene centrism), which can be supported on the grounds that genes are suitable handles for  
manipulating organisms or decried on the assumption that such a focus, if it exists, will yield a biased view 
on the organism. Often accusations of reductionism are mixed in that they claim that there is an undue 
focus on genes and it is motivated by an alleged special role of genes,  assumed by the proponents of  
reductionism (who usually are taken to implicitly have a reductionist view rather than explicitly defending  
it).
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differential values of variables that serve as data to indicate genes (a thin concept). This 
echoed a terminology employed by Lenny Moss.
Moss introduced a distinction between Gene-P and Gene-D (Moss 2003). Gene-P has its 
roots  in  classical  genetics.  It  is  defined  by the  phenotype72.  By tracing  the  hereditary 
transmission of phenotypes,  a gene associated with the phenotype can be identified.  A 
gene-P is unspecific with respect to DNA sequence, because the observed phenotype is 
mostly the result of the absence of a product derived from DNA. There are many ways this 
product can be absent, in that many modifications of the part of DNA that gives rise to the 
product can lead to a situation where the product is not or only incompletely produced, or 
where it is dysfunctional. Nevertheless, a gene-P can be located in a chromosome. And 
particular versions of the absence of the normal form of the sequence, that is particular 
alterations of the sequence at this locus, can be used to predict the phenotype, as it is done 
in genetic screening.
The sequence that gives rise to a functional product is instead a gene-D. “D” stands for 
developmental resource.  A gene-D is defined by its  sequence,  but it  is  unspecific with 
respect to the phenotype. Gene products are usually active in a great variety of tissues and 
at various times and situations in the life of an organism, and not only in the structure that  
is most affected if they are dysfunctional.
Accordingly, BRCA1 is a gene-P for breast cancer in the sense that mutations in that 
gene allow to predict breast cancer. But the sequence of normal BRCA1, the gene-D, is not 
a gene for healthy breasts, but instead is a gene only for a protein that is present in almost 
every cell in the human body and which has various cellular functions.
Moss argues that it is the conflation of these two gene concepts that gives rise to the 
idea that genes contain the information for making a phenotype, which is also expressed in 
72 In Moss text the “P” stands for preformation, because the strategy of predicting phenotypes from genes-P is 
a form of instrumental preformationism, in that it treats the trait as being determined by the gene (and thus  
as  somehow  present  in  the  gametes).  I  prefer,  however,  as  warranted  by  Moss,  to  read  the  “P”  as 
designating phenotype.
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the metaphors of „genetic programme“ and „genetic blueprint.“ It is, however, not clear 
who holds this view. It is certainly, as Moss remarks, part of public discourse about genes. 
But within science it will be hard to find researchers who express a naive and simplistic 
view on the relationship between genes and phenotypes. However, in evolutionary biology, 
a straightforward relation between genes and normal phenotypes seems to be presupposed 
sometimes.73 Another field, where straightforward relations between genes and phenotypes 
seem to  be  proposed is  in  agricultural  and epidemiological  genetics.  But  most  people 
would agree that if Moss’ distinction is applied, and these disciplines are seen as relating 
genes-P to phenotypes for pragmatic predictive rather than for explanatory purposes, the 
proposed relation is unproblematic.
Developmental  geneticists  certainly  aim  at  understanding  the  development  of  the 
phenotype  by investigating  gene  function.  The main  strategies  employed,  forward  and 
reverse genetics,  both rely on relating mutant  phenotypes  to  genes that  have lost  their 
function due to mutation or knock-out, respectively. Does this imply that researchers in 
these  disciplines  grant  a  particularly  prominent  role  to  genes  in  the  explanation  of 
characters?
Sylvia  Culp,  in  discussing  the  strategy  of  targeted  gene  knock-out,  questions  the 
assumption  that  this  strategy  can  illuminate  genotype/phenotype  relationships,  thereby 
assuming that this is what is intended. She describes the strategy as follows:
73 For instance, Maynard- Smith (2000) argues that a gene represents a trait, since it has been selected for  
because  of  its  contribution  to  the  development  of  a  trait,  which  is  an  adaptation  to  the  organism’s  
environment. The gene has a function in producing the trait, which in turn has a function in sustaining the 
live of the organism and lets it reproduce itself. A function, here, is the effect something is selected for. If 
the trait has a function, a gene responsible for that trait has a function too, even if there is no direct causal  
nexus between single genes and certain traits. It is sufficient that the gene contributes to the development of 
a trait.
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Gene targeting allows precise, predetermined changes to be made in a chosen 
gene. Once molecular biologists make this kind of change in a genotype, they 
look for change(s) in a phenotype. From these changes in a phenotype they 
infer a causal relation between genotype and phenotype (Culp 1997, S268).
Culp observes  that  studies  of that  type  frequently meet  the problem of identifying the 
changes in the phenotype. She distinguishes three situations. First, the phenotypic effect of 
the  knock-out  is  different  from the hypothesized (Culp  1997,  S272).  This  point  is  not 
relevant,  because  sometimes  loss-of-function  studies  are  performed  without  any  prior 
hypothesis concerning phenotype. It depends on how much is known beforehand about the 
gene-product. And after all hypotheses are meant to be put to test and to be rejected if 
necessary. Second, there is no phenotypic effect detectable (Culp 1997, S272-273). This 
point indeed came as a surprise to a certain extent when gene targeting was introduced. It 
seems to be often the case that the loss of function of one gene is compensated by the 
system, that is, that there is a certain amount of redundancy in genetic networks. But from 
this perspective such results actually provide important insights in the architecture of such 
genetic  networks  and  thus  rather  add  information  to  the  way genes  contribute  to  the 
phenotype than being an obstacle. If no phenotype is detectable, it is also possible that a 
more  fine-grained  screen  for  phenotypes  is  necessary.  This  leads  to  Culp’s  last  point. 
Phenotypes  might  only  be  visible  under  highly  artificial  conditions.  She  writes  “It  is 
disturbing, however, that [the scientists] could identify an unexpected phenotypic change 
only because they placed the gene-targeted mice in a particular circumstance.” (Culp 1997, 
S274)
This observation, however, points out exactly the problem with Culp’s criticism. She 
conflates  the  phenotype  as  something  that  undergoes  changes  when  a  gene  loses  its 
function, and the phenotype as the outcome of the developmental process that is explained 
only indirectly through the causal function of genes. If the knock-out of a gene has an 
effect in any structure of the organism, this does not mean that the gene in question is a 
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gene for that structure or even for the normal development of that structure. Therefore, the 
phenotype can be something as obscure as performing well in some laboratory behavioral 
test. Such a test is just a contrastive procedure, employed to identify and classify an entity 
by its  effect.  What she fails  to  distinguish properly is  the two concepts of phenotypes 
involved. One is the mutant phenotype and its wild type pendant, defined by contrast, the 
phenotypes-G. The other is the phenotype-D as the actual anatomical or physiological part 
or capacity that is the outcome of a developmental process. 
Sandra Mitchell also discusses the problem of redundancy in interpreting gene knock-out 
experiments (the lack of phenotypes due to compensation). Her point is that in robust gene 
networks, it is problematic to make causal claims on the basis of interventionist reasoning. 
But it seems that Mitchell as well does not see the phenotypes in question as thin data for 
gene interactions, but as the explanandum concerning which such experiments collect bits 
of an explanans. At least, she sees such experiments as aiming at formulating gene function 
in terms of phenotypes. She writes:
What  is  the  causal  relationship  between  genes  and  phenotypic  traits? 
Undoubtedly this is an extremely difficult question to answer, yet technological 
developments  in  genetic  engineering  continue  to  provide  new  tools  of 
intervention.
She continuous by briefly explaining what a gene knock-out is, to go on in characterizing 
the alleged conclusions drawn from such an experiment.
Differences between the normal organism and the double knockout mutant, in 
particular  the  presence  in  one  and  absence  in  the  other  of  the  expected 
phenotype, indicated the function of the normal gene. 
The logic of these experiments is typical of controlled experiments. That is, if 
the gene that  is  knocked out  is  a component  cause of the phenotypic trait, 
successfully eliminating its contribution should issue in a change in the trait. 
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The  change  reflects  the  contribution  or  function  of  the  knocked  out  gene. 
(Mitchell 2008, 700)
Developmental biologists certainly made use of the notion of a genetic program, that Moss 
criticized, but this already implies a complex interaction among genes instead of a relation 
between genes and phenotypes. The critics of gene centered explanations of phenotypes 
certainly do not accuse biologists of proposing one-one relationships between genes. They 
acknowledge that biologists are aware of the complexity of developmental process and its 
many  causal  influences,  genetic  and  environmental  (who  else  should  be  –  after  all, 
philosophers  can only know about  the complexity from the biologists).  But still,  these 
authors  seem to  claim that  biologists  present  genes  as  making causal  contributions  to 
phenotypes and thus as having some explanatory force with respect to phenotypes, or, to 
put it differently, that bringing about these phenotypes is part of the function of the gene in 
question.  Another  author  who  exemplifies  this  view  is  Jason  Scott  Robert,  who  after 
correctly pointing out that some form of simplification is a necessary heuristic in the study 
of causal factors in complex systems, characterizes developmental genetics as following 
the premises listed below (Jason Scott Robert 2002):
Genes by themselves are not causally efficacious, as genes and environments 
(at  many scales) interact (differentially,  over time) in the generation of any 
phenotypic trait. (p. 978) 
We  decide  to  focus  on  the  causal  agency  of  genes  against  a  constant 
background of other factors, for pragmatic or heuristic reasons. (p. 979)
A trait  x is  caused  by  a  gene  y only  against  a  constant  background  of 
supporting factors (conditions), without which x would not be present (even if 
y is present). (p. 979)
This  is  correct,  if  it  describes  the  way that  phenotypes-G are  conceptualized  as  valid 
indicators of genes, that is, as a description of the observation theory that guarantees the 
validity of phenotypes as data for genes and their interactions. But the author seems to 
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suggest  that  by this  reasoning biologists  present  genes  as  causes  of  phenotypes-D.  He 
continues his reconstruction of developmental geneticists’ reasoning like that:
Therefore, organismic development is a matter of gene action and activation, as 
particular  alleles  have  their  specific  phenotypic  effects  against  standard 
environmental backgrounds. (p. 980)
In  the  following,  I  will  use  as  a  last  case  study  an  example  from  recent  zebrafish 
developmental genetics74 to illustrate that thin phenotypes-G are used only to study causal 
relations among genes and that the causal relations between genes-P and phenotypes-G is 
only relevant  in the sense of  an observation theory,  just  as  in  the case of the Morgan 
school’s study of gene transmission. The observation of phenotypes-G clearly does not 
establish causal relations between genes (-P or -D) and thick phenotypes-D. Phenotypes-D, 
instead, are explained by cellular dynamics. The genes-P identified through phenotypes-G 
can be  interpreted  as  genes-D,  but  then  they lose  their  connection  with  phenotypes-P. 
Instead  they  can  enter  mechanisms  either  as  thin  objects  in  thin  causal  dependence 
relations with other genes or as thick structures, that give rise to other structures (RNA, 
proteins)  that  are  involved  in  thick  processes.  Such  mechanisms  can  contribute  to  the 
explanation of cellular dynamics. It is important to note again, that genes-D are usually 
active in all kinds of tissues, not only those related to the phenotypes-G.
There is an event that has an almost mythical character in the zebrafish community, as 
becomes apparent in the label people use to refer to it: The Big Screen. It refers to two 
coordinated large-scale  mutagenesis  screens performed in the mid-1990s (Haffter et  al. 
1996; Driever et al. 1996). Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, who already had eminent success 
with this strategy before, in studying Drosophila development, initiated the screen. While 
74 On the history of zebrafish as a model organism and the general role of model organisms in constructing  
phenomenological models of developmental mechanisms, see Meunier (unpublished manuscript).
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in the Drosophila screens, the mutants selected were limited to those affecting very early 
embryonic patterning, the zebrafish screens also targeted early development, but up to a 
stage where organs are formed in the larvae. The strategy was to screen for mutants on a 
large scale, but to select only those mutants that affect the process of interest, such that 
with  respect  to  this  process  all  relevant  genes  are  detected,  without  relying  on  any 
preceding idea concerning which genes or how many this might be. This is what is called a 
saturation  screen  for  a  specific  phenomenon,  in  this  case  embryonic  development. 
Analyzing not only the effect of the loss of function of a single gene on a phenomenon, be 
it the architecture of the nervous system or the patterning of early embryos, but instead 
identifying  all  genes  affecting  one  phenomenon  when  mutated,  allows  geneticists  to 
hypothesize  interactions  among  genes  and  thus  molecular  level  explanations.  The 
researchers reporting the screen write:
There are a number of cases where small groups of genes are responsible for 
the same or a very similar phenotype. [...] The similarities in phenotype suggest 
that the genes within the group participate in the same developmental process. 
[...]  The  molecular  analysis  of  most  of  them  has  now  complemented  the 
phenotypic analysis. In the majority of cases, genes producing similar, but not 
identical, phenotypes are participants in the same pathways and often interact. 
(Haffter et al. 1996) 
Similarity among effects here is a heuristic to construct hypotheses on the interaction of 
causes. The classification of genes by the temporal order of their activity and their effects 
on the patterning already provide a basic structure for a model of their interactions. Thus 
material collections of mutants constitute proto-models of molecular pathways.75
With  respect  to  the  heuristic  role  that  phenotypes-G  play  in  the  practice  of 
developmental genetics, it is important to notice here that they do not indicate genotype-
75 James Griesemer’s study on Joseph Grinnell makes a similar point concerning collections of appropriately 
annotated specimen of the local fauna in California as first steps towards theoretical models, in this case of 
ecological relations (Griesemer 1990). 
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phenotype  relations,  but  are  used  to  identify causal  relations  among genes by way of 
similarity of phenotypes-G that are found to have different genotypes by complementation 
analysis. It is the genetic interactions identified that figure in more complex explanations 
of phenotypes-D, but as we will see only via the phenotypes of cells that harbor them. Only 
in  that  sense  the  phenotype-G  selects  the  elements  that  figure  in  the  explanation  of 
phenotypes-D, but these are usually more phenotypes-D than those directly related to the 
phenotypes-G  in  question  (by  relation  I  mean  what  can  be  called  the  locus of  the 
phenotype-G in the organism that can be associated with a phenotype-D).
To show how models of genetic interaction and cellular dynamics are built, I will briefly 
follow one of the mutants identified in the screens:  one-eyed pinhead (oep), thus named 
because of its cyclopic phenotype.76 Different alleles of the  oep gene were identified in 
Tübingen and Boston.  The mutant  was,  as  most  others,  assigned to  several  classes  of 
mutant phenotypes, according to the different structures or processes affected at different 
stages  during  development.  oep was  described as  being  involved in  midline/notochord 
formation  (Brand  et  al.  1996,  133),  dorsal-ventral  patterning  and  brain  development 
(Schier  et  al.  1996,  168)  and  as  “affecting  morphogenesis  during  gastrulation” 
(Hammerschmidt et al. 1996, 143,145). Many of the mutant categories were motivated by 
an interest in the study of the patterning of the very early embryo, which lies at the heart of  
embryology. During gastrulation, the cells generated during the cleavage period form the 
three primary germ layers. These give rise to different tissue types and their organization 
along the embryonic axes instantiates the early body plan. 
76  According to the convention in the field, gene symbols are italicized and lower case, whereas the protein  
symbol  is  non-italic  with  the  first  letter  upper-case 
(https://wiki.zfin.org/display/general/ZFIN+Zebrafish+Nomenclature+Guidelines, accessed September 26, 
2011).
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Subsequently, the labs of Alexander Schier and William Talbot, in cooperation, published a 
study further elaborating the functions of Oep (Gritsman et al. 1999). The main result was 
that Oep is an essential component of the Nodal signalling pathway. Nodal is a signalling 
molecule  discovered  in  mouse  that  plays  a  critical  role  in  the  early patterning  of  the 
embryo. Its name is derived from the node, a region in the mouse embryo that corresponds 
to the Spemann organizer in Amphibians77. The two genes  cyc and  sqt were found to be 
orthologs of nodal in Zebrafish and their products are, therefore, collectively referred to as 
Nodal signal. A guiding observation for the experiments in question was that the phenotype 
of the double mutant for the  sqt and  cyc genes is very similar to the  oep mutant. This 
similarity and the fact that the  oep mutation affects embryonic processes associated with 
Nodal signaling, together with the knowledge that the protein is membrane associated, but 
acts cell-autonomously — i.e., that it does not transfer the mutant phenotype to cells with a 
wild type genotype, as determined by mosaic development studies — led to the hypothesis 
that “Oep is required for cells to receive Nodal signals” (Gritsman et al. 1999, 125). It  
becomes  clear  how carefully  comparing  and  relating  different  mutants  from the  large 
collection available already provided the basic outlines of a model. To test whether Oep is 
essential for Nodal signaling and where it is located in the pathway, two experiments were 
performed:78 
1) Phenotypic analysis already showed that Oep is necessary for Nodal signalling, but it  
might have been just a signal-amplifying element. In this case overexpression of the Nodal 
signal (through injection of sqt and cyc mRNA) should rescue the oep mutant phenotype or 
even lead to dorsalization (excessive growth of dorsal tissues). The result, however, was 
77 In 1924 Hans Spemann and Hilde Mangold published their experiments in newt on the induction of a 
secondary embryo in a  host  embryo upon transplantation of  cells  from a particular  region in a  donor  
embryo,  named the  organizer,  into the  host  embryo  shortly after  gastrulation  (Spemann and Mangold 
1924).
78 Though the whole study as published consisted of more experiments.
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that,  whereas  overexpression  of  these  genes,  alone  and  in  combination,  leads  to 
dorsalization  in  wild  type  embryos,  there  is  no  rescue  effect  or  even  dorsalization 
observable in  oep mutants.  The conclusion was that Oep is  indeed essential  for Nodal 
signaling during embryogenesis (Gritsman et al. 1999, 125).
2) There was evidence available that Nodal signaling in the cell is mediated by a pathway 
involving the ActRIB receptor and the Smad2 transcription factor. Another experiment then 
consisted in injecting mRNAs of the genes coding for these factors in the  oep mutants. 
Here the result was that the oep mutant phenotype was rescued. The conclusion was that 
the Nodal signal is indeed transduced by this pathway and that this requires Oep, which 
acts upstream of these components (Gritsman et al. 1999, 125).
These experiments thus “identify Oep as a novel and specific component of the Nodal 
signaling pathway” and localize it as an extracellular co-factor that is required for Nodal to 
activate  the  downstream  elements  in  the  pathway  (Gritsman  et  al.  1999,  128).  By 
integrating further mutants or reagents to the model, further elements have been added to 
the pathway (e.g. Bisgrove et al. 1999). What clearly indicates that here the phenotype is 
thin data, is that it  does not play any role for the investigation of the pathway that the 
phenotype is  cyclopic.  Indeed,  it  does  not  matter  where in  the embryo a phenotype is 
observed. Some changed expression pattern of a marker gene in earlier stages serves the 
same  purpose.  And,  as  we  will  see,  when  it  comes  to  explaining  phenotypes-D,  the 
pathway’s  contribution  to  different  processes  than  only  the  formation  of  eyes  can  be 
investigated.
Pathways  have  to  be  related  to  cellular  phenotypes,  which  in  turn  explain  broader 
developmental  or  physiological  processes.  Another  study in  which  the  Schier  lab  was 
involved illustrates how the genetic interactions investigated in the previous study are put 
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in  the context of cellular phenotypes that  figure in thick morphogenetic processes that 
enable explanations of characters as parts in developmental biology, or phenotypes-D. In 
this  case the study aims at  heart  morphogenesis,  especially concerning the asymmetric 
morphology and  position  of  the  organ (de  Campos-Baptista  2008).  The  example  also 
shows that for such an approach the same elements, involving oep mutants that have been 
used to construct the phenomenological model of the Nodal signalling pathways are now 
used to construct a model of the Nodal pathway’s role in heart organogenesis. The point is 
that  the  model  is  extended  by  adding  contrastive  tracking  procedures  that  allow  the 
researchers to represent morphogenetic processes. In particular, the model now includes 
transgeneic  animals  that  express  the  fluorescent  protein  GFP in  all cardiomyocytes 
throughout cardiac morphogenesis and in vivo 4D confocal time lapse imaging, aided by 
the appropriate analysis software. Movements of cell populations are contrasted with other 
populations by means of the  GFP marking and with cell movements in mutant animals. 
The representation is dense and taken to be open for further decomposition. The authors 
establish a scheme to analyse cellular movements when they quantify speed, displacement, 
and  meandering  of  a  cell:  “Speed  was  defined  as  distance  moved/time  interval, 
displacement  rate  as  distance  from  first  to  last  location/  entire  time  interval,  and 
meandering index as total  distance traveled/ displacement.”  (de Campos-Baptista  2008, 
3627) The analysis of processes yields sub-processes or parameters. The parameters used 
are partly established standards in studying cell dynamics, but the observation is still open 
for all kinds of peculiarities of the process. In short the process and the part it brings about 
are thick phenomena. The results are formulated like this:
Our quantitative analysis of LZoep mutants shows that loss of Nodal signalling 
affects the direction of movement of individual cardiomyocytes during early 
heart development. Anterior movement is reduced and leftwards migration is 
abolished.  In  addition,  our  results  show  that  loss  of  Nodal  signalling  also 
affects  the  speed of  cardiomyocyte  movement.  Cardiomyocytes  move more 
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slowly and meander  more,  resulting  in  strongly reduced displacement.  The 
differences between anterior/posterior, left/right, and atrial/ventricular cells are 
reduced or absent. Taken together, these results suggest that Nodal signalling 
provides a directional cue and promotes the speed of heart cells. (de Campos-
Baptista 2008, 3631)
When,  above,  I  gave  the  impression  that  mutant  phenotypes  (and  their  wild  type 
counterparts) are exclusively interpreted as thin indicators of genes and their interactions, I 
have to point out now that mutational phenotypes can also be thick phenomena. As such 
they are amenable to detailed distinctions in terms of their cellular components. Certainly, 
developmental  biologists  sometimes  pick  sub-collections  of  mutants  from a  screen  (or 
screen  only  for  specific  effects),  because  they  are  interested  in  the  affected  parts  or 
capacities as phenotypes-D, and not only in order to find out something about molecular 
pathways that actually operate in many tissues. But when mutants are interpreted as thick 
phenomena,  they  offer  information  about  cellular  processes,  not  genes.  Looking  at  a 
deformation  such  as  cyclopia,  might,  for  instance,  suggest  some  problem  with  cell 
migration at certain stages in development. This sets the cellular level explanandum that 
can be related to molecular mechanisms.
The examples show that while phenotypes-G are used to establish causal relations 
among genes, the genetic mechanisms thus established are related to cellular behaviors that 
in turn constitute thick processes that can explain thick characters (e.g. parts like the heart, 
or their structural properties such as the hearts asymmetrical structure and position). The 
link between genes and thick phenotypes must go via the cell, because we saw above that it 
is  part  of  the  thick  character  concept  that  characters  are  composed  of  cells.  And 
complementarily, Brian K. Hall calls the cell the gene’s “locus of operation” (Hall 2001, 
226). This role of cellular phenotypes mediating gene action and organismal phenotypes-D 
has not always been fully acknowledged by philosophical commentators of experiments in 
developmental  genetics  and  gene  function  studies.  The  relation  between  molecular 
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mechanisms  and  cellular  phenotypes  is  itself  not  straight-forward,  but  it  is  much  less 
remote than that between genes and organism level phenotypes. I suggest that an answer to 
the question of how molecular mechanisms can be connected to cellular phenotypes lies in 
the  flexible  character  of  mechanistic  models  with respect  to  containing  thin  and thick 
components. Some thick entities and interactions will be known while others in the vast 
network  of  interactions  are  black  boxed by thin causal  dependence relations  such that 
mechanisms including thin components can explain thick phenomena. But this idea has to 
be developed elsewhere.
Concerning the question of integration, it can be said that the thin character concept of 
genetics  has  been  integrated  with  the  thick  character  concept  of  embryology,  1)  by 
employing representational practices of both fields79 and 2) by moving from thin objects 
(phenotypes-G) to thin mechanisms (gene interactions) that do not explain these objects 
but that can successively be turned into thicker mechanisms (protein interaction can be thin 
or  thick)  and  that  can  explain  some  thick  medium  level  of  organization  (cellular 
phenotypes and the processes they are involved in), which finally have some explanatory 
power  concerning  thick  phenomena  on  the  same  level  as  the  thin  phenomena  the 
investigation started with (organismal form). This might instantiate a generalizable pattern 
that applies also to other sciences like economics and sociology, where there are similar 
conflicts between thick and thin concepts.80 This, however, is another intuition that has to 
be developed elsewhere.
79 Rheinberger describes integration as the merging (hybridization as he calls it) of experimental systems and  
their modes of representation (Rheinberger 1997, Ch. 9). And even if integration does not result in a new 
field with its own experimental system, but only consists in more cooperation between fields, this happens  
among other things through the exchange of representational practices (Griesemer 2006).
80 Indeed, the notion of thin phenomena can be traced back to Marx’ discussion of political economy (Marx  
1903) as has been pointed out to me by Staffan Müller-Wille.
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